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The Collateral Source Rule and
Personal Injury Damages: The
Irrelevant Principle and the
Functional Approach
by ROBERT ALLEN SEDLE_*
PART I**
Damages law is often thought of as static and uninteresting.
It is part of the "minutiae"' that makes up the law of remedies.
Notwithstanding that every litigated case involves a potential
question of remedies,2 most frequently damages, this area of the
law plods its way, ignored by the academicians 3 and "accepted"
by the courts. The "winds of change" sweeping over other areas
of law rarely stir the law of damages. There are a few ripples
here and there, to be sure,4 but no one gets too excited. Our
interest stops when questions of liability have been determined.
An exception is damages for personal injuries, perhaps because
suits for personal injuries comprise the great majority of litigated
cases. But here too, there is little academic interest in the
question of damages. The real debate revolves around the suit-
ability of the existing system of fault based on negligence to
deal with the problem of automobile accidents and the matter
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, BA., 1956, J.D.,
1959, University of Pittsburgh.
** Editor's Note: In view of the necessarily unusual length of this article, it
is being published in two parts. Part H will appear in the next issue of the
Kentucky Law Journal (Vol. 58, No. 2).
1 C. Wrucirr, Preface to CAsES ON REMEDms (1955).2 See Wright, The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 17 U. Dsr. L.J.
376 (1955).3It may be significant that the most current text on the subject is C.
McCoaMIcx, DAMAGES (1935).
4 Professor Harris is trying to create this with respect to seller's damages.
See e.g., Harris, A Radical Restatement of the Law of Seller's Damages, 34 FoRD.
L. REv. 23 (1965); 18 STAN. L. REv. 66 (1965); 61 MicH. L. RIxv. 849 (1963).
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of enterprise liability.5 The bulk of the writing about damages
will be found in the "trade journals" published by the compensa-
tion and defense bar. There is a gap between the practitioner's
concept of what is important and the academician's, or perhaps
the academician's concept of what is interesting.
And so it has been with the venerable collateral source rule,
which has received at least some academic commentary." When
the New York Court of Appeals, which had been one of the few
courts that refused to give the rule unqualified acceptance, re-
affirmed its position in 1962, it appeared that the rule might
again be subject to attack. However, any direct attack has
fizzled, and the position of the New York court was not followed
by other courts when faced with the identical fact situation.7
All the while a "silent revolution" has been taking place in the
practice. Defense counsel have stopped mounting a direct attack
on the rule and have been resorting to a "flanking movement"
to get evidence of benefits from a "collateral source" before the
jury. As we will see, this evidence may have the same "dynamite
potentiar' as was once attributed to the mention of liability
insurance. Today, the number and variety of collateral source
benefits are increasing, particularly as regards social insurance.
And despite the proposals for statutory solutions to the accident
problem, it is likely our present law of tort liability will remain
the primary "legal" solution for some time to come.8 For these
5 See e.g., Blum and Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law
Problem-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. Bnv. 641 (1964); Calabresi,
Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J.
261 (1965); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YAr. L.J. 499 (1961); Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An
Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HAv. L. REv. 713 (1965); Keeton,
Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HAv. L. BEv. 401 (1959); Keeton and
O'Connell, Basic Protection-A Proposal for Improving Automobile Claims, 78
HAuv. L. REv. 329 (1965).
oMaxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 MIN. L. RBv. 669 (1962); Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B. U. L.
REv. 348 (1961). Another study from the academic perspective is West, The
Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Windfall, 16 Ox.A. L. 1Ev.
395 (1963).
7 The New York case, to be discussed subsequently, was Coyne v. Campbell,
11 N.Y.2d 386, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962). C.f. Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202,
173 N.E.2d 777 (1961). Contra, are Nelson v. Federal Mogul Service, 27 Pa.
D. & C.2d 222 (1962); Odde v. Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 (R.I. 1966).8 However, because of the availability of collateral source benefits, many
victims will receive some compensation. As to the adequacy of compensation
from "legal" and "non-legal" sources, see e.g., Morris and Paul, The Financial
Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. BEv. 913 (1962).
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reasons, a further exploration of the collateral source rule may
be justified.
Tim COLLATERAL SOURCE RUiLE AND Tm SILENT REVOLTION
The collateral source rule, stated simply, is that the receipt
of benefits or mitigation of loss from sources other than the
defendant will not operate to diminish the plaintiff's recovery
of damages. One way of putting it is that "The defendant will
not be permitted to establish that the plaintiff did not actually
sustain the amount of injury alleged, if diminution resulted from
the conduct of a third person."' It is also possible to analyze
the rule as an exception to the principle that benefits to the
injured party resulting from the wrongful act are to be credited
to the defendant. There is said to be a "judicial refusal to credit
to the benefit of the wrongdoer money or services received in
reparation of the injury which emanated from sources other
than the wrongdoer."10 If A runs B down with his automobile,
but takes him to the hospital and pays the bill, B cannot recover
the cost of the hospital bill in a suit for damages against A. Since
A paid the bill, he conferred a benefit on B, which is credited
against B's judgment. Whereas if C pays B's hospital bills, this
does not operate to reduce B's recovery against A, since C is a
"collateral source."" And so this has been the traditional view
in the American law of damages.'2 Although the doctrine is
occasionally involved in other kinds of cases," its primary sig-
nificance is in the personal injury action, and we will discuss it
in that context.
The reasons for the rule are not difficult to understand when
we consider the social and economic milieu existing at the time
that the law of personal injury damages developed. The sig-
nificant period of development, of course, was the latter part of
9 Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages, 77 Hav. L. Rzv. 741 (1964).
10 Maxwell, supra note 6, at 670-71.
"1As we will see, where the government is at the same time the tortfeasor
and the payor of the benefit, some courts have seen the government qua tortfeasor
as A and qua payor as C.
12 See the discussion of the distinction between payments by a tortfeasor and
payments by a third party in C. McCoamac, supra note 3, at 324-25.
13 Genprallv regarding insurance proceeds, see the discussion in Maxwell, supra
note 6, at 672-79.
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the nineteenth century, when many suits were brought by
victims of the accidents that flowed from the process of industrial-
ization. This was the period when concepts of laissez faire,
rugged individualism, and private initiative were deeply in-
grained in our value structure. People paid their medical bills
out of private funds or savings, or a member of the family paid
for them. Recovery of such sums from the defendant was justi-
fied as recovery for "out-of-pocket" loss, and this phrase was
accurate. Those who were unable to pay were treated in the
"poor ward" of a hospital or at a "charity" hospital, where such
existed. By the same token, a person worked for his wages.
When he was injured or disabled, this meant that he lost time
from work or was unable to work again, and the concept of
recovery for "time lost" or "impairment of future earning op-
portunity" was realistic. There were no Blue Cross and Blue
Shield, health and accident insurance, sick leave, Worknen's
Compensation, and other "collateral sources" which would assist
the victim or his family in meeting some or all of the loss.14
So too, it was quite realistic to think of the defendant as a
"wrongdoer." He would be held liable only if found to be
negligent under the rather strict concepts of negligence that
existed at that time, and if the plaintiff was not barred by his
own contributory negligence, assumption of risk, the fellow-
servant rule, or one of the other liability-limiting devices de-
veloped by the courts to protect the new industrial enterprises.1 5
Furthermore, liability insurance, as we now know it, was not
generally available.'6 This being so, and in light of the prevailing
social and economic attitudes of that time, where a benefit was
received from a collateral source, it seemed perfectly proper that
the plaintiff rather than the wrongdoer should be the beneficiary.
It was accurate to say that the donor's intention was to benefit
the victim and not the wrongdoer. Poor wards and charity
hospitals were society's way of taking care of those who could
14 For the view that such benefits generally do not meet all the tangible loss
in cases of serious injury, see Morris and Paul, supra note 8, at 919-20.
15 The concern of the courts with limiting the liability of the new enterprises
is reflected in decisions such as Beattv v. Central Iowa Ry., 58 Iowa 242, 12 N.W.
332 (1882); Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, [18561 11 Excheq. 781; Winter-
bottom v. Wright, [1842] 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402.16 Dean Prosser suggests that liability insurance developed first as a means of
indemnifying employers, particularly as to liability under the early Workmen's
Compensation acts. W. Peossim, TonTs 563 (3rd ed., 1964).
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not pay for medical care, and a wrongdoer should not reap the
windfall. If the employer would give the plaintiff his wages
despite his incapacity, surely this act of generosity should not
result in reduced recovery for the object of the benevolence.1r
Of course, the social and economic setting has changed
radically. Liability insurance has long been available not only
to enterprises, but to potential individual defendants, so that
losses are no longer shifted, but distributed through insurance
or in the case of an uninsured enterprise, among the users of
the enterprise's product or services. Insurance is also available
to potential victims to cover medical expenses, loss of income
and the like, and to even make specified payments in case of
contingency. Social insurance, which in America usually takes
a form analogous to private insurance, has also become more
prevalent. Social insurance would include Workmen's Com-
pensation, unemployment compensation, social security, and a
variety of other governmental-controlled benefits. Not only does
the individual defendant or enterprise not have to bear the loss,
but the accident victim himself might receive benefits through
private or social insurance.
What is interesting is that the changed economic and social
setting did not have any effect on the collateral source rule.
Although the rule originated during a much different period of
development, the courts have almost uniformly continued to
apply it to "benefits" which were unknown at the time of its
origin. Whenever a benefit can be classified as "collateral", the
trend is to extend the application of the rule so that the receipt
of the benefit does not affect tort rcovery.'8
We may also consider the method by which recovery for
personal injuries is determined. In the United States practically
all personal injury actions are tried before a jury. In theory, if
the plaintiff proves liability the jury will then award him full
recovery for all the damages he has suffered and proved to their
satisfaction. The award of damages will not be affected by any
doubts as to the defendant's liability. If the jury finds that the
defendant is not liable, it will award the plaintiff nothing, no
17 Contra, Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).1 8 The change in "systems of reparation" is effectively summarized in CoNRAD,
MoRGAN, PRATT, VOLTZ and BOmmAUGH, AuTromonIIE ACCIDENT CosTs AND
PAYMENTS, Ch. 1 (1964).
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matter how much damage it finds that he has suffered. It will
consider each category of damages: so much for medical ex-
penses, past and future; so much for time lost from work prior
to the accident; so much for impairment of future earning
capacity; so much for pain and suffering.'9 The final verdict repre-
sents the sum total of these components.
Of course, we all know that this is not what happens, and
perhaps this is not what we want to happen. In most states
the jury returns a general verdict in which it resolves liability
and damages, and if it finds liability, it assesses damages in a
lump sum. If we expect the jury to perform as it is supposed to
do in theory, it may be asked why the jury does not first hear
all the evidence relating to liability, render a decision, and then
hear the evidence relating to damages.20 So too, it may be
asked why the jury is not required to itemize its verdict,
indicating how much it awarded for each item of damage
claimed. Every trial lawyer knows that the jury does not separate
the question of damages from the question of liability and that
the more appealing the case from the standpoint of damages,
the more likely the jury is to award some recovery. The ten-
dency of the jury to apply a "rough and ready" standard of
comparative negligence in cases it feels are appropriate is equally
notorious. The fact that the jury usually does pass on the
plaintiff's contributory negligence-and we may note the ten-
dency of courts to leave the question to the jury2 -enables us
to avoid making a decision as to the desirability of a com-
parative negligence approach.22 The judge solemnly instructs
that the plaintiff's contributory negligence is to be a complete
bar, and we then rely on the jury as the "conscience of the com-
munity" to decide whether it should be so in the particular case.
Furthermore, if Professor Kalven and his colleagues in the
jury study project are correct,23 the jury does not compute dam-
19 Here, of course, no problem of collateral source benefits is presented.
20 Some states have now adopted the "split-verdict" procedure in criminal
cases where the jury is to assess the penalty. See e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1
(West 1959).21 See the discussion in W. PRossER, supra note 16, at 430, 444.
22 To the extent that courts are extending the "last clear chance" doctrine,
the opportunity for the jury to apply its version of comparative negligence is
increased.23 Three volumes have appeared to date, but the one on the civil jury has
(Continued on next page)
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ages by ascertaining a series of component sums. Instead it
takes a "gestalt approach," putting a price tag on the particular
injury. The person who lost both legs, but made a rapid recovery
and returned to work with two artificial legs, incurring only a
few thousand dollars in "specials," will, nonetheless, receive a
substantial verdict.24 The jury may conceive of this as involving
pain and suffering,25 but it is equally probable that they are
awarding damages for the "loss of humanity," and it is doubtful
if the final amount would be much different if the plaintiff's
"specials" were substantial.2 6 So too, the jury will award sub-
stantial damages for the death of "non-productive" persons such
as retired people and young children;27 the study indicated
that many jurors feel that any human life must be worth at
least $5000.28
It is not only the institution of the jury that impels me to
call our system of awarding damages for personal injuries "crude
and inefficient." There is little difficulty measuring past medical
expenses or loss of wages where the plaintiff is a wage-earner,
and such damages are often stipulated. But the court, as well
as the jury, will have much more trouble in trying to estimate
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
not. The references to the findings of the jury study project are to Kaven, The
Jury, the Law and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 158
(1958).
24 This is the case of McNulty v. Southern Pacific Co., 96 Cal. App. 2d 841,
216 P.2d 543 (1950).
25 M. BEmLi, THE MonE ADEQUATE Aw~Ai 24 (1952).
26 See the discussion in Kalven, supra note 23, at 170. However, I would
think that where the tangible loss was more significant and the injury was not
such that the tangible loss would be "swallowed up" in the loss of humanitv, the
size of the verdict would be affected by the evidence of tangible loss. This factor
becomes significant when we consider the kind of data the jury can "absorb".
271 do not include housewives in this category, for it is now recognized that
damages for the loss of services or wrongful death of a married woman can be
"quantified". See Lambert, How Much Is a Good Wife Worth, 41 B. U. L. REgv.
328 (1961). Courts will sometimes strain to uphold the jury's verdict in the
case of non-productive persons. See e.g., Durkeep v. Mishler, 233 Ore. 243, 378
P.2d 267 (1963) (in action for wrongful death of 77 year old retiree, jury could
consider the value of his services in caring for the wife through maintenance of
the home). This does not always happen. See e.g., Herbertson v. Russell, 150
Colo. 110, 371 P.2d 422 (1962) (verdict of $25,000 for death of six year old girl
wa,; excessive, where family had little annual income, there were nine surviving
children, and the four oldest girls had married in their teens, contributing little, if
anything, to the parents' support). For an attempt to "quantify" damages for the
wrongful death of a child, see Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d
118 (1960). Some courts are now coming around to realizing that what is really
involved is the loss of society and companionship and are instructing the jury to
award damages on that basis. See Currie v. Fitting 375 Mich. 440. 134 N.E.2d
611 (1965); Lockhart v. Besel, 71 Wash.2d 112, 426 P.2d 605 (1967).2 8 Kalven, supra note 23, at 162.
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future medical expenses or the value of the lost time of a
plaintiff who was unemployed 29 or who was self-employed in an
enterprise involving capital investment.30 A determination of
impairment of future earning capacity is even more complicated.
This involves predictions as to whether the injury will worsen,
what kind of work the plaintiff can do, what kind of work will
be available, and the like, plus a guess as to his life expectancy.
And I have not even mentioned the damages for pain and suffer-
ing. When the presence of the jury is added to all this, the
picture is even more complex. Do we permit the lay jury to
have access to mortality and annuity tables?31 Will they be
permitted to consider tax aspects and the inflationary spiral?32
Can they accurately reduce recovery of loss of future earnings
and the award in a death case to present worth? And, as we
have pointed out, they do not separate the issue of liability
from the issue of damages, and probably do not divide the award
into its component parts. However, while the system is "more
crude and inefficient" because of the jury, it must be remembered
that the very method of measuring loss is in no sense scientific.
The plaintiff must recover all damages, past and prospective,
in a single action, and we are making no more than a guess-
only to some extent, an educated guess-as to what they are.
It is in the context of this system that we will be considering
the collateral source rule. This needs a word of explanation.
Because of the prevalence of collateral source benefits, it is
unrealistic to think of tort liability as the only way of shifting
or redistributing the loss resulting from accidents. In fact,
surveys have concluded that close to half of the compensation
received by accident victims comes from sources other than
tort liability settlements or judgments.33 Professor Fleming has
proposed that the collateral source rule be reconsidered from
29 See e.g., Smith v. Triplett, 83 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
30 See e.g., Dempsey v. City of Scranton, 264 Pa. 495, 107 A. 877 (1919).31 See e.g., Littman v. Bell Telephone Co. of Pa., 315 Pa. 370, 172 A. 687(1934).3 2 Compare McWeeney v. N.Y., N.H. & H fy. Co., 282 F.2d 34 (2d Cir.
1960), with Floyd v. Fruit Industries, 144 Conn. 659, 136 A.2d 918 (1957). See
also Hall v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 5 Ill.2d 135, 125 N.E.2d 77 (1955).33 See the discussion in Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Alloca-
tion in Tort Law, 54 CAIn. L. P1v. 1478, 1481-82 (1966). The most compre-
hensive study is CoNnA, MoiiGAn, PRA-t, VuLTz, and BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE
ACCmENT CosTs AND PAYmENTS (1964).
1969]
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this perspective.34 Rather than permit the victim to "cumulate
benefits," it would be decided whether accident losses generally
or a particular loss should be absorbed by the tortfeasor or a
collateral source, that is, whether the loss would be dealt with
by tort law or by private or social insurance.3 5 He concludes:
"It may be that tort liability will become only an excess or a
guarantee liability, its function being merely to allot responsibility
for compensation to a person (labelled tortfeasor) to the extent
that the cost of compensation has not been met by another
source."
36
Professor Fleming makes his point very persuasively. Clearly
tort liability is no longer the sole point of reference in determining
how particular accident losses should be absorbed. However,
I do not think-nor do I think that Professor Fleming is advocat-
ing-that an attempt at a different method of loss allocation
should be made within the framework of the present system.
We should not be thinking of how to reallocate loss until we
have dealt with the more fundamental question of providing
adequate compensation to victims of accidents in all cases. This
we do not now do. Our present system is based on what has
been called vertical splitting, under which "deserving victims"
obtain full recovery and "undeserving victims" obtain nothing
(unless from a collateral source); this is considered superior to
horizontal splitting, under which all victims, "deserving" and
"undeserving" obtain something.3 7 So long as the present system
is retained, I question the utility of dealing with the secondary
question of loss reallocation.
Moreover, it seems to me that any attempt at comprehensive
reallocation,3 8 under our present system of loss-allocation, which
34 Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54
CALF. L. REv. 1478, 1481-82 (1966).35 He lists the following criteria as significant: (1) the reprehensiveness of
the defendants conduct; (2) the desirability of attributing the cost to the loss-
causing enterprise for reasons of accident-prevention, proper cost allocation, etc.;
and (3) the function and the economic base of the particular collateral compensa-
tion regime. Id. at 1546.36 Id. at 1549.
37 Blum and Kalven, supra note 5, at 672.88 This could be accomplished in the following ways: conferring on the
collateral source a right to indemnification, by either subrogation, assignment or
an independent claim against the tortfeasor; requiring the beneficiary to return
the benefit to the collateral source; in the case of continuing benefits, such as
periodic payments, by terminating the benefits after tort damages are recovered.
Fleming, supra note 33, at 1485. We will to some extent discuss loss reallocation
in connection with social insurance.
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so far as the legal system is concerned is based on tort recovery,
requires the kind of empirical data that cannot be developed
in the context of litigation. A most important question, for
example, is whether it is worth the cost to redistribute a loss
once placed in efficient channels of distribution.39 The answer
may depend on the sources involved: perhaps there may be a
sufficient number of accident victims obtaining medical care at
a Veterans Administration Hospital so that the Veterans Ad-
ministration would wish to recover the cost from the tortfeasor,
but there may be so few people receiving Social Security dis-
ability pensions due to accidents in which there is third party
liability that the Social Security Administration is not interested
in indemnification from the tortfeasor. Obviously, these kinds of
decisions cannot be made by courts in the context of deciding
a litigated case. It is only when we have addressed ourselves
to the primary question of comprehensive compensation for the
accident victim that we should consider comprehensive re-
allocation of losses between tortfeasors and collateral sources.
My guess is that the present system of vertical rather than
horizontal splitting will remain with us for some time.4" So far
as the law is concerned, the primary source of loss-shifting in
accident cases will be the enterprise or insured individual held
responsible for the harm under the fault principle. We will
continue to award all damages in a single action, and practically
all cases of consequence will be tried before juries. Therefore,
the question with which we will be concerned is the extent to
which damages recoverable from the person held responsible
under tort law are affected by the plaintiff's receipt of benefits
from a collateral source.
We may now consider the "silent revolution" that is taking
place with respect to the collateral source rule. We have said
that at the time the rule was formulated, it reflected society's
attitude toward the receipt of collateral source benefits. Since
the defendant was truly a "wrongdoer", and since there was an
39See the discussion of the "condition of desirable equilibrium" in James,
Social In urance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27
N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 557 (1952). We will be alluding to the "condition of
equilibrium" in a number of contexts, particularly as regarls subrogation.
40 This is because neither plaintiff or defense advocates desire any change in
the present system. Liability insurance companies are opposed to change, and
there is no "pressure group" representing automobile accident victims.
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intention to benefit the plaintiff or the class of people to which
he belonged, it made perfect sense to say that the plaintiff rather
than the defendant should get whatever "windfall" resulted. It
makes no sense today, where our concepts of "wrongdoer" and
"benefit" have changed appreciably. The ordinary tort defendant
is not a moral wrongdoer. It may be an enterpirse held liable
for manufacturing or distributing a defective product. Its "fault"
is in turning out the defective product,41 and the basis of liability
is really that it is an efficient loss distributor. Most likely the
defendant will be the driver of an automobile, who is perhaps
a morally blameless, accident prone person,4 but who has been
found to be "negligent," whatever that means as applied to an
automobile accident. And his liability will be met by insurance.
The "benefits" the plaintiff has received are not likely to be
considered a "gift" from a generous soul or a society concerned
for needy victims. 43 Unless a more satisfactory explanation can
be given than "the donor did not intend to benefit the wrong-
doer," the jury cannot understand why the plaintiff should re-
cover for medical expenses he never incurred, or for lost earnings
when he received the same money he would have received if he
had not been injured. As Professor Kalven put it, "Their plaintiff
sympathy does not extend to compensating the plaintiff for a
loss which some other source has already made good.""
Moreover, the study suggests that the jury may have a
broader concept of "collateral benefits" as operating to diminish
recovery. For example, where the plaintiff was injured while a
passenger in his employer's automobile, the jury may assume
that somehow the employer will take care of him, and this will
affect the size of the verdict. Likewise the jury may assume that
adult children will take care of an injured parent.45 If this is
so, it is clear that they will be most reluctant to award com-
pensation where the loss has already been met from a collateral
source. It is said that "the average man finds the plaintiff a
more unconscionable beneficiary of windfalls than the de-
41 For the view that it is "fault", see Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products
Liability, 17 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1087-92 (1965).42 See F. HAnPaF and F. JAmvs, 2 THE LAw oF Toars § 11.4 (1956).
43 See Reich, The New Property, 73 YAiE L.J. 728, 742-46 (1964).
4 4 Kalven, supra note 23, at 169.
45 Id.
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fendant."4 I am not sure that the jury treats the question as
one of windfall. Rather the jury wants to compensate the plaintiff
fully, but does not believe that a person should take advantage
of an accident to "come out ahead." It feels that it is adequately
compensating the plaintiff by giving him what it thinks he lost
and resents what appears to be an attempt to recover twice for
a single loss. It seems clear enough that were the jury advised
of the receipt of collateral source benefits, it would reduce
recovery by that amount.
This, however, is only half of the picture. The fact that the
plaintiff has received benefits from a collateral source may
cause the jury to return a verdict for the defendant on the issue
of liability as well. We have come to realize that the presence
of insurance or the obvious financial responsibility of the de-
fendant enterprise does not necessarily mean that the jury will
return a verdict for the plaintiff. The jury in the particular
case may try to follow the judge's instructions to the letter or
may be willing to depart from them only within certain limits.
If it concludes that the defendant in an automobile accident
case was not at fault, it may return a verdict in his favor, al-
though it knows that the judgment will be paid by his insurer.
They are likely to be attuned to the "increased insurance rate"
argument, and further, they may be unwilling to jeopardize the
defendant's chances of keeping his insurance, assuming they are
also attuned to the restrictive underwriting practices of liability
insurance companies. The significance of the defendant's finan-
cial responsibility or insurance may be relevant only in cases of
doubt, that is, if the jury is in doubt as to liability, it may resolve
the doubts in favor of the plaintiff rather than the financially
responsible defendant or the insurance fund.47 It is for this
reason that the controversy over the existence of insurance may
now be academic.48
By the same token, where the plaintiff has received benefits
from a collateral source, the jury may conclude that doubts as
46 Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77
HInv. L. REv. 741, 749 (1964). To the same effect see, Peckinpaugh, An Analysis
of the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 545, 551.
47 See the discussion of this point in Kalven, supra note 23, at 171.
48 See the discussion in W. PaossEn, supra note 16, at 570-71. For a case
holding that the mention of liability insurance did not amount to prejudicial error,
see Waid v. Bergschneider, 94 Ariz. 21, 381 P.2d 568 (1963).
1969]
KENTucxY LAw JouRNALo
to liability should be resolved in favor of the defendant. The
plaintiff will not really be uncompensated, and this may seem a
satisfactory compromise to the jury. Defense counsel, at least,
is persuaded that evidence of collateral source benefits may
tip the scales in their favor, and this is the import of the "silent
resolution."49 It is not necessary from their standpoint that the
courts abolish the collateral source rule, so long as evidence that
the plaintiff has received collateral source benefits gets before
the jury. Thus, defense attorneys are trying to accomplish the
same result with respect to collateral source benefits that plaintiffs
attorneys have tried to accomplish with respect to insurance:
to get such evidence before the jury by indirection, contending
that it is relevant for other purposes such as impeachment.
Their hope is that the introduction of such evidence will cause
the jury to resolve doubtful issues of liability and damages in
the defendant's favor. In cases where they succeeded in intro-
ducing such evidence at trial, the result was effective; so effective
that most appellate courts which have passed on the question
have concluded that such evidence, like evidence that the de-
fendant is insured, necessarily amounts to prejudicial error.50
The battleground between plaintiff's counsel and defense counsel
is not over whether receipt of benefits from a collateral source
should reduce recovery, but over whether the defense may
introduce such evidence for a "subsidiary purpose."51 Let us now
consider some of the cases where such evidence was introduced.
In my opinion, the clearest example of a case where evidence
of collateral source benefits caused the jury to resolve the
liability issue in favor of the defendant is Stanziale v. Musick.5 2
The plaintiff was a passenger, along with some other women,
in an automobile which collided with the defendant's automobile.
The collision appeared to be slight, and the other women said,
in response to the defendant's inquiry after the accident, that
49 For a warning to plaintiffs counsel on this point, see Lambert, The Case
for The Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 530, 540-42.
50 But note the trend toward treating the existence of liability insurance as
immaterial. If the jury assumes that the defendant is insured, but would not
necessarily assume that the plaintiff has received collateral source benefits, it
could well be that the introduction of evidence of liability insurance would amount
to harmless error while the introduction of evidence of collateral source benefits
would amount to prejudicial error.51See note 49, supra.
52 370 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1963).
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they "weren't hurt." The plaintiff did not reply. She then asked
the defendant for his name and address "because one of the
women was pregnant." Later the plaintiff sued to recover dam-
ages for "back trouble," which she claimed resulted from the
accident. There was conflicting evidence on whether she suffered
any injury. And the evidence on the issue of liability was also
conflicting. The defendant sought to introduce evidence that
the plaintiff, who was working, had accumulated four months
sick leave, all of which she took after the accident. Defendant
also contended the plaintiff claimed "back trouble" for the pur-
pose of using up her sick leave. The court permitted the de-
fendant to introduce the evidence, and the jury returned a
verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed,
the court holding that the evidence "bore on the plaintiff's
credibility and was relevant on the issue of whether the accident
was the cause of her claimed disability." The appellate court
also referred to the "peculiar circumstances of the case," as justify-
ing a departure from the rule that evidence of benefits from a
collateral source was not admissible. The defendant had suc-
ceeded in his "flanking movement," and the result was a verdict
in his favor.
It is not difficult to conceive of the sick leave benefits in-
fluencing the jury to find in favor of the defendant. The case
was contested both on the grounds of liability and on the ex-
istence of any harm. A claim of back injury and nothing more
results in minimal jury sympathy; this is not the case of the
"battered plaintiff." The fact that the plaintiff alone claimed
some injury and that she insisted on getting the defendant's
name and address might cause the jury to suspect her of being
"litigation-minded." At this point the jury is probably ready to
find for the defendant. But then they might ask, "What if she
is telling the truth; what if she really was injured?" Now the
fact that she received four months of sick leave becomes very
significant. The jurors do not have to wrestle with their con-
sciences. As a result of the accident she received a four month
vacation with pay, so even if she was injured, she "got some-
thing." There is no need for the jury to give her any more, and
they may, with a clear conscience, return a verdict for the
defendant. The evidence of benefits from a collateral source
1969]
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may have tipped the scales and caused the jury to resolve
considerable doubts in favor of the defendant. The decision
permitting the defendant to introduce the evidence also seems
correct. There was a genuine dispute as to whether the plaintiff
suffered any injury at all, and the availability of sick leave was
most relevant on this point. But the evidence may well have
affected the jury's decision on the issue of liability, and this
case demonstrates why defense counsel are so anxious to get
this evidence before the jury.
Another case where evidence of the receipt of collateral
benefits may have influenced the jury's decision on the question
of liability is Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Company. 3 In a suit
under the Jones Act,54 an issue was raised as to whether the
plaintiff was a "seaman" and therefore entitled to maintain the
action. The defendant was permitted to introduce evidence that
the plaintiff received compensation under the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act,55 which is inapplicable
to "seamen" covered by the Jones Act. Throughout the trial
counsel for the defendant emphasized this fact, arguing that
the plaintiff did not think he was a "seaman" within the meaning
of the statute. The jury returned a finding that the plaintiff
was not a "seaman and rendered a verdict for the defendant.
It is difficult to see how the question of whether the plaintiff
thought he was a "seaman" had anything to do with whether
he, in fact, was covered by the statute. The Court of Appeals
held that the admission of the evidence was error, but treated
it as "harmless error," saying that it could only prejudice the
issue of damages and not of liability. Since the jury did not
find liability, the evidence could not have been prejudicial.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the jury was
led to place undue emphasis on the fact that the plaintiff ob-
tained benefits under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act, and that this had nothing to do with whether
he was a "seaman" within the meaning of the Jones Act. Perhaps
the jury was influenced by the plaintiffs views as to his status.
53 375 U.S. 34 (1963).
54 37 Stat. 1158 (1915), as amended 46 U.S.C. § 680 (1964).
5 544 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1964).
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What is equally probable is that the jury was reluctant to award
what it thought was double compensation, or at least, if it had
doubt about the plaintiff's status, it would resolve that issue
against him, knowing that he had already received some com-
pensation. The dangerous impact that such evidence could have
was expressly recognized by the Supreme Court, and since the
evidence could have slight relevance, if at all, its admission
was held to be reversible error.
The efforts of defense counsel to introduce such evidence
before the jury have been most ingenious. One line of attack
has been to introduce the evidence of collateral benefits osten-
sibly for the purpose of showing "malingering," that is, because
he has received benefits, the plaintiff does not return to work
when he is able to do so. The argument is that if the plaintiff
has failed to work when able, he has not mitigated damages,
and, therefore, he cannot recover for the lost time.5 6 In the
same vein it is said that the evidence is relevant to show the
absence of permanent injury; the plaintiff has claimed an injury
in order to obtain the benefits. In Eichel v. New York Central
Railroad Company,57 an injured railroad employee sued his em-
ployer under the Federal Employer's Liability Act.58 The rail-
road sought to show that the plaintiff was receiving disability
pension payments under the Railroad Retirement Act.5" It was
contended that the evidence was relevant to impeach the testi-
mony of the plaintiff as to the permanency and seriousness of
his injury, i.e., he was making his injury out to be worse than
it was in order to collect the disability pension. The evidence
was excluded in the trial court, and the jury returned a verdict
of $51,000. The Court of Appeals reversed on the issue of
damages, holding that the evidence of the receipt of the disa-
bility pension should have been admitted. The Supreme Court,
in turn, reversed the Court of Appeals, stating emphatically that
56 Failure to mitigate damages by not accepting employment arises more
frequently in cases of breach of employment contracts. See e.g., Schisler v.
Periection Milker Co., 193 Minn. 160, 258 N.W. 17 (1934). However, it would be
equally relevant where the plaintiff was trying to recover for the value of his
lost time.
573 75 U.S. 253 (1963).
5835 Stat. 65 (1909), as amended 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1964).
59 49 Stat. 967 (1935), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 228b(2)4 (1964).
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under no circumstances was evidence of disability payments
under the Railroad Retirement Act admissible in a FELA case. 0
In our view the likelihood of misuse by the jury clearly
outweighs the value of this evidence. Insofar as the evidence
bears on the issue of malingering, there will generally be
other evidence having more probative value and involving
less likelihood of prejudice than the receipt of a disability
pension.... We have recently had occasion to be reminded
that evidence of a collateral benefit is readily subject to
misuse by a jury [citing Tipton v. Socony Mobil Oil Com-
pany]. It has long been recognized that evidence showing
that the defendant is insured creates a substantial likelihood
of misuse. Similarly we must recognize that the petitioner's
receipt of collateral social insurance benefits involves a sub-
stantial likelihood of prejudicial impact ... 61
The reference to "evidence of more probative value" demon-
strates that the court is aware that the defendant's purpose in
introducing the evidence of collateral source benefits is not to
prove malingering, but to influence the jury on the issue of
liability. The analogy to insurance buttresses this conclusion.
Other courts have also emphasized that the defendant's real
purpose in introducing the evidence is not to show malingering.
For this reason evidence that the plaintiff's medical expenses
were paid by an indemnity insurer62 or that he received unem-
ployment compensation 3 has been held inadmissible despite the
contention that this would show a disposition to malinger.
Massachusetts, 64 however, has held that evidence of income from
a collateral source, e.g., sick leave, was admissible to show that
6 O justice Harlan took the position that whether to admit such evidence should
be within the trial judge's discretion. Since the trial judge disallowed it, he
favored reversal in the particular case, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion
that the evidence should necessarily be excluded.61 375 U.S. at 255.62Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 154 So.2d 297 (1963).
63 Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (1962). In that case the jury
returned a finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and the court
concluded that it could have been strongly influenced by this evidence. It cited
an earlier case, Len gle v. North Lebanon Township, 274 Pa. 51, 117 A. 403(1922), where the introduction of evidence to the effect that the beneficiaries in
a wrongful death action had received some compensation was held to be reversible
error. The court in that case observed that "No further suggestion was necessary
to Convince the jury that the township should not be asked to pay more to the
children."6 4 McElwain v. Capotosto, 332 Mass. 1, 122 N.E.2d 901 (1954).
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the alleged disability was not the reason that the plaintiff was
not working, and a federal court thought itself bound by that
case to allow evidence of receipt of income from collateral
sources to be admitted on the issue of disability! 5
Another approach has been to try to introduce evidence of
the receipts of pensions or the like as showing an inducement
for the plaintiff to retire from his employment. In Kainer v.
Walker,6 6 where the plaintiff claimed that he was forced to re-
tire because of the accident, the defendant sought to introduce
evidence of the fact that the plaintiff was receiving a veteran's
disability pension. The contention was that the evidence was
relevant to show the plaintiff might have chosen to retire even
if he had not been injured. The court stated that evidence of
the receipt of benefits from a collateral source should be excluded
"unless clearly relevant and with substantial probative value."
Since the pension was some $60 per month and the plaintiff had
been earning $7000 per year, the evidence would have had little,
if any, probative value. Obviously the defendant was trying to
influence the jury to find in his favor, or at least to reduce the
award,67 and the court was not deceived. On the other hand,
in Murray v. New York, N.H. & Hartford Railroad Company,8
the court stated that evidence of pension rights was relevant to
determine probable loss of future earnings, since the availability
of a pension could affect the age at which the plaintiff might
decide to retire. In that case the defendant failed to introduce
any evidence of what the plaintiff's rights were, so the de-
fendant's requested instruction that the jury take pension rights
into account was properly refused. Nonetheless, the fact re-
mains that the jury's determination as to probable loss of future
earnings-a difficult process at best-could not help but be in-
fluenced by the fact that the plaintiff could retire on a pension
before reaching normal retirement age, i.e., 65.69 The question
is still whether the prejudicial effect of such evidence under
65 Thompson v. Kawasalci isen, 348 F.2d 879 (1st Cir. 1965).
66 377 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1964).67 The plaintiff in that case persuaded the court that the evidence should be
heard in the absence of the jury because of the prejudicial effect it might have.
The court heard the evidence and ruled it inadmissible.
68 255 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1958).
69 We are assuming that in most cases the jury awards damages for loss of
future earning opportunity up to the time the plaintiff would regch the age of 65,
since that is when most people retire,
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the present collateral source rule is such that it should be ex-
cluded, and as we will see, the tendency is to exclude it."0
Yet another device to get evidence of Workmen's Compensa-
tion benefits before the jury was tried in Mangan v. Broderick
and Bascom Rope Company.71 The defendant was able to get
the evidence before the jury, which returned a verdict in its
favor, but the decision was reversed on appeal. The defendant's
counsel first asked the office manager of the company for which
the plaintiff worked whether the plaintiff had received Work-
men's Compensation benefits. The plaintiff's objection was
sustained, and the defendant's counsel was admonished to drop
the point. Undaunted, he then questioned the plaintiff's doctor
as to who paid the bills, and the doctor replied that the em-
ployer's insurance company had done so. This was before the
plaintiff's counsel could make his objection, and the court in-
7 0 See e.g., Capital Products v. Romer, 252 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1958);
Hume v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App.2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Rusk v. Jeffries,
110 N.J.L. 307, 164 A. 313 (Err. & App., 1933); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d
202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961). See also the criticism of Browning on the ground
that the plaintiff "gave value" for the pension. 1963 CAmBa. L.J. 37, 39-40.
However, the disability benefit may be in lieu of other benefits that the
plaintiff would have received but for the injury. In Healy v. Rennert, the plaintiff
alleged that if he had not been injured, he could have retired in two years at
half-pay. The evidence of the disability pension was introduced by the defendant
to counter the plaintiff's claim of loss. Here the jury found for the defendant,
and the court concluded that the introduction of the evidence of the disability
pension was reversible error. See the discussion, supra, note 75. Nonetheless,
since-the disability pension was, in effect, a substitute for the retirement pension,
the plaintiff should not be able to recover the lost retirement pension in addition.
Perhaps because of the posture of the case, this fact escaped the court's notice.
The same situation was involved in Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen A/S,
333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964). In a wrongful death action the plaintiff sought
recovery for half the value of pension payments her deceased husband would
have received upon retirement. She had received death benefits, which she
would not have received if he had lived. The court correctly reasoned that she
was entitled either to the death benefits or the loss of retirement benefits, but not
both. However, it was applying New York law and read Healey to hold that
damages for the loss of future benefits were recoverable without regard to the
benefits received. In such a case it seems that the claim for the future benefits
necessarily opens up the question of the present benefits. Unless the plaintiff can
show (and perhaps this could be done at the pre-trial conference) that the loss
of future benefits was greater, in which case he should be limited to the excess,
he should not be permitted to claim those benefits.
See e.g., A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Ligon, -285 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1960);
McMinn v. Thompson, 61 N.M. 387, 301 P.2d 326 (1956); Stone v. City of
Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 166, 931 P.2d 179 (1964). In all of these cases the
defendant claimed that the evidence was relevant for a subsidiary purpose, e.g.,
to show a reason for the plaintiff to take the benefit rather than work. ...
71351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965).
lNsoNx,. INjURy DA A.s
structed the jury to disregard the evidence. It chastised the
defendant's counsel, but did not order a mistrial. The judgment
in favor of the defendant was reversed on appeal, the court re-
jecting the argument that the evidence was admissible to show
bias on the part of the office manager. The tenor of the argu-
ment was that if the plaintiff recovered from the defendant,
the employer would be reimbursed for the Workmen's Compen-
sation payments. 2 This being so, the fact that the plaintiff had
received such payments was relevant to show the bias of the
office manager. The court doubted whether a low-ranldng em-
ployee would perjure himself so that the employer could obtain
reimbursement from the defendant. The probative value was
too slight to outweigh the obvious prejudicial effect, and the
evidence was excluded.
Most courts now recognize that the introduction of evidence
of collateral source benefits can affect not only the question of
damages, but the issue of liability as well. As one court put it,
"The smell of insurance or workmen's compensation must be
presumed to affect a jury adversely to a plaintiff's cause."73 This
being so, at least where the evidence does not have a high degree
of relevance, 74 its introduction necessarily amounts to reversible
error.7 Some courts still treat this as harmless error, suggesting
72 As we will see, this is required in most states.
73 Mangan v. Broderick and Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965).4
.As it did in Stanziale v. Musick, 370 S.W.2d 261 (Mo. 1963). There the
court referred to the "peculiar circumstances of the case."
7 See Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647(Alas. 1963), where the court expressly stated that the introduction of such
evidence would likely influence the jury on the issue of liability as well as damages.
See also Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961), where the
court held that evidence that the plaintiff had received a disability pension and
health insurance benefits was inadmissible and that the introduction of such
evidence amounted to reversible error. The jury had returned a verdict for the
defendant, and the court observed:
They may well have considered that the plaintiff had sustained no
damage, especially in view of the acceleration and increase in the amount
of payments of laintiff's pension, and may have decided the case on
the basis that plaintiff was not harmed rather than on the questions of
negligence and contributory negligence. Id.
Comnare Gladden v. P. Henderson Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir. 1967), where
the plaintiff, who had testified that he returned to work and failed to see his
doctor because he needed money to pay his bills, was asked on cross-examination
whether during the period when he was disabled his employer had made it
poyihle for him to receive financial assistance. The court allowed the question,
and the plaintiff answered that he bad received around $70 per week, apparently
benefits under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act. The admission of this
evidence waz held to be proper, since it waq relevant to refute the contention of
the plaintiff that he returned to work and failed to see his doctor due to economic
(Continued on next page)
KENTuCKY LAw JouRNAL
that the plaintiff must seek a corrective instruction7m but on the
whole, the prejudicial effect of such evidence has been recognized
by the courts. The "silent revolution" has not succeeded very
much more than has the frontal attack on the rule.
However, the attempts to introduce the evidence by in-
direction have been thwarted on the assumption that the
plaintiff's recovery is not affected by the receipt of benefits from
a collateral source. The fact that the jury is prejudiced by the
knowledge that the plaintiff has received collateral source bene-
fits would indicate that the collateral source rule itself conflicts
with the "conscience of the community." As pointed out previ-
ously, the concept that the benefit was intended for the plaintiff
and not the defendant makes no sense today. It still seems to
the jury that the plaintiff is being compensated twice. Perhaps
there is a more realistic way to deal with the problem of cumu-
lative recovery. If a more satisfactory rationale for cumulative
recovery were advanced, the jury might not be so hostile to the
idea; and in those situations where evidence of the receipt of a
collateral benefit could be considered by the jury, the jury
would not use this to justify to itself a denial of recovery. Cer-
tainly this makes more sense than the present pattern, where
recovery is said not to be affected by the receipt of benefits
from a collateral source, but defense counsel does try to introduce
such evidence by indirection for the "dynamite potential" it
will have on the jury. Let us first ask whether the collateral
source rule as a solution to the problem of cumulative recovery
can now be justified.
The collateral source rule is often discussed in terms of the
conflict between overcompensating the plaintiff and enabling
the defendant to reduce his liability, thereby receiving a "wind-
fall." If the plaintiff recovers the value of the benefit he has
received from the collateral source, he will have recovered twice
for the same loss; but if the defendant avoids liability, he will
not have to pay for all the harm he has caused. In the leading
case of Coyne v. Campbell,77 where the New York Court of
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
necessity. The court stressed that it was the plaintiff's testimony on direct examina-
tion which opened up the matter.7 6 Dewitz v. Columbia River Paper Co., 237 Ore. 623, 391 P.2d 613 (1964).
77 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962).
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Appeals rejected the collateral source rule as applied to a phy-
sician who had received free treatment from a colleague and
from his own nurse, Judge Desmond stated: "Diminution of
damages because medical services were furnished gratuitously
results in a windfall of sorts to a defendant but allowance of
such items although not paid for would unjustly enrich a
plaintiff."7 8
The implication is that the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff
is worse than the unjust exculpation of the defendant. Judge
Fuld, on the other hand, saw it from the plaintiff's perspective.
As he observed: "The rationale underlying the rule is that a
wrongdoer, responsible for injuring the plaintiff, should not
receive a windfall." He went on to point out that "The medical
services were supplied to help the plaintiff, not to relieve the
defendant from any part of his liability or to benefit him." To
deny recovery, he concluded, "would be unfair and illogical."79
Commentators also see the conflict between the compensatory
principle and the principle that the party responsible should
bear the full loss he has caused. 0 As one writer stated, in
analyzing the rule:
It is true, in many cases, that a double recovery is thus per-
mitted by the liberality of the courts in interpreting this rule,
but this is consistent with the view of our courts that it is
better to permit the claimant to 'accumulate his remedies'
than to grant the tort feasor the benefits of payments that
come to the plaintiff from 'collateral sources.' The wrong-
doer, the courts feel, is not entitled to such an undeserved
windfall.Sl
Thus, defense lawyers stress the need to apply the compensatory
approach,82 while plaintiff's lawyers warn that if the rule is not
applied, "the guilty rather than the innocent will benefit from
781d. at 374, 183 N.E.2d at 893.
79Id. at 375, 183 N.E.2d at 894-95.
80 See Averbach, The Collateral Source Rule, 21 OMo ST. L.J. 231, 240
(1960); West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's Wind-fall, 16 OxLA. L. RIv. 395, 413-14 (1963); Note, The Mitigating Effect of
Damages on Social Welfare Programs, 63 HARv. L. REv. 330, 331 (1949); Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HInv. L. REv.
740, 741-42 (1964).
81 Averbach, supra note 80, at 240.
82 See Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J.
545, 555.
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a windfall."83 Perhaps the problem is not all that serious, but
nonetheless many are troubled by this conflict between ideals.84
If the sole question were overcompensation of the plaintiff
as opposed to a windfall for the defendant, clearly the defense
would have the better of the argument. For, as we pointed out,
it is absurd today to think of most tort defendants as some kind
of moral wrongdoer. The defendant is simply the individual or
enterprise to whom the loss has been shifted on the basis of
some notion of "fault," and who will redistribute it either through
liability insurance or as a cost of carrying on the enterprise. It
is absurd to conceive of "punishing" the insurance fund or the
enterprise for the wrong. Even if the award of damages was
considered to have accident-deterring effect,85 it is difficult to
see how the award of damages without deducting collateral
source benefits enhances the deterrence achieved by the award
of damages in the first place.8 6 And to the extent the primary
purpose of tort law is compensation, any rule that' espouses
overcompensation must be rejected.87
Of course, the statement of the problem in these terms is not
at all realistic, for we have no way of "knowing" whether in a
given case the award overcompensates or undercompensates.
We have pointed out the difficulties inherent in determining per-
sonal injury damages, and the process of adversary litigation
that we employ with trial before a jury makes them all the more
so. Indeed, plaintiff's lawyers are concerned about the "adequate
award,"8 while the defense counsel hastens to remind us that
the personification of justice is represented by a balancing scale
rather than by a cornucopia.89 In practical operation, some
plaintiff's are overcompensated and others are undercompen-
83 Lambert, The Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 531, 543.
84 Professor Kalven says that this is a problem "to which there is no al-
together satisfactory solution." Kalven, The Juru, the Law and the Personal Injury
Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158, 169 (1958).
85See the discussion of the relationship between tort liability and the
deterrence of accident-producing conduct in F. HARP'ER and F. Ja-ss, 2 THE LAw
OF TORTS, § 12.4 (1956).86 See the discussion of this point in West, suvra note 80, at 412.87 See Tames, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. 1 Ev. 537, 546 (1952).
88 M. BELnr, THE MoRE ADEQUATE AWARD (1952).
89 1 cannot recall where I saw this phrase, but it does seem to succinctly
summarize the position of defense advocates.
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sated.0 To say, therefore, that the plaintiff is to recover "only
those damages that he actually sustained, no less than his full
damages, but no more,""1 is clearly to misstate the problem. Our
system, both in theory and practice, does not lend itself to that
kind of measurement. We do arrive at a conclusion as to what
his damages were and try to translate that conclusion into money
terms, but this is only a guess. To treat that guess as representing
scientific certainty is pure fantasy. The statement of the problem
as a conflict between overcompensation and windfall misses the
mark if it assumes that absent this problem, there would be ac-
curately-measured compensation.92 The most that can be done
is to talk in terms of probability and risk. Do we increase the
risk of overcompensation (or reduce the extent of undercom-
pensation) by excluding consideration of benefits from a col-
lateral source, or do we increase the risk of undercompensation
(or reduce the extent of overcompensation) by allowing such
benefits to be considered? Either way the risk of overcompen-
sation or undercompensation remains, because it is the system
itself that creates the problem. The question is whether we
"feed data" of collateral source benefits into the machine so as
to increase the probability of undercompensation or ignore this
factor and thereby increase the probability of overcompensation.
Even within this framework, however, proponents and op-
ponents of the rule can find justification for their positions. The
opponents would say that the jury should not consider awarding
the plaintiff certain damages, "if he did not sustain damage in
a particular area."93 This being so, recovery will necessarily be
less, and the risk of undercompensation becomes more probable
than the risk of overcompensation. The proponents, on the other
90 In this connection settlement practices must also be taken into account.
Studies indicate that the plaintiff who has sustained relatively little loss is more
likely to be overcompensated by a settlement, since it may be less expensive for
the insurer or enterprise to settle such claims for more than they are worth than
to engage in litigation. See Morris and Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile
Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913, 920-26 (1962). However, a particular plaintiff
who has suffered extensive injuries still may be overcompensated when out of
pocket loss is considered.
91 Peekinpaugh, supra note 82, at 555.
92 But this assumption is made. See e.g., West, supra note 80, at 82. "The
collateral source rule only involves allowing double recovery for an injury which
has been wholly or partially repaired."
93 Peckinpaugh, supra note 82, at 551.
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hand remind us that no personal injury award really compensates.
By definition, something like pain and suffering cannot be
quantified. Litigation is an inconvenience for which no com-
pensation is made. Awards are affected by inflation, and the
plaintiff does not obtain full recovery, because the attorney's
contingent fee must be deducted.94 Therefore, they would say,
the risk of overcompensation is to be preferred to the risk of
undercompensation. While these facts are true, the obvious reply
is that this does not furnish a rational justification for the col-
lateral source rule.95 If our method of awarding compensation
for personal injuries is inadequate, there must be a sounder solu-
tion than that of chance recovery in an individual case. If A
and B each suffer loss estimated by the jury at $50,000, and A
has received $10,000 in collateral source benefits, the rule helps
to make the award more adequate for A, but does not help B.
Moreover, while such factors do operate to reduce the plaintiff's
award, he may have been grossly overcompensated unless we
take the position that no amount is ever too much to be awarded
an injured person. The question is still whether we increase the
risk of overcompensation or increase the risk of undercompensa-
tion. The application of the collateral source rule in the cases
where such benefits have been received does not represent a
rational solution to the problem of the "adequate award."
Some commentators would deal with the problem of what
they see to be cumulative recovery by providing for reimburse-
ment or subrogation to the payor of the collateral source benefit.98
There would then be no double recovery by the plaintiff nor
windfall to the defendant. This is a deceptively simple solution,
as subsequent analysis will indicate. In the first place, this
assumes that either the plaintiff's damages have been measured
accurately, or that the item represented by the collateral source
payment has been identified. As we have said, it is absurd to
think that the plaintiff's damages have been measured with any
degree of scientific accuracy, and under a general verdict pro-
cedure the jury does not itemize damages. Suppose that a
94 See Lambert, supra note 83, at 542.
95 See James, supra note 87, at 549; West, supra note 80, at 411; Note,
Unreason in the Law of Damages, supra note 80, at 750.
96 This is the essential thesis of West, supra note 80. See also Note, Unreason
in the Law of Damages, supra note 80, at 753.
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generous donor has paid the plaintiffs bill at a convalescence
home, where he stayed following his injury. The plaintiff in-
troduces the bill, say $5000, into evidence; the defendant con-
tends that the period of convalescence was unnecessary and that
the plaintiff should not recover that sum. The jury returns a
verdict for $30,000. Perhaps the jury awarded the plaintiff that
sum and perhaps it did not. Perhaps it found that his damages
were $50,000, but that he was also at fault, and reduced his dam-
ages by 40%; thus, he would have only recovered $3000 of the
bill. The possibilities are endless. Moreover, as we will see, there
are situations where no double recovery occurs, although the
plaintiff retains the collateral source benefit and theoretically
recovers full damages. Subrogation is most relevant in the in-
surance context, and we will discuss it at that time. It is sufficient
to point out that subrogation involves a variety of considerations
relating to the marketing of insurance and the payment of in-
surance benefits. If subrogation is to take place, it must be with
reference to those considerations; and the nature of the insurance
business should not be altered for the sake of theoretical con-
sistency, that is, to avoid the conflict between double recovery
and windfall. While we have found wanting the justifications
thus far advanced for the collateral source rule as a solution to
the problem of cumulative recovery, the reimbursement-subroga-
tion approach needs a much different justification than that it
avoids the dilemma between double recovery and windfall.
Dean Maxwell, a proponent of the collateral source rule,
has advanced a rationale that avoids the "overcompensation-
windfall" dilemma, and this may be called the "orderly admin-
istration of justice" approach.9" Discussing the rule in a number
of contexts, he finds most of the results justified on this basis.
For example, as to "gratuities", he observes that: "To open to
fruitful investigation by the defense in a personal injury case
the question of the economic framework within which the needs
of the plaintiff resulting from the injury were fiunished is to
make recovery depend on how knowledgeably the plaintiff and
his benefactors set up their transaction." 98 He points out, as
9 7 Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages,
46 Mnw. L. R,. 669 (1961).
98 Id. at 688.
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we have done, the inadequacy of our present system of com-
pensation, in that it does not limit awards to strict economic
loss and at the same time guarantee such recovery. 9 He says
that if a different system were adopted, most of the problems to
which the collateral source rule applies a "rough solution"
could be eliminated. He concludes:
For the present system, however, the rule seems to perform
a needed function. At the very least, it removes some com-
plex issues from the trial scene. At its very best, in some
cases, it operates as an instrument of what most of us would
be willing to call justice.100
Perhaps this is true,' I am impressed by the "orderly admin-
istration of justice" argument, and I will have occasion to allude
to this idea further. However, I am still faced with the question
of what to do about the problem of cumulative recovery within
our present system of awarding compensation for personal in-
juries. Since I am not at all optimistic that this system will be
changed in the foreseeable future, the problem is an important
one. I cannot accept the collateral source rule as a sound solu-
tion. 02 I think we can do better. And this is the thesis of the
present writing. It is possible to deal with the question of cum-
ulative recovery without reference to the collateral source rule.
It is possible to approach the question with reference to func-
tional considerations and to determine whether the fact that
the plaintiff received a particular benefit should have any effect
of his recovery of damages in a suit for personal injuries. 03 If
it is concluded that the receipt of the benefit should affect his
recovery, we can then address ourselves to what may be called
the "procedural problem," that is, how we bring this factor into
991d. at 695.
100 Id.
'o For the same conclusion, see Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41
B.U. L. REv. 348, 363 (1961); Averbach, supra note 80, at 240.
102 This writing, therefore, will not be a study of the collateral source rule.
No attempt has been made to investigate or discuss all the cases that have dealt
with the problem of cumulative recovery. A number of cases will be cited and
discussed as illustrative, but that is as far as we will go. A rather complete
compilation of cases will be found in West, supra note 80.
103 It has been suggested that "invocation of the 'rule' has too often been a
substitute for analysis of the merits of the parties' claims." Note, Unreason in the
Law of Damages, supra note 80, at 753. Although courts have sometimes dis-
tinguished between various types of benefits, the problem usually is not approached
with reference to the particular benefit involved.
Vol. 58
PmiSONAL INjuRY DAMAGES
the system under which we award recovery. Perhaps certain
facts could be stipulated: if, for example, it is concluded that
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover certain medical expenses
from the defendant, this could be handled at the pre-trial con-
ference, and the plaintiff would be precluded from introducing
such evidence. Where the receipt of the benefit would not be
deemed to affect recovery, evidence of such benefits for any
purpose would be rigorously excluded. It might also be feasible
to deduct certain sums from the judgment in a proper case. 04
Actually, I believe that if such an approach were adopted, and
collateral source benefits were not necessarily eliminated, the
jury would understand the justification for permitting what may
seem like double recovery, and the dynamite potential would
be absent.
The collateral source rule does not represent a realistic solu-
tion to the problem of cumulative recovery. It is, therefore, an
irrelevant principle. It was developed at a time when either
the plaintiff paid for medical and hospital expenses or was the
recipient of "charity." Generally either the plaintiff worked or
he received a true "gratuity" from his employer. In an era of
Blue Cross, Medicare, sick leave, Social Security and enterprise
liability, some other solution seems necessary. Rather than
classify a benefit as "collateral' and say that, therefore, it can-
not affect recovery, we must consider the nature of the benefit,
and the economic and practical factors involved, and then con-
elude how receipt of that benefit should affect recovery of per-
sonal injury damages. We are proposing what may be called
for want of a better term, the functional approach.
ThE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
I propose to demonstrate the functional approach by a con-
sideration of three situations involving (1) the damaged doctor,
(2) the soldier retired with a disability pension, and (3) the
insured accident victim. We will be moving from African villages
04 See Chambers v. Pinson, 6 Ohio App. 2d 66, 216 N.E.2d 394 (1966),
where the court held that credit for benefits received under the medical payments
provision of an automobile insurance policy could be given by a reduction in thejudgment. Therefore, it was erroneous to instruct the jury that the plaintiff had
received such benefits. The use of the post-judgment credit avoids the possibility,
that the jury will "put the evidence of the benefit to improper use."
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to modern courts to computers and back again, but the reader
can easily follow our flight.
I. The Damaged Doctor.
The damaged doctor is the plaintiff in Coyne v. Campbell.0 5
He was "damaged" in an automobile accident which occurred
when his automobile was struck in the rear by the defendant's.
Essentially he sustained a whiplash injury. Since he was a
physician, he received medical treatment from a fellow physician
without charge. Physiotherapy treatments were given by his
nurse during regular office hours, without charge. He claimed
approximately $2200 as damages for the medical and nursing
care, but the trial court excluded any evidence on this point.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, but he was dis-
satisfied and appealed, charging error in the exclusion of the
evidence as to the reasonable value of the medical and nursing
care. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
The case reflected the conflict between overcompensation and
windfall, the majority rejecting the collateral source rule and
taking the position that the plaintiff could not recover the rea-
sonable value of the medical and nursing expenses. The dis-
senting opinion maintained that the wrongdoer-whom, you will
recall was the presumably insured010 driver of the other auto-
mobile, should not receive a windfall. Since that decision two
cases involving identical facts have arisen in other jurisdictions,
and both courts held that the value of the services was re-
coverable since "they were given to benefit the plaintiff and not
the defendant." 07
These cases were decided under our system of awarding
compensation for damages resulting from automobile accidents,
which means a suit for negligence tried before a jury. This
being so, certain limitations necessarily appear. The suit may
be prosecuted only by the accident victim, assuming he is alive,
although his injury may have caused others to suffer adverse
consequences. We think of an accident in terms of the impact
it has on the immediate victim. But, in reality, an accident should
105 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962).
108 If he had not insured, it is not likely that suit would have been brought.
107 Nelson v. Federal Mogul Service, 27 Pa. D.&C.2d 222 (1962); Odde v.
Cardi, 218 A.2d 373 CR.I. 1966).
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be viewed as a circle with the victim in the center and the effects
of the accident radiating outward like ripples in a stream. Sup-
pose all persons who were affected by the accident could present
claims for compensation. Generally our law does not allow this
to occur. A spouse may have a claim for loss of consortium, 1 8
a husband for medical expenses incurred on behalf of the wife,
and a parent for those incurred on behalf of the child; 0 9 but
others affected by the accident do not possess a cause of action.
If an accident results in the closing of a factory, the employee
who is thereby out of work cannot recover his lost wages from
the torffeasor °10 A valuable employee may be lost to the em-
ployer for months as a result of an automobile accident, but
the employer generally cannot recover for the loss. 1 In our
cases the physician and nurse would have no claim against the
defendant. All recovery is awarded to the immediate victim of
the accident, and any settlement he makes with others is not
determined by the court hearing his claim against the tortfeasor.
Suppose we are not in New York. Let us transpose our case
to an African village where the court is that of the chief, sitting
with elders under a tree.11 2 The chief is not confronted with
problems of "duty," 'limitation of liability," "procedure." He
does not rely on the "system" to produce a just and sound result.
He is the system, and the responsibility is on his shoulders.
Periodically it might be desirable for us to examine our system
and its law from the perspective of the chief trying to administer
justice under the tree. Where a rule of our system requires a
result different from the decision we would reach if we were
sitting under the tree, perhaps the rule-and possibly the system
-needs some reconsideration. At least by putting ourselves in
the position of the chief, we can strip away that which comprises
108 See generally, W. Pnossmi, ToRTs § 119 (3rd. ed. 1964).
109 Id.
110 See .g., Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200 (Ohio App.
1946).
111 See Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District v. Croydon Corp., [1957]
2 Q.B. 154 (C.A. 1956); City of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,
337 Pa. 1, 10 A.2d 434 (1940). C.f. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif.
332 U.S. 301 (1947). See generally the discussion in Maxwell, supra note 97,
at 682-86; Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALIF. L. REy. 1478, 1485-98 (1966).1 12 For a discussion of the nature of a "court" in a primitive legal system see
A. HoEHEL, THE LAW OF PRnmwE MAN 23-28 (1954). See also T. Ew.as, THE
NATunE OF AFmicAw CUsTomARY LAw 212-15 (1962).
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the trappings of the system and imposes its limitations. Coyne
v. Campbell is brought before the chief. Excuse the incongruities
that follow from transplanting the New York automobile ac-
cident to the African village.
Unencumbered by rules of real party of interest and "those
to whom a duty is owed," the chief summons all persons who
have been affected by the doctor's accident. The defendant is
there, with his insurer, ready to make any payments the chief
decrees. The doctor points to his whiplash and the neck brace
he is wearing. The chief directs that the defendant shall pay
the cost of the neck brace and a sum of money to compensate
the doctor for past, present and future pain and suffering. The
plaintiff missed a week of work. He is a doctor, and his time is
very expensive. Since the tortfeasor "takes his victim as he
finds him,"-"3 it was unfortunate the defendant is a doctor. The
doctor is compensated for the value of his lost time. If the
plaintiff were less affluent, the lost income could have had an
adverse effect on his family. Even so, this can be taken care of
by awarding the plaintiff the lost income, and it is assumed that
he will take care of his family as he would have done if he
had not been injured.
At this point the persons who had appointments with the
plaintiff during the period in which he was incapacitated come
forward and complain that they were forced to postpone their
appointments or consult another doctor. The New York court
would say that this interest is not substantial and that, in any
event, the defendant owed no "duty" to them. I think our chief
could agree that this interest was not important enough to
justify awarding damages; "inconvenience" is not the kind of
thing for which a legal system would grant compensation.
The doctor then tells about his medical treatment and
physiotherapy. The chief gives this claim short shrift by saying,
"You didn't pay anything for this treatment, so, of course, you
can't recover. You didn't pay the doctor, and your nurse wasn't
paid anything above her regular salary. Let me hear from those
who rendered the services." Note how the chiefs judgment
113 This is usually thought of in terms of the plaintiff's phyical condition, as
in the case of the "thin-skulled man." See Dulieu v. White, [1901] 2 K.B. 669,
679. But the principle is equally applicable to the plaintiff's economic condition,
and it is "cheaper" to hit a rich man than a poor one.
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differs from that of the court in Coyne v. Campbell. Both the
court and the chief agree that the plaintiff should not recover
the value of these services, because he did not pay anything for
them. But once the court arrived at that decision, the matter
of the claim for these services was at an end. The only party
who had a "legal right" to make the claim, and who, under the
rules of procedure, could bring suit against the defendant, was
not entitled to recover. The chief, however, can call the people
who actually rendered the services and permit them to make
the claim. When he questions the nurse, she answers that she
performed the services during her normal working hours. The
chief concludes that there is no reason to award her anything,
since she was ifot adversely affected by the accident her em-
ployer suffered. She does not have to be paid for treatments she
gave her employer during working hours. The physician has
treated the plaintiff and argues that the defendant should pay
for such treatment, since it was his fault that it was necessary.
There appears to be some justice in this claim. But when the
chief reflects a moment, he angrily dismisses the physician. "You
people have an arrangement by which you treat each other
without charge. You treated the plaintiff today; he or someone
else will treat you or your family tomorrow. You doctors can't
'suffer" damages for medical services, because by the nature of
your profession you get (and give) free services. Just because
there's a tort doesn't mean that you should be paid for the
services rendered a colleague."
And now we come back to New York, refreshed by our
excursion, and perhaps we see Coyne v. Campbell in a different
light. If the tortfeasor "takes his victim as he finds him," this
should work both ways. Where the plaintiff was a physician,
the defendant and his insurer will have to pay higher damages
for the plaintiff's lost time. But he will not be liable for medical
expenses, because his victim gets those services free. No one
lost anything by the nurse's giving the physiotherapy treatment.
The real question revolves around the services of the other
physician. The short answer is that the physician cannot re-
cover for those services, since the system doesn't allow it. We
could let the plaintiff recover as his representative, assuming
he would then reimburse the physician for the value of his time.
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But there is a serious question whether, in accordance with
medical ethics, he could accept payment from the plaintiff;11.
and, in any event, it is not likely that he would do so. The
more telling reason to me is that the doctors treat each other
without charge. They are not likely to alter this practice so
that there can be occasional recovery against a torifeasor. There-
fore, the doctor plaintiff does not need to recover damages for
medical expenses, which, by virtue of his profession, he does
not incur. When viewed from the functional approach, the re-
sult in Coyne v. Campbell is correct.
Let us now vary the facts. An old derelict is run over by
an automobile. A crowd gathers, and someone calls out, "Get
a doctor." A doctor appears, and the derelict begs, "Doctor,
please help me." The doctor does so, and in fact, saves his
life. A lawyer also was in the crowd, and when the derelict is
released from the hospital, he files suit against the tortfeasor.
There is no doubt that as part of his damages he can recover
the value of the doctor's services. By requesting (or accepting)
the doctor's assistance, he impliedly promised to pay the rea-
sonable value of those services and so became "legally obligated."
Since he had an obligation to pay for the services, their reasonable
value is treated as an "out-of-pocket" loss.
Suppose, however, that what the derelict says is, "Doctor,
don't waste your time with me, I can never pay you anything."
The doctor, as I believe most would, brushes this aside, saying
sincerely, "I don't care about money now, I want to try and save
your life." The doctor succeeds, and again the derelict sues
the tortfeasor. This case is different, since the services were
rendered "gratuitously." If the court follows the collateral source
rule, the plaintiff can recover, because "the services were rendered
for his benefit and not for the benefit of the wrongdoer.""'; But
if it rejects the collateral source rule, and holds that the plaintiff
can recover only for "sums expended or obligations incurred,"
recovery would be denied, as these services were rendered
"gratuitously."
114 As I understand it, a physician will not accept compensation from another
physician (apart from psychiatrists) for treating him or a member of his family.
I do not believe, however, that there is a formal "canon of ethics" to this effect
It is customary to give a substantial gift to the physician who donated his services.
115 See Dablin v. Kron, 232 Minn. 312, 45 N.W.2d 833 (1950).
Vol. 58
PERSONAL INjEY DAmAc s
If these cases came before our African chief, who is not
sophisticated in the distinctions between binding obligations and
gratuitous services-which, in our examples, depend on whether
the injured person cried out, "Doctor, please help me," or whether,
conscious of his poverty, he told the doctor he couldn't pay-he
would see the cases as identical. He would say to the doctor,
"My boy, you have performed well, and we are proud of you,"
and to the defendant, "Pay the doctor the reasonable value of his
services." Certainly we would agree that the doctor should be
paid. But our system does not allow the doctor to make a claim
against the tortfeasor."( If we give recovery to the plaintiff and
depend on him to pay the physician, I wonder if he is any more
or less likely to pay in the "gratuity" situation than in the "legal
obligation" situation. In any event, the only possibility that
the physician treating the derelict has of recovering his fee is
to allow the plaintiff to recover it from the tortfeasor. The system
under which we operate prevents us from making the tortfeasor
pay the physician's fee. So, most courts will allow the plaintiff
to recover the value of his services and hope that he will pay
the physician. They think that they lack the machinery in the
personal injury suit to insure that the physician will receive his
fee.
But do they? Any court has the power to issue a conditional
decree, whether the action is historically "legal" or "equitable."1 7
These decrees have been issued to protect third parties or the
public.11 8 Where medical services have been rendered "gratu-
itously," the court can direct the plaintiff to pay the physician
a reasonable fee out of the judgment. English courts, which, it
must be remembered, assess the damages in personal injury cases,
have included a direction to repay in their judgments. In Dennis
v. London Passenger Transport Board,"9 the accident victim had
received a pension from the Ministry of Pensions and sick pay
from his employer, a municipal council. The defendant argued
that the verdict should be reduced by those amounts, since the
116 Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
117 See Sedler, Conditional, Experimental and Substitutional Relief, 16
RuTErns L. REV. 639, 714-15 (1962).
118 See Medical Fabrics Co. v. D. C. McLintock Co., 12 N.J. Super 177 79
A.2d 313 (App. Div. 1951); Hartman v. Cohen, 350 Pa. 41, 38 A.2d 22 (19445.
19 [1948] 1 All E.R. 779 (K.B.).
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plaintiff was not legally required to reimburse the Ministry and
his employer. However, the court found that reimbursement was
"expected." It, therefore, permitted full recovery subject to a
direction to reimburse. So too, in Schneider v. Eisovitch,2 0 the
plaintiff was permitted to recover the cost of bringing her hus-
band's body back to England notwithstanding that the expenses
were paid by friends. She was required to state that she would
pay the money to the donors. A direction to repay would avoid
the dilemma of overcompensation versus windfall, and some
commentators have advocated this solution for gratuity cases.12'
Even where juries render the verdict, the court could include a
direction to repay the sum admittedly expended. It would then
be up to the donor to decide whether he wanted to accept it.
As a practical matter, if this procedure were followed, defense
counsel would not find it advantageous to raise the question.
His interest is in reducing recovery and not in the distribution
of the judgment.
The point is that where the plaintiff recovers for "gratuitous"
services rendered by a physician, the recovery may be justified
on the ground that the plaintiff is really recovering as the "repre-
sentative" of the physician. This may be the only practical way
the physician will be paid. If the court were really concerned
about protecting the physician, it could issue a direction to
repay. Moreover, "gratuitous" is a relative concept. The under-
standing between the plaintiff and the physician may be that if
the plaintiff recovers a judgment from the tortfeasor, he is ex-
pected to make payment. Or, suppose that the plaintiff is a
relative of the physician, and the physician has always treated
him free of charge. If the plaintiff is involved in an accident,
it still does not seem unfair to require the torifeasor to com-
pensate the physician, and this is done by permitting the plain-
tiff to recover the value of his services. Unlike the physician
who rendered the services in Coyne v. Campbell, the physician
in the last example does not receive free treatment from the
plaintiff in return. Where the plaintiff has not suffered out-of-
pocket loss, but still seeks recovery, the proper question may
120 [1960] 2 W. L.R. 169 (Q.B.).121 See West supra note 80, at 414; Ganz, Mitigation of Damages by Benefits
Received, 25 MOD. L. REv. 559, 568 (1962).
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be whether the plaintiff is really recovering on behalf of someone
who cannot sue in his own right. If this is so, and the plaintiff
is the "appropriate representative" of the person who is really
entitled to be compensated, the recovery is justified.
By going to the African village we have succeeded in
eliminating the collateral source rule in the case of the damaged
doctor. Now let us leave the primitive for the most modern-
the world of computers-and consider the case of the soldier who
has been retired with a disability pension.
II. The Retired Soldier and His Disability Pension.
An American serviceman, stationed in England, was seriously
injured in an automobile accident while on duty. His arm had
to be amputated, and he ceased to be of value to the military.
Since he was injured in the line of duty and forced to retire
from the service as a result of those injuries, a grateful govern-
ment will provide him with a pension for the rest of his life.122
When he brought suit against the tortfeasor in England, the
defendant contended that his pension should be considered in
determining the damages for loss of future earnings. The trial
court refused to take the pension into account, and awarded
damages of £25,000. In Browning v. The War Office,123 the
Court of Appeal held that the disability pension had to be con-
sidered, and reduced the award to £14,000. English courts rely
heavily on precedent,12 so it is useful to consider the precedents
that faced the Court of Appeal. Traditionally the insurance
proceeds would not operate to reduce recovery, 25 since the plain-
tiff "had bought the insurance benefits with his own money."' 26
So too, the award in the personal injury action would not be
affected by charitable gifts, 27 nor by the receipt of sums of
money which the plaintiff was obligated or had undertaken to
122 70A Stat. 91 (1956), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 1201 (1964).
123 [1963] 1 Q.B. 750 (C.A. 1962).
124 The House of Lords has only recently held that it has the power to depart
from prior holdings. See Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [19661 3 All
E.R. 77, and Dias, Precedents in the Home of Lords-A Much Needed Reform,
1966 Cwm3. LJ. 153.
125 See Bradburn v. Great Western Railway Co., [18741 L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (C.A.).
12 6 Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759 (C.A. 1962).
127 Peacock v. Amusement Equipment Co., [1954] 2 Q.B. 347 (C.A.). See
the discussion in Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759 (C.A. 1962).
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repay.128 On the other hand, where the plaintiff had received
pay "as of right," he could not recover for the value of lost time
during the period for which he was paid; this would include
sick leave and what the English call "half-pay." 9 English courts
do not approach the problem of cumulative recovery via the
collateral source rule. Each "benefit" is considered separately,
and in accordance with certain criteria, the court decides whether
it should affect the recovery of damages. The question was into
what category a disability pension fell.
If the plaintiff had died, recovery in the wrongful death
action would not have been affected by the pension. This is
specifically provided in the Fatal Accidents Act of 1959.130 And
as will be seen, specific provision is also made for social insurance
benefits in the personal injury action. 3' However, the matter
of pensions as affecting recovery in a personal injury action is
not regulated by statute, and, therefore, will depend on judicial
determination. The court in Browning was faced with Payne v.
Railway Executive, 32 which involved a British serviceman who
received a pension following his discharge from service as a
result of the accident. The nature of the pension differed sub-
stantially from that paid to the American serviceman, since the
Minister of Pensions had the power to reduce or withhold the
pension where the recipient also recovered damages against a
torffeasor who caused the injury. The Court of Appeal unani-
mously held that the pension should not be deducted from the
award. Cohen, L.J., based his decision on the ground that the
accident was not the causa causans of the receipt of the pension;
the causa causans was the plaintiff's service in the Royal Navy,
and the accident was the sine qua non, Singleton, L.J., dis-
cussed the relationship between the pension rights and the pay
of the serviceman-to which we will allude shortly-but based
his decision on the ground that the Minister could reduce the
pension if there was recovery from a tortfeasor. In actual practice,
1 28 See the discussion in Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759
(C.A. 1962).
129 Id. See Receiver for the Metropolitan Police District v. Croydon Corp.,
[19571 2 Q.B. 154 (C.A. 1956).
130 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 65.
131 See also the discussion in Ganz, Mitigation of Damages by Benelits Re-
ceived, 25 MOD. L. REv. 559, 566 (1962).
132 [1952] 1 K.B. 26 (C.A. 1951).
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the Minister reduced disability pensions by the annuity value
of 25o of the total damages recovered from the tortfeasor.
In Browning, Denning, M.R., disposed of Payne by adopting
the rationale in Singleton's opinion. If he had adopted the
rationale of Cohen's opinion, Browning could not have been dis-
tinguished, because here too the accident was not the causa
causans of the receipt of the disability pension. Browning dif-
fered from Payne because in Browning the pension could not be
affected by recovery against the torifeasor, while in Payne the
pension was reduced by such recovery. As Denning saw it, the
plaintiff in Browning could not have received the disability pen-
sion and his salary if he had remained in service. Since he was
seeldng recovery for the loss of future earning opportunity, i.e.,
his pay if he had remained in service, the amount of the disabil-
ity pension-which he would not have received had he been re-
ceiving pay-would have to be deducted from the award. By
adopting the rationale of Singletons opinion in Payne, he was
able to rid himself of that troublesome precedent. 33 Diplock,
L.J., agreed with Denning, saying that the matter was one of
simple arithmetic: the plaintiff recovers the difference between
what he would have received had he not been injured and what
he will receive following the injury. If he had not been injured,
he would have received his salary for the period in which he
remained in service; since he was injured and forced to retire,
he receives a disability pension rather than the salary. He,
therefore, would be entitled to recover from the tortfeasor the
difference between the salary and disability pension he will
receive now that he is retired (to be strictly accurate, he recovers
the difference between the amount he would have earned, con-
sidering possible salary increases, less what he may be expected
to earn despite his disability, if anything, and less the disability
pension-which is not a matter of simple arithmetic). Donovan,
L.f., dissented, saying that the case was indistinguishable from
Payne and that the rationale of Payne, as he saw it, was not
affected by Singleton's "additional reason." He also brought
in the collateral source doctrine, pointing out that money pay-
able from a collateral source is not "compensation" for the tort.
13 3 He concluded that it was open to the court to accept that ground as
having binding effect and to discard the other. [19631 1 Q.B. at 760,
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And, like Singleton in Payne, he discussed the relationship be-
tween pension rights and serviceman's pay.
Denning, then, saw the following categories of benefits and
their effect on tort recovery:
(1) proceeds of insurance policies for which the plaintiff
had given value-no deduction;
(2) true gratuities-no deduction;
(3) sums of money which the plaintiff is under an obligation
or has undertaken to repay-no deduction;
(4) sums which the plaintiff receives as of right such as
continuation of wages during disability under sick leave
or "half-pay" arrangements,' 34 and disability pensions
that would not be reduced because of tort recovery-
deduction.
He was also unwilling to rest the decision on the analogies
either to insurance, which would argue against a deduction, or
sick leave, which would argue in favor of a deduction. 35 The
test was whether the plaintiff was being compensated twice for
the same loss: since he would not have received both the dis-
ability pension and his salary had he stayed in the service, the
disability pension had to be deducted from the award for loss
of future earning opportunity.
Now let us consider the problem under the functional ap-
proach. Rejecting the collateral source rule, as we do, and
certainly rejecting distinctions depending on whether the ac-
cident was the causa causans of the benefit, is Lord Denning's
reasoning persuasive? I think not. Of course, the plaintiff would
not have received both his salary and the disability pension.
But another question remains to be answered: why he did
receive the pension? Probably the answer is that our societal
values demand that a person injured "in the line of duty" re-
ceive a government pension. We are thinking of the person
wounded in battle or the like, but one injured in an automobile
134 In Browning the plaintiff did not seek to recover the value of his wages
paid during the period of disability. As the subsequent discussion will indicate,
the rationale under which we justify the recovery of loss of future earning op-
portunity without regard to the disability pension would also justify recovery for
the value of his lost time during the period of disability notwithstanding that his
salary was continued.
135 [1963] 1 Q.B. at 760-61.
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accident "in the line of duty" is also included in the statute.
This reason does not help our analysis. We are looking for a
reason translatable into economic terms affecting the question
of cumulative recovery.
Suppose a young man contemplating a military career con-
suits the recruiting officer and is told, among other things, that
he can retire at half-pay after twenty years, and that if he is
ever forced to retire because of disability incurred in the line of
duty, he will receive a generous pension. He is told of all the
other "fringe benefits." There is no doubt that the availability
of these benefits cushions his shock when he is told of the low
salary. The assumption may then be made that a serviceman
or other public servant exposed to hazardous duty receives the
guarantee of a disability pension 36 as part of his total compensa-
tion picture, and that if it were not for the possibility of a pension
and other fringe benefits, he would receive a higher salary. In
Payne, Singleton observed that the fact that a person in the Navy
receives a pension is a factor which enters into the question of
pay, and in the absence of pension rights, "it is reasonable to
assume that the pay would be higher."1 37 In Browning, Donovan,
dissenting, stressed that the plaintiff "earned" his pension by
taking less salary, and drew an analogy to insurance premiums:
the difference between the salary as it was with the pension
rights included and what it would have been if there were no
pension rights was the equivalent of the payment of premiums
of insurance.18
The insurance analogy may appear more clearly in a case
where the employee has actually made a contribution to a fund
from which the disability pension is paid. Such a case was Judd
v. Hammersmith, Etc. Hospitals Board,139 decided by Queen's
Bench. The plaintiff was employed by a municipal council and
was required to make contributions from his salary to a pension
fund, which were matched by the employer. He was permanently
disabled as a result of an accident and forced to retire on a
136 Whereas in the case of private employment, disability pensions are
generally absent. The disabled employee may receive 'Workmen's Compensation
benefits, which ar roperly considered social insurance, and which, therefore,
do not form a part of his total compensation picture.
137 Pavne v. Railway Executive, [1952] 1 K.B. 26, 40 (C.A. 1951).
138 [19631 1 Q.B. at 763-64.
139 [1960] 1 Weekly L.R. 328 (Q.B.).
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pension, seven years before retirement age. In his suit the de-
fendant admitted that there should not be a deduction for the
value of the pension represented by the plaintiff's contribution,
but argued that that portion representing the employer's con-
tribution should be deducted. The court rejected the conten-
tion, although the decision in Browning would indicate that in
the future a court would have to do this very thing. The court
found no distinction between that portion represented by the
employee's and employer's contribution because:
As everybody knows, in a contributory pension scheme,
whilst the employee makes a contribution and the employer-
in this case the council-makes one, the amount which the
employer contributes has to come from somewhere, and when
there is a scheme of this sort in operation, it would seem, as
a matter of common sense, that wages or the salary paid
would have to take into account and reflect the contributions
made by the employer, at all events in some degree; it is not
just a case of the employee paying so much and the employer
paying so much, because it is almost bound to be that the
actual wages, or salary, paid would be very likely less than
the notional sum which the employee might get if there were
no such scheme in operation.140
The court, however, did not base its decision on this ground,
but on the authority of Payne.
The reasoning that the employee receives less salary because
of a pension finds its way into American cases contrary to
Browning, although the decision rationale is usually the col-
lateral source rule. In Hume v. Lacey,'14 which involved the
same factual situation, a California appellate court held that
the disability pension would not affect the recovery of damages.
Although basing its decision on the collateral source rule, it went
on to say:
It may be observed that there is a valid reason for not giving
the wrongdoer any benefit from pension rights with which he
had nothing to do. They were previously acquired by the
injured party, were paid for by him in some manner, and the
140 Id. at 330.
141 112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952).
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fact that he had other property in the nature of a pension
right may logically be held immaterial. (Emphasis added.) 142
In Beaulieu v. Elliot,43 which involved both a disability pension
and wages that were continued from the time of injury to the
time of discharge, it was observed:
By entering the military service, Elliot in effect agreed to
perform certain duties and functions in exchange for certain
benefits to be given him by the government. One of those
benefits was that he was to receive military pay and allow-
ances during periods of physical incapacity from performing
his duties. This was in the nature of a contractual agreement
between Elliot and the government when he became a mem-
ber of the armed forces, and which he may have paid for
by accepting wages lower than those he might have obtained
from the performance of like duties in civilian life. (Emphasis
added.)144
In the case of a contributory scheme by police and firemen, one
court drew the analogy to a system of "forced insurance" and
held that the receipt of the disability pension would not affect
tort recovery1 45 The fact that the plaintiff "gave value" for the
disability pension by taking less salary was completely ignored
by the court's majority in Browning.
Let us examine the matter of "giving value" more carefully.
Ignoring employee contributions-which we may liken to in-
surance premiums-let us assume that the entire cost of the
pension is borne by the employer. In Judd v. Hammersmith the
court supposed a fixed sum to be available for payment to the
employee as part of a "package. 1 46 Suppose that this sum is
$5,000 and that $500 per year is allocated to "pension and dis-
ability." The employee starts to work at age 30, and we will
assume (because our mathematics is weak) that he would re-
42 Id. at 151, 245 P.2d at 675-76.
143 434 P.2d 665 (Alas. 1967).
'44 434 P.2d at 673-74. See also Young v. Warr, S.C. , 165 S.E.2d 797
(1969).145Rusk v. Jeffries, 110 N.J.L. 307, 164 A. 313 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
See also Capital Products v. Romer, 252 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1958).146 That this is realistic is demonstrated by the "package" concept found in
collective bargaining agreements.
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ceive the same salary until he retired at age 65. At that time,
or whenever he is permanently and totally disabled, he will
receive a pension of $100 per month. He has been advised of
this at the beginning of his employment. He thus receives a
salary of $4,500 per year, and at the end of twenty years it can
be said that his pension rights have "cost" him $10,000 in gross
salary (to determine actual cost, we would have to deduct
income taxes and decide whether he would have spent the
extra money or kept it, in which case we would have to add
interest). As a result of an automobile accident, he is per-
manently and totally disabled at age 50. In a suit against the
tortfeasor, he recovers his salary of $4,500 for the fifteen years
until retirement (it is reduced to present worth, of course, but
we will deal only with gross figures), which amounts to $67,500.147
He will be receiving a disability pension in lieu of salary for
those fifteen years, which comes to $18,000. The court in Brown-
ing held that this sum would have to be deducted from his
recovery, so if we deducted this amount, that would leave an
award of $49,500. In order to secure this pension of $18,000,
he had to actually relinquish some $10,000 in salary. His gain
from the disability pension, therefore, is $8,000 rather than
$18,000.
The plaintiff would have had to take less salary even if he
had not been injured. 4 But it is the defendant asserting that the
pension should operate to reduce recovery and prevent over-
compensation. He is not overcompensated if the award is re-
duced by his "net gain," that is, the difference between the
amount of the disability pension and the amount of reduced
salary. Since it is the defendant who is seeking the deduction,
the plaintiff's salary reduction, even if he did not receive the
benefit, is irrelevant. It is equally correct to observe that if the
accident had never happened, the plaintiff would not have needed
the pension. If we are going to look at the total economic
picture in order to determine the plaintiff's actual loss, we must
consider (1) lost salary, (2) benefits accruing because of the
injury, and (3) what the plaintiff gave up in order to obtain
147 We are also, for purposes of this example, assuming that income tax
savings will not be considered.
'
48 Ganz, supra note 121, at 565.
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those benefits. The award should equal the difference between
(1) and the excess of (2) over (3). If this is done, the plaintiff
is put in the same position as he would have been if there had
never been an accident and he had not received the pension.
In Browning the court considered factors (1) and (2), awarding
the plaintiff the difference between (1) and (2), but completely
ignored factor (3).
This may be because the example I posed did not correspond
to the state of facts presented in Browning and probably repre-
sents an impossible factual situation. The problem is how to
assign a specific sum of money as the pension "cost:' and even
more importantly, how to assign a sum of money as the cost
of the disability portion. We are familiar with the "packages"
in collective bargaining plans: so much for wages, so much for
sick leave benefits, so much for retirement, and so on. Even
then, it may be asked how effectively we can allocate the value
of a disability pension paid only in case of contingency. When
applied to military personnel, the matter is much more complex.
The pay structure may be such that the value of all fringe bene-
fits exceeds the value of the salary. The theory of military service
is that the serviceman-historically without dependents-has all
his needs supplied and his salary only represents "pocket money".
The theory remains the same, but now military men have de-
pendents and American affluence has forced military salaries up-
ward. Where there are dependents, extra allowances are pro-
vided, and the dependents are eligible for fringe benefits. The
serviceman's salary is planned to reflect early retirement at half-
pay, free medical care for himself and his dependents, quarters
allowances or free housing, and post exchange privileges. Indeed,
if we wanted to be completely scientific, the military plaintiff
who is forced to retire should also recover the value of the fringe
benefits lost while he is recovering for loss of future earnings.
It is accurate to assume that if the military pay structure were
organized on the same basis as private industry or even other
public employment, salaries would be substantially higher. Per-
haps we could determine with a small computer how much higher
salaries would be if there were no fringe benefits.149 It would,
149But query, since military pay scales and benefits are determined by
Congress, can the question be approached in purely economic terms?
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however, take a most sensitive computer to assign a specific
value to the disability pension.
It may be contended that the pension's value and cost in
terms of reduced pay is very little. On the other hand, the total
value of the fringe benefits is very significant. The serviceman
accepts less pay because of the security embodied in fringe bene-
fits, one aspect of which is a disability pension in case of injury.
If we had a very good computer, we might be able to answer
questions such as these:
(1) What would be the difference in pay if the military did
not offer fringe benefits?
(2) What portion of this difference can be assigned to the
disability pension?
(3) What is the economic value of the fringe benefits lost
during the years of the plaintiff's premature retirement?
If this information were available, it would be possible to de-
termine how much the plaintiff "gained" through the pension,
so as to offset this amount against his recovery for loss of salary
caused by his retirement.
We may now leave the world of computers and return to
the system used for determining personal injury damages. This
system does not have computers, but instead twelve laymen or
a judge, who can assimilate only so much data. Nor is recovery
based on the economic needs of the injured person and his
family. If it were, the fact that he was receiving a pension, re-
gardless of what he "paid" for it, would be relevant to determine
actual need.5 ° If the injured person can establish a case of
liability against the particular defendant under our rules of tort
law, we allow him to recover for all economic loss sustained. We
measure this economic loss with reference to the income he
could have earned, but will not because of his disability resulting
from the accident. If this amount is to be reduced by pension
benefits, it is not because they demonstrate the absence of need-
for this is not the basis of compensation-but because they in-
dicate how much was actually lost. This question cannot be
15o "A system of compensation designed to limit awards to strict economic
loss and to guarantee such recovery may someday evolve. Certainly, most of the
problems to which the collateral source rule provides a rough solution can be
eliminated in such a context." Maxwell, supra note 97, at 695.
[Vol. 58
1]ESONAL INjumY DAwAGES
accurately or even roughly determined unless the cost of the
benefit to him, i.e., the reduced salary he took because of the
availability of the benefit, is also considered. And we have no
way, in the absence of a very special computer, which we don't
have, of determining this amount The necessary data to feed
into the system is simply not available, even if the system could
absorb it. It should be noted that to the extent the plaintiff was
employed for a lengthy period he will be receiving the disability
pension for a relatively shorter period of time. Consequently,
it is not at all inconceivable (except perhaps in the military
situation, where there are so many fringe benefits) that the
amount of reduced salary would exceed the value of the benefit.
Therefore, the result reached under the collateral source rule
and the functional approach coincide. The court in Browning
is wrong when it gives the defendant credit without deducting
the cost to the plaintiff. It assumed that the lost salary less the
pension represented the plaintiff's true economic loss without
considering what the plaintiff relinquished in order to get that
pension. The pension may represent the equivalent compensa-
tion that he would have received earlier if it had not been for
the pension arrangment. Since we cannot realistically determine
the value of what the plaintiff forfeited to get the pension, we
cannot assign value to the pension. Under our law we give the
plaintiff what he "lost" rather than what he "needs", so there is
no justification for deducting the pension on the ground that it
reduces the plaintiff's need for compensation. The defendant is
claiming reduced liability, and it seems proper that he sub-
stantiate his claim. If he cannot show the plaintiff's actual bene-
fit, which he cannot, since he is unable to show how much the
plaintiff gave up in order to obtain the benefit, he should not be
able to claim the saving. Even though the defendant may not
be a moral wrongdoer, he is, by law, assigned responsibility for
the plaintiffs loss. The plaintiff prima facie demonstrates loss
by showing the salary he would have received if he had not been
disabled. The defendant contends that the loss is actually less,
because the plaintiff will receive a pension. This is true, in eco-
nomic terms, only if the value of the pension exceeds the value of
what the plaintiff gave up to get it. This the defendant cannot
show in the context of our system of awarding damages for per-
1969]
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sonal injuries. He does not have the data, and there is a serious
question as to whether the system could absorb such data if it
existed. For this reason, recovery for loss of future earning
opportunity should not be reduced by the receipt of a disability
pension.
IfI. The Insured Accident Victim
Insurance cases have posed no difficulty for the courts, and
the defendant's claim that insurance benefits should operate to
reduce recovery has constantly been rejected.151 This is clearly
established with life insurance proceeds in a wrongful death
action, since the proceeds would have been payable at some time
and the only effect of the fatal accident was to accelerate pay-
ment.152 In the case of damage to property, no problem of "over-
compensation" arises, because the property insurer subrogates
to the plaintiff's claim against the tortfeasor 53 However, in
personal injury cases a question as to the effect of insurance may
properly arise. Subrogation does not generally exist with respect
to health, accident and related insurance,154 unless perhaps it is
specifically provided for in the contract. 55 Therefore, the ac-
cident victim who has taken out "first person" insurance against
various aspects of personal injury damage retains the insurance
proceeds notwithstanding recovery against the tortfeasor. The
question is whether his recovery should be affected by the in-
surance proceeds. The courts, applying the collateral source
rule, have held not.'5
It is important to consider present societal attitudes toward
insurance. At first insurance was considered an aleatory trans-
action 57 in which the insured "gambled" a small premium against
the possibility of substantial recovery if a designated contingency
151 See Maxwell, supra note 97, at 673 n. 14.
15 2 See West, supra note 80, at 409 n. 106. This question was involved in
one of the earliest American cases on the subject of collateral source benefits.
Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1860).
153 See W. VANCE, INsuRANcE § 134 (3rd ed. 1951).
.54 Id. See Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d
638 (1954).
-55 Subrogation on this basis was allowed in Michigan Hospital Service v.
Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954). The Blue Cross policy did not
provide for subrogation, but the Blue Shield policy did.
156 See the discussion and citation of cases in Maxwell, supra note 97, at 674;
West supra note 80, at 409 n. 108.
1 5 7 See Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1870).
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occurred. This was rationalized on the ground that the insured
was insuring against a "catastrophe", such as his death, the
destruction of his home or farm, the loss of goods at sea. 15 While
the gambling aspect is never far from our minds, as the law
regarding insurable interest and the suicide provisions of a life
insurance policy indicate, taking out insurance has become very
respectable. The "good family man" will take out insurance to
protect his family. First, of course, is the need for adequate life
insurance, enough to provide for his family's needs when he is
gone. If he earns $10,000 per year, and his family needs, let
us say, $8,000 per year when he dies, he will need to carry
$200,000 worth of insurance. His wife might die before the
children grow up and there will be the expenses of a housekeeper.
Some insurance on the wife is also desirable. And it is a good
idea to take out a small policy on each child to cover burial
expenses in case of death. Since college is expensive, the prudent
father who wants to provide an education for his children will
also take out an endowment policy. As to health, Blue Cross and
Blue Shield represent the minimum protection, with major medi-
cal becoming an essential. The traditional fire insurance policy
has been replaced by a comprehensive homeowner's policy which
costs little more. As a motorist, he will take out the minimum
10/20 coverage, but if he is at all prudent, he will make it
50/100, and since 100/800 costs practically no more, he is ad-
vised to insure for the highest amount. This will be part of a
comprehensive family automobile policy.
Thus far, we have been talking only about "basic protection",
but it is clear that the concept of insurance against catastrophe
has changed even here. Blue Cross and Blue Shield meet most
expenses of an ordinary hospitalization, and major medical pro-
tects against the really serious illness. Gone are the days when
the family "saved" to meet medical crises. The modem home-
owner's policy protects against all kinds of small losses that in
the past any homeowner assumed he would have to bear. The
comprehensive automobile policy guarantees that the automobile
owner, if he wishes, can have all the expenses of an accident met,
save for a $50 deductible provision. More significantly, the con-
158 See the discussion in W. VAwcE, supra note 153, §11.
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cept of insurance as protection against loss has changed. Now
it is possible to insure against the occurrence of a contingency,
and notwithstanding the gambling aspect of this arrangement, it
is perfectly respectable. Modern insurance marketing stresses
that the insured can cumulate insurance proceeds. Furthermore,
benefits are payable without regard to "out-of-pocket" loss or
obligation. Consider an individual who anticipates that he may
have to go into the hospital at some time. Moreover, let us say
he is a hypochondriac. He will take out Blue Cross, Blue Shield
and major medical to cover the actual costs. But he may take
out any number of health and accident policies in addition.
One may pay him a specified sum of money whenever he under-
goes an operation, which he may use as he wishes (query, is this
insurance against pain and suffering?). Another may pay him
so much per day while he is in the hospital. This may be akin
to income protection insurance (although income protection in-
surance is actually marketed differently), but there is no re-
quirement that the purchaser of the insurance has been earning
any income. If a person is insured to this extent, is he not in-
suring against a contingency, with an element of gambling sur-
rounding the transaction? It may be asked whether insurance
is not marketed so as to encourage such gambling. It is necessary
to recognize the changed societal attitude toward insurance and
to distinguish between insurance against loss and insurance
against the occurrence of a contingency. The prevalence of first
person insurance indicates that many accident victims will have
received insurance benefits which have met some of the loss
for which they are trying to recover against the tortfeasor. 5 9 The
question remains as to whether the receipt of such benefits should
affect their tort recovery.
The courts have refused to allow the receipt of insurance
benefits to affect tort recovery, stressing that the plaintiff has
paid for the insurance benefits and is recovering them under
his contract with the insurer. With disarming candor the Ver-
mont court, in the earlier days of insurance, stated that an ac-
cident insurance policy was "in the nature of a wager between
159 As to how well such insurance and other collateral benefits meet actual
loss, see Morris and Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 913, 920-22 (1962).
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the plaintiff and a third person, the insurer, to which the de-
fendant was in no measure privy."' 60 The court went on to make
two other points. First, recovery should not be reduced because
the plaintiff did not acquire the policy in order to benefit the
defendant. Secondly, there might be subrogation as between the
plaintiff and the insurer, but subrogation would not affect the
plaintiff's recovery against the defendant. Around the same time
an English case utilized a somewhat different rationale.1 1 It
stressed that the right to be compensated when the event insured
against occurred was the equivalent of the premiums paid (pre-
sumably that part of the premium apportioned to protection).
The court also resorted to the causa causans doctrine: the in-
surance contract rather than the accident was the causa causans
of the receipt of benefits, so the benefits could not be deducted
from the award of compensation for the accident. The view
that the plaintiff has paid for the benefits is followed by Ameri-
can courts which hold that the plaintiff can recover for hospital
and medical expenses, notwithstanding that they were covered
in whole or in part by Blue Cross and Blue Shield 62 or health
insurance. 63
The argument that the plaintiff has paid for the benefits
received is also advanced by the proponents of the collateral
source rule. The benefits, "being products of the plaintiffs own
thrift, foresight and sacrifice, should be immune from mitiga-
tion."164 It is further contended that to allow the plaintiff to
recover both the insurance proceeds and full damages may serve
as an inducement to insure.'65 Moreover, as a practical matter,
the beneficiary of an accident policy is usually willing to settle
his claim for less, so to allow him to keep the proceeds may
facilitate the chances of settlement. 66
160 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536, 537 (1870).
161 Bradbua v. Great Western Railway Co., [1874] L.R. 10 Ex. 1 (C.A.).
162 See e.g., Taylor v. Jennison, 355 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1960); Kirkham v.
Carter, 335 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1960). C.f. Kopp v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 6 Wis.2d
53, 94 N.W.2d 224 (1959), holding that insured who bad received Blue Cross
benefits could also recover under the medical payments clause of an insurance
policy.
163 See e.g., West v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286 154 So.2d 297 (1963); Healy v.
Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d 202, 173 N.E.2d 777 (1961).
364 See Lambert, The Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 531,
544. See also Jolowicz, 1963 C mB. L.J. 37, 40 (1963).65 Lambert, supra note 164, at 544.166 See discussion in James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem
of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 555-56 (1952).
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The reply to this argument is that by purchasing accident
insurance the plaintiff is seeking security rather than possible
double recovery. 167 He may be injured in circumstances where
no tort recovery is possible, e.g., a one-car accident, or may be
unable to make out a case of liability. Even when there is a
possibility of tort recovery, he wants to see that his bills are
paid without the need for litigation. Certainly the insured is
thinking primarily in terms of payment of the bills, whether as
a result of the accident or any other occasion for hospitalization.
It is doubtful if double recovery will have much to do with an
individual's decision to take out health or accident insurance. 68
At least this is so in the case of what I call "loss insurance" as
opposed to contingency insurance.
The argument is also made that where there is insurance, the
plaintiff should recover less, because he has lost less. 69 In the
case of loss insurance, this is correct. If his hospital and medical
bills came to $1,000, $970 of which was paid by Blue Cross, the
plaintiff's out of pocket loss for hospital and medical expenses
was only $30. The question is what to do about the remaining
$970. This is posed in terms of the dilemma between overcom-
pensation and windfall.
One proposal is that the principle of subrogation be extended
to health, accident and other forms of loss insurance, as now
applied to fire and marine insurance. In our example, the plain-
tiffs casualty insurer would recover $970 from the defendant,
or more realistically, from his liability insurer, either in a direct
action, or from the proceeds of the plaintiff's recovery. Subroga-
tion is often proposed as the.perfect solution to overcompensation
and windfall, since the defendant will be required to pay full
167 Swarz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U. L. REV. 348, 354 (1961);
James, supra note 166, at 553. See also the discussion in Ganz, Mitigation of
Damages by Benefits Received, 25 MoD. L. RIv. 559, 565 (1962). And even if
this were not his purpose it is contended that it is undesirable to permit the
insured to wager, to "gamble a very small portion of his premium on the chance
of a windfall in excess of recovery." James, supra note 166, at 544-45.
1-68 "The plaintiff recovers but once for the wrong done him, and he receives
the insurance money upon a contract to which the defendant is in no way privy,
and in respect to which his own wrongful act can give him no equities." Perrott
v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 47, 56 (1868).
See also Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1860); Ganz, Mitigation of Damages
by Benefits Received, 25 MOD. L. REv. 559 (1962).1 6 9 See Ganz, supra note 167, at 565.
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damages, but the plaintiff will not receive double recovery.170
Moreover, subrogation might operate to reduce the rates for loss
insurance.
171
I must confess that I find this solution somewhat incredible.
For what is proposed is something no less than the alteration
of the health and accident insurance business. Subrogation
has been allowed where there is an express provision to this
effect in the policy,17 but the fact remains that most health
and accident insurance policies do not have such provisions.1 7 3
Since the courts traditionally allowed subrogation in property
claims, the fire and marine insurance business was organized
on this basis, and rates reflect the pattern of subrogation. More-
over, it may be that in a significant number of property insurance
claims there was a question of tort liability, so that to allow
subrogation could materially affect the rates for fire and marine
insurance, i.e., a substantial portion of the loss would be shifted
from the casualty insurer to the responsible enterprise or liability
insurer. But it may be asked whether the number of Blue Cross
and Blue Shield claims, for example, in which there might be
tort recovery is sufficient so as to affect the rate structure. At
least this is doubtful. If health and accident companies wanted
subrogation, they would provide for it in the policies. 4 Indeed,
automobile liability insurance companies do not seem impressed
by the "savings" resulting from subrogation to property damage
claims, as evidenced by the widespread "knock for knock" ar-
rangements. As Professor James has said about subrogation,
"Altogether it is a far, far thing from the fair-haired boy it is
often assumed to be."175 In theory, insurance companies are in
business to insure against loss and to pay such losses when they
170 West, supra note 80, at 414; Note, Unreason in the Law of Damages: The
Collateral Source Rule, 77 HAlv. L. REv. 741, 751 (1964); Note, The Mitigating
Effect on Damages of Social Welfare Programs, 63 HAv. L. REv. 330, 332-33(1949).
171 This is assumed to follow from the allowance of subrogation. Query, will
this necessarily be so, or will the "savings" be disposed of otherwise?
172 Michigan Hospital Service v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713
(1954).
173 .Tames, supra note 166, at 553 n. 60.
'
74 We may assume that this would be permitted under state insurance laws,-
or if such subrogation were desired, the companies would try to obtain favorable
legislation.
175 James, supra note 166, at 563.
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occur.' 6 When the loss has been met by the health and ac-
cident insurer, it may be asked whether there is any utility in
shifting it again from this efficient distributor to an enterprise
or liability insurer, which will then have to distribute it among
its consumers, if it can,'7 7 or among its policyholders.
In any event, if subrogation is to be introduced into the
health and accident insurance field, it would seem that there
should be a more economically rational justification than that
it is necessary to prevent double recovery or to avoid giving the
defendant a windfall. The decision to alter the nature of in-
surance practice should be based upon a consideration of
empirical data, rate structures and the like, which would not
ordinarily be available in a suit for personal injuries. This
requires a legislative judgment made after careful investigation.
For a court to hold that the plaintiff could not recover for loss
met by insurance, but that the insurer could recover as subrogee,
would be to judicially impose subrogation in a new field, and
I do not believe that a court should or would do so.
Discarding the subrogation solution, we still have to decide
what to do about the $970. Professor James suggests that since
the courts were unwilling to let the accident insurer subrogate
to the rights of the insurer,178 they approached the problem in
terms of the overcompensation-windfall dilemma, and resolved
the dilemma in favor of the plaintiff. 7 9 It cannot be argued that
if the plaintiff's hospital bills are paid by the health and ac-
cident insurer and he also recovers their cost from the defendant,
he is recovering twice for an ascertained loss. But, as the ad-
vocates of the collateral source rule maintain, the plaintiff has
"purchased" one recovery by paying the premiums for the in-
surance. Granted that this is so, what conclusion follows?
It is not the "wisdom of Solomon" to suggest that the func-
tionally sound solution is what the court in our early Vermont
176 In practice, however, it seems that much of the automobile liability in-
surance business is based on restrictive underwriting. The insurance companies
try to identify the "good risks". This being so, the insurance companies are then
in business to collect premiums and to insure against loss only those who are not
likely to incur it.
177 For the view that it cannot always do so, see Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution in the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 521-24 (1961).
178 Tames, supra note 166, at 555-56.
379 Id.
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case80 was unwilling to say, namely, that the plaintiff purchased
the insurance for the benefit of the defendant. This was not
his intention, of course, but the insurance is available to meet
a loss that the defendant would otherwise have had to meet
under principles of tort liability. Since that loss was met by
insurance, the plaintiff has no need to recover it from the de-
fendant. But since the plaintiff's insurance has rebounded to
the benefit of the defendant by relieving him of a portion of
his liability, it seems only fair that the defendant pay for the
insurance protection. An analogy may be drawn to the case of
Automobile Insurance Company v. Model Family Laundries.18'
Goods in storage were destroyed by fire, and the bailor refused
to pay anything for the storage. In a suit by the bailee, recovery
was denied because he had breached the contract by failing to
return the goods, notwithstanding that he was not responsible
for their destruction. He could not recover the reasonable value
of his services in storing the goods on a restitutionary theory,
because the services were of no value to the bailor when the
goods were not returned. However, the bailee did insure the
goods, as he was required to do under the contract, and the
insurer settled with the bailor. Therefore, the bailee's act of
insuring had rebounded to the benefit of the bailor, and on a
restitutionary theory, the bailee was entitled to recover the cost
of insurance.
In that case the bailee was required to insure the goods
under the contract, so he intended to insure for the benefit of
the bailor. Nonetheless, the result should be no different where
the insurance has benefited the other party. There is no need
for the plaintiff to recover the cost of medical services which
were met by insurance. But if he is not reimbursed for the cost
of the insurance, the insurance did not benefit him, since he
could have recovered the loss met by insurance from the de-
fendant as tort damages. It would be unfair to make him, in
effect, pay for the insurance which operated to reduce his
tort recovery. Since the insurance enabled the defendant to avoid
a portion of his liability, he should reimburse the plaintiff for
180 Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt. 536 (1870).
181 133 Conn. 433, 52 A.2d 137 (1947).
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the cost of the insurance under a restitutionary theory. To this
extent, the plaintiff is not overcompensated, and the defendant
does not receive a windfall.
If this approach is followed, the question then becomes what
are the premiums for which the plaintiff is entitled to be re-
imbursed. If the insurance policy was in force for ten years
at the time of the accident, the defendant would argue that he
should be liable only for a portion of the premium due the tenth
year, since the plaintiff also had protection against other possible
loss unrelated to the accident.182 Or, he may contend that dur-
ing the life of the policy the plaintiff made use of his hospital
protection on other occasions. Ultimately, he will argue, very
little of the premium cost can be attributed to the protection
afforded the plaintiff as a result of the accident.
At this point we must stop since we are necessarily limited
in the nature and amount of data that we can feed into the
machine. The spectacle of the jury totaling the number of the
plaintiff's illnesses plus the amount of insurance premiums in
an attempt to assign a certain portion to the particular accident
is ludicrous. Either the medical expenses were so extensive as
to exceed the total amount of premiums paid during the life of
the policy, in which case the defendant should be very relieved
that the plaintiff carried insurance, or they were relatively small,
so as to be less than the total of the premium paid. Moreover,
if the plaintiff had insurance for nine years and finally made
use of it in the tenth, it would seem that he measures the cost
of the premiums for the entire period against the benefits paid.
We would, therefore, limit our consideration to the total amount
of premiums paid during the life of the policy.
Where insurance meets an ascertained portion of the loss,
there is no reason, under our compensatory theory of damages,
to permit the plaintiff to recover again for that portion from
the defendant. The defendant, who is relieved of a liability
that under tort law he would be required to bear, cannot com-
plain if he is made to pay for the insurance that rebounded to
his benefit. For practical reasons-again, we do not have a sensi-
tive computer in the jury room-and taking account of society's
attitude toward insurance, this would mean the total premiums
182 See Peckmnpaugh, supra note 82, at 553.
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paid during the life of the policy. The plaintiff would recover
either the cost of the medical expenses that were met by in-
surance or the total premiums paid, whichever was smaller.
This could be determined at the pre-trial hearing, since we
may assume that the health and accident insurer would have
an accurate record of premiums paid and that the medical ex-
penses would be ascertainable. The "damages" for medical
services could then be stipulated.
However, not all insurance is loss insurance. As we have
pointed out, it is possible for a person to "over-insure", that is,
to take out more insurance than is necessary to cover his losses.
Fire insurance policies are written so that the insured cannot
cumulate, and where the property owner has insured the property
in excess of its value, recovery under the policy is on a pro rata
basis.183 Perhaps a fear of arson for the purpose of collecting
insurance proceeds has impelled such an approach. But health
and accident insurance does not operate in this manner, and
indeed is marketed on the basis that the plaintiff can cumulate.
Perhaps it is undesirable to permit a person to insure against
the contingency of illness to the extent that he can recover a
specified sum for a stay in the hospital or for undergoing a
particular operation.8 4 This is not the concern of a court award-
ing personal injury damages, where the legislature has permitted
the health and accident insurers to carry on their business in
this way. Once the plaintiff's actual loss has been measured, in-
surance recovery beyond actual loss is truly collateral' 85 to the
tort case, and should not affect the damages award. Therefore,
insurance coverage is relevant only insofar as it meets the loss
which the defendant would otherwise be required to bear.
Moreover, even as to loss insurance, other considerations may
dictate that the plaintiff have full recovery of the insurance
proceeds and tort damages rather than be limited to the insurance
proceeds and the cost of the premiums. We will discuss this
in connection with recovery for loss of earning opportunity. It
will be contended that there are sound reasons to ignore the
183 W. VANCE, supra note 153, § 154.
184We do not seem to have considered the economic utility of "over-
insuring".185 He would recover from the tortfeasor for his actual loss and from the
insurer under the contract, which, by definition, has nothing to do with the loss.
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plaintiff's income protection insurance, for example, just as there
are sound reasons for ignoring the receipt of social insurance
benefits in such a case. The point we are trying to make now,
however, is that where an identifiable loss has been met by
insurance, and there are not countervailing considerations, the
plaintiff need not be compensated for that loss by the defendant.
Since the insurance has operated to reduce the liability of the
defendant, the defendant rather than the plaintiff should bear
its cost.
The Collateral Source Rule and
Personal Injury Damages: The
Irrelevant Principle and the
Functional Approach
By ROBERT ALLEN SEDLERe
PART II*
It is the thesis of this writing that the collateral source rule
represents an irrational and unsound way of dealing with the
problem of cumulative recovery in personal injury actions. It
is, therefore, an irrelevant principle. The plaintiff should be
limited to recovery for what he has 'lost," to the extent that our
system of adjudication can accurately measure loss. Benefits
received from a collateral source obviously have something to
do with determining what loss actually resulted from the
accident. However, the fact that the plaintiff has received bene-
fits from a collateral source does not necessarily mean that the
award of damages should be reduced thereby. It may be that
realistically the plaintiff is not recovering on his own behalf, but
on behalf of another, who is not able to proceed directly against
the tortfeasor under our system. It may be that the plaintiff has
given up something or "paid" to obtain the collateral benefit,
which our system is unable to measure, so that the deduction of
the benefit without giving the plaintiff credit for what he has
given up or paid would be unfair and would not give proper
compensation. Perhaps the plaintiff can be adequately compen-
sated by being awarded the amount paid to obtain the benefits.
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, B.A., 1956, J.D.,
1959, University cf Pittsburgh.
i'* Editors Note: In view of the necessarily unusual length of this article, it
is being published in two parts. Part I appeared in Volume 58, Number 1, of the
Kentucky Law Journal (58 Ky. L.J. 36).
KENTUcKY LAW JOUIRNAL
The deficiencies and unscientific nature of the system under
which we award compensation for personal injuries must be
kept in mind. The functional approach, advanced in this writing,
represents an attempt to deal with the problem of cumulative
recovery and collateral source benefits in a realistic manner, with
reference to economic factors and considerations of practicality.
This approach would discard the collateral source rule, although
frequently the result reached by its application may be reached
under this approach.18 A particular solution-and I would not
maintain that everyone would agree with all my solutions-is less
important than the approach taken to the problem. In the
second half of the writing, we will apply the functional approach
to a number of collateral source benefits. The discussion will be
divided into the two aspects of "out-of-pocket" loss: medical,
hospital and nursing expenses; and loss of earning opportunity.
MEDICAL, HosPrrAL Aim NtmsiN ExPNsEs
A. Gratuitous Medical and Hospital Treatment
In the United States-seemingly alone among the industri-
alized nations of the world-adequate medical care is not con-
sidered an "inherent right" of every individual. Like any
commodity, medical care is to be bought and purchased, and
the quality and nature of the care may well depend upon a
person's ability to pay. Medical and hospital treatment, therefore,
represents an "out-of-pocket" loss, and the accident victim who
has paid or who has become obligated to pay for such treatment
and services is entitled to recover from the tortfeasor. In theory,
he recovers the reasonable value, but in practice, of course, he
recovers the actual cost, and the jury ordinarily will not determine
whether the charges were reasonable.18 7 But not all people are
able to pay for hospital and medical care, and while our society
may not believe that there is an "inherent right" to such care, it
186 Thus, I agree with Dean Maxwell's conclusion that "in some cases the
rule operates as an instrument of what most of us would be willing to call justice."
Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MDWv.
L. R51. 669, 595 (1961). However, this does not seem to me as a justification for
retaining the rule as the solution to the problem of cumulative recovery.
187 Such damages are frequently stipulated. But see Begley v. Adaber Realty
& Inv. Co., 358 S.W.2d 785 (Mo., 1962), where the plaintiff failed to show
that the bills were paid and did not introduce evidence as to their "reasonableness."
The court denied recovery.
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rejects the view that a poor person should not receive some
medical attention. Charity is one of the seven virtues, and
somehow the poor, if they seek it or are involved in an accident,
will get medical care. Doctors have, and perhaps some still do,
treated poor patients without charge or at a reduced fee. Most
privately-incorporated hospitals are now non-profit institutions,
(where doctrine is recognized they are entitled to benefit of
charitable immunity) and have charity wards where the poor
receive medical care free or in accordance with the administra-
tor's estimate of their "ability to pay." The accident victim will
certainly receive medical care. Under the collateral source rule,
the accident victim can recover the value of medical and hospital
services, for, at the time the question first arose, it was correctly
reasoned that the charitable intention was to aid the victim
rather than relieve the tortfeasor of his liability."' How should
this matter be dealt with under the functional approach?
We have already discussed the value of services furnished
by a physician. Under our system of private medical care, a
doctor who renders services is entitled to be paid. Where the
services were necessitated by an accident, the cost should be
borne by the person legally liable for the loss. The fact that the
doctor rendered services "gratuitously" is irrelevant as regards
the doctor's right to be paid. We do not, for reasons of judicial
convenience, permit the doctor to sue the torifeasor. By per-
mitting the victim to recover, we hope that the doctor will be
paid. If the cost of such services were paid by a third person,
he too should recover the cost from the tortfeasor, but again,
our system does not permit him to do so. By allowing the victim
to recover their value from the torifeasor, there is the possibility
that the donor will be reimbursed.8 9 So, where the plaintiff is
recovering the value of medical services rendered "gratuitously"
or paid for by a third party, he is really recovering on behalf of the
doctor or the donor.1 0 If the court is really concerned about
188 See the discussion, supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
189 Recovery is generally permitted. See West, The Collateral Source Rule
Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiffs Windfall, 18 Oai.. L. REv. 395, at 400 n. 31(1963). In Jones v. Keith, 134 So. 630 (Ala. 1931), the court said by way of dicta
that the plaintiff could not recover where his employer paid the costs. Where the
employer pays the medical bills of his employee, the payment is analogous to pay-
ment of wages as a gratuity.
'
00 Except in a case such as Coyne v. Campbell, where the party rendering the
services should not be entitled to recover their value.
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protecting the doctor or donor, it can accomplish this by the
use of a decree directing repayment.'91 It is simpler to allow the
injured party to recover the value of the services from the tort-
feasor and let him make arrangements with the benefactor, who,
considering the injured person's poverty, may be willing to make
him a "gift" of the recovery.
We may now consider hospital services.'92 Following the
accident, the victim will be taken to the emergency room of
some hospital. The particular hospital will depend on many
factors, such as the arrangements the police have with emergency
rooms of local hospitals. A number of localities now have public
hospitals, supported by taxation, where care is rendered free of
charge to specified classes of persons, or where any charge is
dependent upon the patient's ability to pay. Our victim may
be taken to one of these. Or, he may be taken to a private
hospital and given free care in the charity ward. In either case,
he either has paid nothing for the hospital services, or has paid
substantially less than the "reasonable value," i.e. less than what
he would have had to pay if he were financially able.
Clearly, there is no reason why he should recover the value
of services for which he has not paid and consequently, is not
"out-of-pocket." The Restatement of Torts9 ' draws a distinction
between services rendered by a private charity and those
rendered by a "state-supported or other public charity," and
would allow the plaintiff to recover the value of the services
from the defendant when they were rendered by the former,
but not when rendered by the latter. Dean Maxwell contends
that there is no sound reason to distinguish between services
rendered by a private or public charity, and that if the collateral
source rule is to be applied, it should include all such services.'"
While we agree that there is no distinction, unlike Dean Maxwell,
we would conclude that recovery should be denied in both cases.
The reason is that for the particular plaintiff the cost of hospital
services does not represent an item of loss, because he was not
191 See the discussion, supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
192 We are assuming that the hospital services also include the services of
attending physicians. The previous discussion of services rendered "gratuitously'
by a physician refers to those rendered by a private physician.1 93 ESTATEIVMENT OF TORTS, Explanatory Note § 924, comment f at 637 (Ex-
penses, 1939).
194 Maxwell, supra note 185, at 689.
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required to pay for them. Again, the principle that the tort-
feasor takes his victim as he finds him operates for the defendant's
benefit. Because the plaintiff was poor, he received free hospital
care, and if our purpose in awarding compensation is to put him
in as good a position as he would have been if the tort had not
occurred, it is not necessary that we award him the cost of
hospital services.
If this result is difficult to accept, it is only because in our
society free medical and hospital care is available for some, but
not all. Suppose that all accident victims, or indeed all persons,
were entitled to free hospital and medical care, as under the
National Health Service in Great Britain.'95 An accident victim
there who obtains free medical and hospital services, as most
do, cannot recover the value of those services from the tort-
feasor.196 If all persons obtained free medical and hospital care,
we would not consider this a compensable item of damage, for
this would not be an expense that an accident victim would be
required to undergo. We allow recovery on the theory that the
victim is "out-of-pocket," because he has paid for such care,
and if he has not had to do so, there is no reason for him to
recover. 97  This does not mean that there is discrimination
between "rich" and "poor" with respect to the recovery of
damages. Just as the high wage-earner recovers more for his
lost time than the low wage-earner, because he has lost more,
the person who has paid for hospital services recovers their cost
because he has lost something as a result of the accident, while
the person who has not paid does not recover because he has
not lost anything in this regard. While in the United States only
a minority of accident victims receive free hospital and medical
care, those who do have no need to recover this item of damages,
and some courts have denied recovery where the services were
furnished by a public hospital' 98 or a hospital where the plaintiff
'95 National Health Service Act, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 81 (1946). See the dis-
cussion in Friedmann, Social Insurance and The Principles of Tort Liability, 63
-A1v. L. REv. 241, 242 (1949).
196 See Ganz, supra note 167, at 563.
197 In Great Britain the p]aintiff who has, in fact, obtained private medical
care, can recover the cost from the tortfeasor. Law Reform (Personal Injuries) Act,
11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 41, 11 2, sched. 4. (1948).
198 See City of Englewood v. Bryant, 100 Colo. 552, 68 P.2d 913 (1937); Di
Leo v. Dolinsky, 129 Conn. 203, 27 A.2d 126 (1942).
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received the services free of charge. 9' Under the functional
approach, the plaintiff could not recover for hospital services
rendered without charge whether at a public or private charity
hospital.
The real question in such a case is whether the hospital should
recover the cost of the services from the tortfeasor. Louisiana
provides for such recovery by statute and the hospital is subro-
gated to any award made to the accident victim. 00 Where the
hospital requires that the patient pay for the services, if he
recovers any compensation from a tortfeasor, the patient has not
received "free" services. It has been argued that the plaintiffs
recovery should not depend on "how knowledgeable the plain-
tiff and his benefactors set up the transaction." 20 1 Nonetheless,
if a particular hospital, whether public or private, enters into
such an arrangement with the accident victim, the courts have
little choice but to allow him to recover their value from the
torifeasor, since by obtaining the judgment he will become
"legally obligated." But this is more than implying a contract
to pay in such cases, as some courts have done when allowing
the plaintiff to recover from the tortfeasor. 02 Where the hospital
has not been sufficiently concerned about reimbursement to
expressly require it, it may be assumed that they are uninterested.
Administratively, it may be questioned whether reimbursement
arrangements are sound, particularly in the case of a public
hospital. The number of accident cases in which third party
liability is possible may not be significant. I think this would
also be true for private hospitals. The potential amount recover-
able is probably not sufficient to justify the time and record-
keeping involved, and the arguments against subrogation are
equally applicable here.20 If we could accept the concept of
free hospital care, it would not be necessary to concern ourselves
with holding the tortfeasor "responsible" for the cost. Unless it
is clear that the plaintiff has paid or is legally obligated to pay
for the hospital services he has received, recovery should not be
allowed against the tortfeasor.
199 See Nelson v. Western Steam Navigation Co., 52 Wash. 117, 100 P. 325
(1909).
200 LA. REv. STAT., tt. 46, U 8 (1951).
201 Maxwell, supra note 185, at 688.202 See Reichie v. Hazie, 22 Cal. App. 2d 543, 71 p.2d 849 (1937).
2
o James, supra note 166, at 557-63.
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However, the nature of the plaintiff's injuries may be such
that he will require medical and hospital care in the future.
Irrespective of the fact that the plaintiff is eligible to obtain
free care, he should be entitled to recover the reasonable value
of future medical and hospital services from the tortfeasor.0 4
In our society private medical and hospital care is to be preferred
to the public or charitable kind. It is more desirable to have a
private or semi-private room than to be in a ward with other
indigents, and in many localities, faced with a choice between
a public and private hospital, most people would prefer the
private one. The accident victim, despite his poverty, is entitled
to the same choice. In Great Britain, it is specifically provided
that in determining the reasonableness of expenses for medical
care, "the possibility of avoiding those expenses or part of them
by taking advantage of facilities available under the National
Health Service Act shall be disregarded." 2 5 Under our system
the plaintiff must recover for past and prospective damages in
a single action, so there is no way of knowing whether he will
actually make use of the free facilities and thereby obtain a
windfall. If damages were awarded only after the expenses
had been incurred, it would be possible to limit recovery only
to those cases where the plaintiff actually made use of private
care, but this is not the way it is done. Since there is a single
recovery and since the plaintiff has a right to elect private
care, he is entitled to recover the value of future medical and
hospital services irrespective of his eligibility for free care.
B. Treatment in Military and Veterans Administration Hospitals.
If a person in active military service or one of his dependents
is injured in an accident, he will be treated at a military hospital
or elsewhere at government expense. 0 6 However, others are also
entitled to medical and hospital care at the expense of the
government or the Veterans Administration. Former members
of the military service and their dependents are entitled to care
at military facilities.20 7 Veterans of any war or of service after
January 31, 1955, who are unable to pay for necessary hospi-
204 See the cases cited, infra note 214.
205 Supra note 197.
20572 stat. 1445 (1958), as amended, 10 U.S.C. § 1071-1085 (1964).
207 10 U.S.C, §§ 1074(b), 1076(b) (1958).
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talization, are entitled to be admitted to a Veterans Administra-
tion hospital, even for a non-service-connected disability.2 08
Where an accident victim has received free care at a military or
Veterans Administration facility, the question is whether he
can recover the value of the medical and hospital services from
the tortfeasor. The question has arisen both with respect to
ordinary tortfeasors and to the United States, sued as a defen-
dant under the Federal Tort Claims Act.209 Let us first consider
a person in active military service suing an ordinary tortfeasor,
who seeks to recover the reasonable value of the medical and
hospital services furnished by the government. A moment's
reflection will indicate that this is Sergeant Browning's case
again. The accident victim received free medical and hospital
care in the sense that he did not have to pay the physician
and hospital bills. But, as we have said, this fringe benefit is
part of his total compensation picture. We cannot determine how
much less compensation he received than would have been the
case if this fringe benefit were not available. Therefore, as with
the disability pension, the fact that he has received this benefit
should not affect his recovery of damages against the tortfeasor;
and the person in active military service has uniformly been
permitted to recover the value of medical and hospital services
from the tortfeasor.210 The same would be true of the services
furnished his dependents, for these too, are part of his total
compensation picture. As to the retired person, the medical and
hospital services available after retirement fall into the same
category as a disability pension, and he should be able to
recover their value.
A different question is presented when the tortfeasor is the
United States, and suit is brought under the Federal Tort Claims
Act. The dependent or retired person could have been injured
by a mail truck, for example, or even a military vehicle. It has
also been held that a serviceman who is injured by a government
instrumentality while off-duty may maintain a suit under the
Act.211 You will recall that ordinarily recovery is reduced by
208 72 Stat. 1141 (1958), as amended, 38 U.S.C.A. § 610 (Supp., 1966). See
also 38 C.F.R. §§ 17.47, 17.49 (1966).209 62 Stat. 933 (1948, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964).
210 See, e.g., Gillis v. Farmers Union Oil Co. of Rhame, 186 F. Supp. 331
(D. N.D. 1960); Herrick v. Sayler, 160 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. Ind. 1958).
211 United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).
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benefits that were furnished to the victim by the tortfeasor
rather than a collateral source. The result should be no different
where the tortfeasor is the government; the government has
injured a person, and has taken care of his medical and hospital
services to a serviceman injured in the line of duty. There is
no reason then, to permit the serviceman or his dependents to
recover the reasonable value of the services in a suit under the
Act.212
However, if future medical and hospital services are neces-
sary, the plaintiff should be entitled to recover their reasonable
value in a suit against the government. The same would be true
if the plaintiff had, in fact, incurred expenses for private care.
As discussed previously, the availability of free medical care
does not mean that the plaintiff "fails to mitigate damages" if
he does not take advantage of such care. In our society, paid
private medical care is still deemed superior to care at public
expense. 1 3 Since prospective damages must be recovered in the
tort action, there is no way of knowing whether they would
make use of the government's facilities, and they are entitled
to have the choice. For this reason recovery for future medical
care has been permitted by a plaintiff who was eligible for free
care at a Veterans Administration hospital,214 and this should be
equally true for the plaintiff presently in service.
We may now consider the case of a person who is eligible
for treatment at a Veterans Administration Hospital. Of course,
he can recover for future medical and hospital services in actions
against the ordinary tortfeasor as well as the government. The
important question is whether he can recover for services that
were actually furnished at the Veterans Administration Hospital.
In a suit against an ordinary tortfeasor recovery has been per-
mitted. The leading case is Hudson v. Lazarus,215 where the
plaintiff, a veteran, received free care at a military hospital.
In permitting full recovery, the court made the following points.
First, it said that a collateral source benefit will either work to
212 See United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949); Jones v. United
States, 236 F. Supp. 756 (E.D.N.C. 1964).
213 Thus, persons in active military service may fail to take advantage of
medical care at military facilities. If the plaintiff had employed private care, he
should be entitled to recover the cost from the United States.2 4 Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 1964).
215 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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the advantage of the injured person or the "wrongdoer," and
"the purpose of the parties and the interest of society would be
better served if the injured party rather than the wrongdoer is
benefited." Secondly, the court observed that legal compensation
for personal injuries does not fully compensate, since the injury
cannot be measured in economic terms. We have discussed
these kinds of justifications for the collateral source rule pre-
viously, and found them wanting.216 However, the court also
"borrowed a leaf" from the functional approach, saying that it
might well be considered that medical and hospital services
supplied by the Government to these members of the United
States Navy were part of the compensation to them for services
rendered and that, therefore, by their service in the Navy they
had paid for them."2 17 It is this point that seems crucial to me.
Is this Sergeant Browning's case, so that under the functional
approach, recovery would be permitted? Or, is this instead the
case of the victim in the public hospital or charity ward, where
we would deny recovery on the ground that the services did
not cost the victim anything?
In criticizing the view that the free hospitalization was
compensation for past services, one commentator observed that
it was not available to all veterans, but only those who could
not afford to pay for private care.218 I do not think that this fact
alone is significant, since a fringe benefit may be made available
only to those who are in need of it. This is true of medical and
hospital care while a person is in service. The point, as I see it,
is that it is difficult to think in terms of such care as representing
compensation for past services performed by non-career veterans.
The great majority of veterans today were draftees or volunteers
for a specified period of time or the duration of a war. The
draftees had no choice, and the volunteers, even if they con-
sidered the economic aspects of military service, could not have
been influenced by the availability of this fringe benefit, which
at least for older veterans did not exist at the time they entered
service. Free hospital care for indigent veterans is but one of
the benefits our society provides for those who have served in
time of war, "hot" or "cold," and cannot be considered part of
216 See the discussion, supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
217 217 F.2d at 347.
218 Note, Hudson v. Lazarus, 43 GEo. L. J. 515, 517 (1955).
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a total compensation picture in any meaningful sense. Because
of their status as veterans, they are, if indigent, entitled to free
care in a Veterans Administration Hospital. To this extent they
are in a "favored class," as are veterans who attend school
under the G.I. Bill of Rights or who receive civil service
preference. They have received their medical and hospital care
free and cannot be said to have "given up" anything in the
economic sense in order to obtain such care. Perhaps it seems
"heartless" to deny double recovery to indigent veterans, as it is
to indigent plaintiffs who receive free care at a public or charity
hospital. But, then, maybe we should add twenty per cent to
the award when the plaintiff is an indigent. Facetiousness aside,
if we purport to compensate for loss as well as we can measure
it, a plaintiff who has received free care at a Veterans Admini-
stration Hospital has not suffered a loss in this respect because
of the accident, and should not be entitled to recover that amount
from the defendant.1 9
The matter is complicated, however, by Veterans Administra-
tion regulations, which provide as follows:
Persons hospitalized pursuant to paragraph... (b) of §17.47
(the indigency provision), who it is believed may be entitled
to hospital care or medical or to surgical treatment or to reim-
bursement for all or part of the cost thereof by reason of any
one or more of the following:
* * 4 0
(2) By reason of statutory or other relationships with third
parties, including those liable for damages because of neg-
ligence or other legal wrong, will not be furnished hospital
care, medical or surgical treatment, without charge therefor
to the extent of the amount for which such parties, referred
to in subparagraph (1) or (2) of this paragraph, are, or will
become liable. Such patients will be requested to execute an
appropriate assignment as prescribed in this paragraph.220
This is a part of a broader scheme designed to guarantee that
the veteran is really indigent, and it includes union or fraternal
219 See Smith v. Foucha, 172 So.2d 318 (La. App. 1965), where the court
denied recovery on the grounds that (1) the services had not cost the plaintiff
anything, and (2) the United States had subrogated to his claim.
220 38 C.F.R. § 17.48 (f) (1966).
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benefits, private insurance and workmen's compensation.22' This
regulation was not involved in Hudson v. Lazarus, since it had
not become effective until after the victim's death. In one case
where the claim had been assigned, the court permitted the
Veterans Administration to intervene and to recover the value
of medical and hospital services as assignee.222
I really question whether the number of cases where an
indigent patient in the Veterans Administration Hospital is an
accident victim are sufficient to justify the Veterans Administra-
tion trying to cover the cost of care from the tortfeasor. Perhaps
there are, but I think it is more likely that the Veterans Adminis-
tration lawyers were enamoured of subrogation and inserted this
provision in the regulations. It seems to me that compared to the
total cost of supplying free care to indigents for non-service-
connected disabilities, the amount of actual reimbursement would
be quite small. When the veteran has not executed the assign-
ment, there is no reason to permit him to recover the amount
from the defendant; if he does not recover, he will not be
"legally obligated" to the Veterans Administration. Even if the
Veterans Administration sues as assignee, there is still no reason
for the court to permit recovery. It should take the position
that a veteran who has obtained free care is not entitled to
recover that item of damage from the tortfeasor. It is difficult
to see the utility in shifting the cost of care from the government
to the enterprise or the defendant's liability insurer in the absence
of evidence that this would result in substantial savings to the
government. The argument against subrogation223 is strongest
where the government is involved; the burden on the American
taxpayer will not be appreciably lessened, if at all, by requiring
the government to bear the full cost of treating indigent veterans,
notwithstanding that tort recovery by a patient is possible.
The question has also arisen in a suit by a veteran, who has
been furnished free care at a Veterans Administration Hospital,
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Incredibly enough, one court permitted the veteran to recover
the value of such services.224 The court reasoned that (1) the
221 Id.
222 City of Fort Worth v. Barlow, 313 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
223 See, note 203 supra.
224 United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952). A contrary result
was reached in Feeley v. United States, 337 F.2d 924 (3rd Cir. 1964).
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Veterans Administration furnished the hospitalization under
separate legislation rather than under the Act, and (2) there was
nothing to indicate that Congress intended for recovery under
the Act to be diminished by the amount expended in furnishing
hospitalization and treatment.225 This ignores the fact that such
care did not cost the plaintiff anything and that the United
States, now being sued as tortfeasor, furnished it. It can be
contended with equal logic that Congress did not intend for the
United States to pay twice for the same injury.228 It is absurd
to permit recovery for medical expenses that the victim did not
pay or give up anything to get, and doubly absurd where it was
the tortfeasor who did pay for them.
The final case is where a non-military person was taken to
a military hospital because he was a passenger in an automobile,
driven by a serviceman, which was involved in an accident. He
received complete care without charge, and was then permitted
to recover the value of the medical and hospital services from
the tortfeasor.227 Recovery was justified on the ground that the
government could not recover from the tortfeasor and the tort-
feasor should not be able to avoid liability. As we have pointed
out repeatedly, our theory of tort recovery proceeds on the basis
of compensating the plaintiff rather than punishing the defen-
dant and his insurer. Since the plaintiff received free hospital
and medical care, for which he had given no "value," he should
not recover the cost of such care from the defendant.
C. Insurance and Mutual Protection Benefits.
We have previously discussed the case of the insured plain-
tiff in the medical setting.228 Under our approach, to the extent
that medical and hospital expenses are covered by loss insurance,
that amount should be deducted from the recovery in the tort
225 At the same time the court held that the plaintiff's disability pension, also
furnished by the Veteran's Administration, was to be deducted.
226In suits arising under the Act, liability is to be determined "in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Some courts
proceed on the assumption that whether benefits obtained from the United States
are to be deducted from the award is to be determined by state law. It would
seem that the question should be determined by federal law, since "double
recovery" involves the federal social insurance programs apart from the govern-
ment's tort liability. However, where the collateral source benefit was not received
from the federal government e.g., from the plaintiff's employer, state law should
apply. See Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1964).227 Rayfield v. Lawrence, 253 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1958).
228 See the discussion, supra notes 179-89 and accompanying text.
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action, but the total cost of the premiums during the life of the
policy would be added. Where the expenses are less than the
total cost of the insurance, the plaintiff would recover the
expenses. Insurance against the contingency of hospitalization,
that is, insurance in excess of the hospital and medical expenses,
would be unaffected. The same approach should be taken with
respect to medical and hospital expenses paid for by a welfare
fund or some other similar protective arrangement. In Ken-
tucky, for example, hospitals are operated by the United Mine
Workers, which are supported by contributions from employers
based on coal royalties, and monthly contributions by employees.
The Kentucky Court has allowed recovery for the value of
medical and hospital services provided under such an arrange-
ment,229 and courts have allowed full recovery where the plain-
tiff was a member of an employee's hospital association230 or
made monthly contributions to obtain access to a clinic operated
by his employer.2 1 As one court observed, "A person from whose
paycheck deductions were made for a health and medical plan
has paid the medical bill in any event."232 In that case the
amount of the bill was less than the total of the contributions
made, but where the total of contributions was less, the plaintiff
should only recover that amount.
However, insurance that the plaintiff has taken out for his
own benefit is different from accident insurance that the defen-
dant has secured for the plaintiff's benefit. This brings us to
the medical payment provisions of an automobile insurance
policy, under which payment is made to a passenger in the
insured's vehicle irrespective of liability.233 Where such payments
have been made, the question is whether they may be set off
against the passenger's claim for medical expenses in a personal
injury action against the insured. Some courts have held that
they may not.234 The rationale of these decisions seems to be
229 Conley v. Foster, 335 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. 1960), overruling Sedlock v.
Trosper, 307 Ky. 369, 211 S.W.2d 147 (1948).23 0 Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).
231 Moyer v. Merrick, 155 Colo. 73, 392 P.2d 653 (1964).
232 Id. at -, 392 P.2d at 655.
233 See generally Katz, Automobile Medical Payments Coverage-A Changing
Concept?, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 976 (1961).234 See Moore v. lggette, 45 Misc. 2d 603, 257 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup, Ct.
1965); Edmondson v. Keller, 401 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Severson v.
Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953).
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that the medical payments coverage is under a separate in-
dorsement, for which the insured has paid an additional
premium.235 This recognizes that realistically, the suit is against
the driver's insurer, and it is not a question of the driver who
paid the premium for the medical payments coverage having to
pay damages for the medical and hospital expenses as well.236
Nonetheless, the fact remains that all or part of the plaintiff's
medical expenses have been covered by the driver's insurance,
and there is no reason to require the insurance company to pay
for them again. The sounder view is to credit the amount paid
under the medical payment provision from the amount of the
judgment rendered against the insured.2 37  The fact that the
insurer would be obligated to pay under the liability provisions
of the policy has nothing to do with the fact that it has already
met this item of the plaintiff's loss.
Medical payments could also be relevant in the passenger's
suit against the driver of the other vehicle involved in the
accident, e.g., A is a passenger in B's automobile, which is
involved in a collision with C's automobile. A receives medical
payments from B's insurer, and brings suit against C.238 Under
the collateral source rule, there would be no deduction for the
medical payments, since they were not furnished by C.239 Again,
however, the plaintiff has received benefits for which he has
given no value. His medical bills have been paid, and whether
it is B's insurer or C's insurer who paid them is irrelevant. An
adjustment can be made in the suit between B and C, if any, but
235 However, the tendency now is to try to market such insurance as part of
a comprehensive policy, e.g. the Family Automobile Policy. Katz, supra Note 233,
at 278-79.
236But see Yarrington v. Thornbury, 198 A.2d 181 (Del. Sup. 1964), aff'd.,
205 A.2d 1 (Del. 1964) where the court in holding that the defendant was entitled
to have the amount paid set off against the judgment, stressed that he had paid the
premiums. It may have been significant that the judgment was in excess of the
policy limits.
237 See Adams v. Turner, 238 F. Supp. 643 (D.D.C. 1965); Dodds v. Buck-
num, 214 Cal. App. 2d 206, 29 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1963); Yarrington v. Thornbury,
198 A.2d 181 (Del. Sup. 1964), aff'd, 205 A.2d (Del. 1964); Tort v. Register,
257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Chambers v. Pinson, 6 Ohio App.2d 66,
216 N.E.2d 394 (1966).
238 If C had medical payments coverage, the question would be whether A's
insurer or C's insurer would make payments to B. Presumably, the insurance
companies have arrangements to cover the situation where the drivers of both
automobiles have medical payments coverage or the passenger is entitled to such
payments under his own policy.
2s9 See Bailey v. Jefres-Eaves, Inc., 76 N.M. 278, 414 P.2d 503 (1966),
where this result was reached.
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there is no reason to permit A to recover for the medical and
hospital expenses met by B's insurance in his suit against C. It
is important to distinguish between the situation where the
plaintiff paid for the insurance and where he did not; where
he did not, the benefits received from the insurance should be
deducted irrespective of whether the insurance was paid by the
defendant or someone else.
D. Medicare and Medical Assistance Payments.
As part of the Social Security legislation of 1965,240 Congress
enacted a program of medical care for the aged. Part of this
program consists of Medicaid, which expanded the provisions of
the Kerr-Mills Act.241 Essentially this involves grants-in-aid to
the states to support their programs of medical assistance for
the indigent aged.242 As discussed previously, where a person
has received free care through public facilities, he should not be
able to recover the value of such care from the torfeasor.243 If
an accident victim received free care in the form of public
assistance under such a program, he should not be able to
recover from the tortfeasor for the same reason.
The major part of the program, however, commonly called
Medicare, is tied to the Social Security Act, and this may
complicate the question. Basic Medicare involves the hospital
insurance benefits, which are provided for all persons over
sixty-five who are entitled to social security or railroad retire-
ment benefits.2 44 After an inpatient hospital deductible charge
of $40 and a co-insurance charge, for the time being of $10,
Medicare pays for full hospital care up to 90 days in any one
"spell of illness." Extended care facility benefits are also pro-
vided. Secondly, there is what is called Voluntary Supplementary
Medicare. This is designed to cover physicians' services, and it
is available not only to persons covered by Basic Medicare, but
24049 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 79 Stat. 353 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
306, 1395-1396 (Supp. I, 1964).
24174 Stat. 987 (1960), as amended, 79 Stat. 353 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
306 (Supp. I, 1964).
242 The grants-in-aid may also relate to programs covering dependent children,
blind persons, and permanently and totally disabled persons.
243 See the discussion supra, notes 192-99 and accompanying text.
244 Federal employees are covered by the Retired Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program. 74 Stat. 849 (1960), as amended, 79 Stat. 170 (1965), 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3051-3060 (1964) (Supp. I, 1964).
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to all citizens and resident aliens over sixty-five. Premiums are
small, $3 per month until 1968, and an amount to be determined
by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare thereafter;
these premiums are matched by the federal government. The
patient pays a $50 annual deductible fee and 20% of the costs;
the program pays the remainder. All in all, we have made a
substantial step toward providing adequate medical care for the
aged regardless of their ability to pay.
Cases will doubtless arise-it is too early for any to have
reached the appellate courts yet-where an accident victim who
has had a substantial portion of his hospital and medical expenses
met by Medicare, seeks to recover the fall value of the hospital
and medical expenses from the tortfeasor. Under our analysis
thus far, if the services have been furnished by the government,
or in this case, paid for by the government, he would not be
permitted to recover their value, beyond the deductible amount
which he paid. On the other hand, we have said that if the
medical and hospital services were paid for by insurance, he
could recover the total premium cost or the value of the services,
whichever was less. Effective with the passage of Medicare, a
sum of money attributable to the program is collected from the
wage-earner along with his social security payments. Discount-
ing the question of how the amount of social security payments
attributable to Medicare would be determined for those presently
enrolled in the program, we may ask whether Medicare benefits
represent "insurance," in which case the plaintiff could recover
the value of the services or the cost of the insurance, or whether
they represent free medical care farnished at public expense, in
which case the plaintiff could not recover the value of the services
beyond the deductible.
It is part of the ethos of social security, as indeed all social
insurance, that it is only slightly different from private insurance.
The wage-earner sets aside a portion of his wages (because
required to do so by law), and when he reaches retirement age
or becomes disabled, his savings all come back to him in the
form of social security payments. From a political standpoint,
social security was "sold" to the American public in this way.
Moreover, social security was designed to eliminate the "means
test," so detested by social workers and social welfare planners.
1970]
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Social security payments were to be the "right" of the wage-
earner independent of his financial condition. 45 This is not
wholly undesirable. As recent commentators have observed:
When all is said and done about stripping the social in-
surances of their supposed insurance attributes, this much
remains, however to be said: The beneficiary does make a
financial contribution, whether correctly called a premium or
a tax, which is regularly and observably deducted from his
wages. From this he gains a feeling of personal involvement,
the belief that his contribution is directly traceable to the
benefit, and a strong sense that he has a right to it. Whatever
may be the strictly logical and legal significance of the con-
tribution, it is a political, social and psychological fact of the
utmost importance, both in terms of the continually increasing
benefits and the willingness to pay for them, and in terms of
a popular mass demand that the worst features of public
assistance be avoided. Sustaining as fas as possible the fiction
of insurance this has important consequences in the character
of the system .... 246
But, of course, this is a fiction. It is difficult to characterize as
insurance a payment that wage-earners are required by law to
make, and which is deducted from their salaries each month
along with withholding tax. Perhaps the fiction may be bent a
little in the case of self-empolyed persons who have "elected"
to come under social security, but even here the non-insurance
factors of the program prevent such bending. The social security
program simply does not operate like insurance. As has been
observed:
The insurance principle is honored more in the propaganda
than in the reality. Half of the premium attributable to each
wage-earning beneficiary is not paid by the beneficiary at all
but by his employer. The benefits do not bear a fixed ratio to
the premiums, by whomever paid. They are adjusted in favor
of the low income groups covered by the system, of those
whose period of coverage for one reason or another is al-
lowed to be lower than the standard, of those who, such as
the disabled are advantaged in various ways. Benefit pay-
245 See ten Broek and Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54
CAlIF. L. REv. 809, 818-19 (1966).
,246 Id. at 821,
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ments are made to dependents but premiums do not vary in
the light of that fact but remain the same whether the pri-
mary beneficiary has dependents or not. Benefit payments,
moreover, are withheld or reduced if the primary beneficiary
continues in substantial gainful employment in old age or
after disability. Medical insurance payments are provided
for persons sixty-five years of age not hitherto enrolled 'financ-
ed from premium payments from enrollees together with con-
tributions from funds appropriated by the Federal Gov-
ernment.' As a result of these and other factors, there is only
the most casual relationship between benefits and pre-
miums, premiums and wages, wages and past productivity
or work; and accordingly there is little foundation for the
claim of benefits as a matter of earned right. The whole
insurance concept thus becomes only a remote analogy rather
than an operative reality.247
When the constitutionality of the Social Security Act was
challenged before the Supreme Court, it was sustained, not as a
government-operated insurance program, but as "a form of social
insurance enacted pursuant to Congress' power to spend money
in aid of the general welfare." 248 In fact, the Supreme Court has
held that Congress may constitutionally provide for the with-
drawal of social security benefits enjoyed by a deported alien
and his dependents.249 Without necessarily agreeing with the
soundness of the result, it can be concluded that the decision
does represent an affirmative declaration that social security
benefits clearly are not in the nature of insurance.
Medicare, therefore, cannot be said to be a form of insurance,
paid for by the recipient. For persons entitled to such benefits,
hospital care is substantially free, and there is no reason for them
to recover the value of such care from the tortfeasor. Voluntary
Supplementary Medicare does involve a payment for the benefit,
and the recipient should be able to recover the payments made
from the torifeasor, but no more. As we have pointed out, dam-
ages for hospital and medical services can be stipulated. In the
case of a person receiving Medicare benefits, the damages will
be the deductible and co-insurance amounts and the payments
247 Id. at 820.248 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).249 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
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for supplementary coverage. This is the only loss that an accident
victim covered by Medicare can sustain. 50
E. Gratuitous Nursing Service.
Recovery for gratuitous nursing services has met some re-
sistance notwithstanding the general acceptance of the collateral
source rule. The value of nursing is a legitimate part of the
accident victim's recovery, where the injury is so serious that
nursing care is needed. Perhaps the plaintiff or his family will
hire private nurses, but it may be that they cannot afford the
cost. Suppose a three year old child is injured when a large
metal boiler weighing over 200 pounds falls on him. The child
requires a series of operations. He is in and out of the hospital,
needing nursing care while he is at home. Since the family
cannot afford to hire private nurses and the child needs constant
attention, this is provided by the mother, who has spent over
1000 hours with the child.' 5 Or, as a result of the accident, a
young woman is confined to her bed for nine months, during
which time she is cared for by her mother.252 Perhaps the mother
is a registered nurse, and instead of pursuing her employment,
she cares for the injured member of her family.25 3
Courts fully committed to the collateral source rule allow
recovery on the ground that the services were performed for the
benefit of the plaintiff rather than the tortfeasor.2 54 One court 55
added that there is an understanding that the recipient will
repay the services which cost the plaintiff nothing.2 56 Massa-
250 It is interesting to note that Medicare payments may not be made where
payment has already been made under a federal or state workmen's compensation
law. 79 Stat. 325 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 1395(y) (Supp. 1966). No comparable
provision is made for tort recovery.
251 This was the factual situation in Large v. Williams, 151 Cal. App. 2d 315,
315 P.2d 919 (1957).252 This was the factual situation in City of Englewood V. Bryant, 68 P.2d
913 (Calif. 1937).
253 For a case in point see Bradford v. Edmands, 215 Cal. App. 2d 159, 30
Cal. Rptr. 185 (1963). In Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 21 N.E.2d 1 (1939),
the plaintiff's wife was a professional nurse, but did not appear to be working at
the time.254 See Bradford v. Edmands, 215 Cal. App. 2d 159, 30 Cal. Rptr. 185(1963); Large v. Williams, 154 Cal. App. 2d 315, 315 P.2d 919 (1957); City of
Englewood v. Bryant 68 P.2d 913 (Calif. 1937); Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball
and Athletic Ass'n, 122 Minn. 237, 142 N.W. 706 (1913).
255 Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Ass'n, 122 Minn. 237, 142
N.W. 706 (1913).256 See Evans v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 255 F.2d 203 (3rd Cir. 1958); Gibney
(Continued on next page)
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chusetts draws a distinction between services rendered by a
wife to her husband, for which there can be no recovery,257 and
those rendered by a parent to an adult child, where recovery is
permitted on the theory that the child has assumed a contractual
obligation to pay their reasonable value.258 In the case involving
the services rendered by the wife to her husband, the wife was
a professional nurse, although it did not appear that she was
working at the time of the injury. It was unfortunate that she
could not find another nurse whose husband also needed such
care. Each nurse could take care of the other's husband. The
first one to provide a day's care would receive payment from the
other. She would, in turn, pay the money back, and the first
payment would exchange hands each day. Thus, each husband
would have "paid" for his nursing services and could recover
the total cost from the tortfeasor.
I would like to take this problem to our African chief, since
I think, for him, this would be an easy case. As we have pointed
out, persons other than the victim are affected by the accident,
and usually it is the victim's family that is affected the most.
The chief would determine how each family was affected by
the particular accident. If the family had the resources to hire
private nurses and did so, the chief would order the defendant
to reimburse the family for this expenditure, as would a court
in our system. But he would realize that most families in his
tribe (and many in our society) could not afford to expend the
equivalent of $50 to $75 per day on private nurses. If we may
return home for a moment, we may add "and take a chance on
recovering it back in a personal injury suit some years later."
When the chief considered the claim of the mother who spent
1000 hours nursing her child back to health, he would not be
impressed by the argument that the services "cost nothing."
They "cost" the mother a great deal and disrupted normal family
life. The mother not only gave the child the care she normally
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
v. St. Louis Transit Co., 204 Mo. 704, 103 S.W. 43 (1907). Note that in Coyne
v. Campbell, the plaintiff was not permitted to recover for the services rendered
by his nurse.
257 Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 21 N.E. 2d 1 (1939).
258 Cepithorne v. Hardy, 173 Mass. 400, 53 N.E. 914 (1899). For a criticism
of this distinction, see Schwartz, The Collateral Source Rule, 41 B.U.L. Brlv. 348,
355 (1961).
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would have, but the care that was necessitated by the accident
for which the defendant was responsible, and care which, if the
family could have afforded it, would have been rendered by
private nurses. He would not be troubled by the lack of evidence
as to the "economic value" of these services, but would use his
layman's judgment and experience. The American court that
was confronted with this case took the same approach, leaving
it to the jury to use their judgment in putting a price on the
1000 hours that the mother spent in nursing the child. The court
viewed their award of $1500 for this item as "little enough for
the amount of nursing care that the mother rendered."
Not all cases may be this extreme. But whenever the accident
victim required nursing care, whether at home or in the hospital,
which was rendered by a family member, he would recognize
the justice of the family's claim. Since the family could not
afford private nursing care, the members of the family would
have to assume the responsibility. Younger children might have
to stay home from school. Older children who were working, or
the mother, if she had an outside job, would have to miss work,
and to that extent would be "out-of-pocket." The chief might
order the defendant to pay something to each member of the
family who rendered assistance. More likely, he would see the
loss as a loss to the family. Family life was disrupted because
of the accident, and perhaps even if the family could have
afforded to hire private nurses, they would have preferred to
take care of the victim themselves. Whether they hired private
nurses or took care of the victim themselves, it is proper that
the defendant compensate them for the nursing services made
necessary by the accident.
When we return to our more formalized legal system, it
should be clear that there is nothing "gratuitous" about nursing
services rendered to an accident victim by members of his
family. Family life has been disrupted by the accident, and to
award compensation for the value of the services to the victim-
the only person who can bring suit to recover from the tortfeasor
-is really to compensate the family for its loss. As a practical
matter, the value the jury will asign to nursing services rendered
by the family is probably less than the cost of professional nurses,
so the defendant is in no position to complain. To deny recovery
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for such services is clearly to discriminate against the families
who cannot afford to expend the money for private nurses.259
It must be remembered that we are talking about nursing services
that were reasonably incurred, so that if private nurses had been
hired, this item of damages would be recoverable. Where nursing
services were not necessary, the plaintiff could not recover the
cost of private nurses, under principles of avoidable con-
sequences. 60 Where nursing services were necessary, it should
not make any difference whether they were rendered by private
nurses or by a member of the family.
It is this point that may be troubling the courts denying
recovery for nursing services rendered "gratuitously" by a mem-
ber of the family. Family members, particularly spouses, parents
and children, are expected to render services to each other as
part of their normal relationship. This includes services during
the course of an illness or injury. The fear may be that they
will try to take advantage of the fact that there is tort recovery
to obtain compensation for the services rendered in the ordinary
course of the relationship. But this is not what the cases have
involved. In all cases where recovery was allowed, and in those
where it was not, it appeared that true nursing services were
actually being performed. The proper test to determine whether
recovery should be allowed is whether the victim or his family
would have been justified in hiring private nurses. If it would
have been unreasonable to do so, recovery for the value of
nursing services would be barred under principles of avoidable
consequences. Where it would have been reasonable, the victim
(who, under our system is the only one who can sue the tort-
feasor 61 ) should recover their value on behalf of the family.
It is not difficult to distinguish between the kind of nursing
259 See the discussion of this point in James, Social Insurance and Tort Lia-
bility: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U.L. REv. 537, 551 n. 49
(1952); Lambert, The Case for the Collateral Source Rule, 1966 INs. L.J. 531, 536.260 Under this principle, the plaintiff is not permitted to recover for expenses
that were not reasonably incurred. A person injured by a tortfeasor is not entitled
to nursing care unless the nature of the injuries makes such care reasonably
necessary.
261 Note, however, that it is the parent who recovers for the cost of medical
and nursing services expended on behalf of a child. In Bradford v. Edmands, 215
Cal. App. 2d 159, 30 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1963), the mother who had rendered the
services was permitted to recover their value from the defendant. However, at the
trial she failed to introduce evidence of what she did in the way of nursing services,
and a new trial was ordered on that ground.
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services that would properly be rendered by professional nurses
and the kind normally rendered as part of the family relationship
when illness or accident occurs. The latter appears when a
victim who is permanently disabled as a result of the accident,
and, therefore, will need extra care from his spouse or members
of his family. Such a case is Gainar v. S.S. Longview Victory,262
where, as a result of carbon monoxide poisoning, the plaintiff
suffered permanent brain damage, making him "little more than
flesh and bones." The court awarded $100,000 for loss of earnings,
$100,000 for pain and suffering, and $19,000 for past and future
medical expenses. He also claimed recovery for the value of
"nursing services" to be rendered by his wife in the future, but
this claim was rejected by the court. The court said that it
doubted whether the collateral source rule should be extended
to the services rendered by a spouse and that, in any event, it
was difficult to distinguish between customary duties and "extra-
ordinary services made necessary by the injury." The court was
correct to deny recovery for this item, since the services the wife
would perform were in no sense nursing services, the kind of
services that a private nurse would be hired to perform. These
services consisted of (1) applying alcohol to his body, (2) ob-
taining medical prescriptions, (3) taking him to the doctor, (4)
assisting him in shaving and dressing, (5) arranging medical
appointments, and (6) "presumably aiding him in most of his
activities." These are the things that a wife does for a disabled
husband, or that one member of a family does for another. If
the victim had no family, he would, in his condition, have had
to have been institutionalized, and the cost of institutional care
would be a proper item of damages. Again, we are back to the
notion that the tortfeasor takes his victim as he finds him. Since
the victim had a family and needed services that are ordinarily
performed by one family member for another in case of disable-
ment, there is no reason for the plaintiff to recover the value
of such services.
The real problem is that the victim is an invalid, and what
he is really seeking to recover is his total dependency on others
as a result of the accident. There is no doubt that this condition
should be the subject of compensation, and the question is how
262 226 F.Supp. 912 (E.D. Va. 1964).
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it is to be done. The answer appears on the case of James v.
State2 13 where due to the accident the plaintiff was paralyzed
and would be confined to a wheelchair for the rest of his life.
He sought to recover as a special item of damages the value of
"nursing services" that had been rendered by his wife in the
past and would be rendered by her in the future. These services
were similar to those involved in Gainar. The court disallowed
this item on the ground that compensation could not be recovered
for services which were "normal marital obligations." The court
did, however, make an award of $75,000 for pain and suffering
In commenting on that award, it observed that "it covers life in
a wheelchair, the resulting sexual impotence, anxieties and his
total dependency on others for his every movement." (Emphasis
added.)264 Life in a wheelchair and total dependency are com-
pensated under the heading of damages for pain and suffering
rather than nursing services of the wife. The jury will award
compensation for the fact that he is dependent, and evidence
of what his wife will have to do for him is relevant to show the
nature of his dependency. Its award of damages for pain and
suffering will not only compensate the plaintiff for his condition,
but will take care of the disruption of family life that has been
caused by the accident. To instruct the jury that it should
award an additional sum for the wife's nursing services could
only cause confusion.2 5 This situation is easily distinguishable
from those where a member of the family has rendered true
nursing services.
F. A Comparison.
We may now compare the results reached under the functional
approach with those reached by an application of the collateral
source rule. Under the functional approach, the plaintiff will
ordinarily recover the value of "gratuitous medical services"
furnished by a physician or paid by someone else. He recovers,
in effect, on behalf of the physician or the donor, because our
system does not permit them to proceed against the tortfeasor.
By allowing the plaintiff to recover, there is the possibility that
263 154 So.2d 497 (La. App. 1963).
264 154 So. 2d at 499.
265 To the extent that the jury is awarding compensation for 'loss of human-
ity," it is not likely to "add" a sum for the wife's services.
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the proper person will be paid, if he desires it, and this can be
accomplished by a direction to repay. We would deny recovery
only in an unusual situation such as that presented in Coyne v.
Campbell, where the plaintiff himself was a physician.
A clear departure from the collateral source rule occurs in
the case of services rendered at a public or private charity
hospital. We would deny recovery to the plaintiff, since as to
him such care was free, and there is no reason to permit him to
recover the cost from the defendant. Whether the hospital should
be able to recover from the tortfeasor is a different matter, but
in all probability it is not worthwhile for them to pursue such
claims. The plaintiff should be able to recover the cost of
future medical services, since he is likely to prefer private care,
and it is his "right" to have it. It may be that he will employ
the free care for which he is eligible and thereby receive a
"windfall," but recovery for past and future expenditures must
be had in a single action, and at the time of suit there is no
way of knowing what he will choose to do.
We would allow servicemen, active or retired, to recover
the value of free medical care at military hospitals, not because
such care came from a "collateral source," but because this
represents a "fringe benefit," and we cannot measure what they
"gave up" in order to get it. It is not proper to deduct the value
of the benefit, without giving them credit for what they lost in
order to receive it, and the defendant, who otherwise is respon-
sible for the loss, must bear it, where he cannot demonstrate the
amount that should be deducted. However, we would deny
recovery in a suit against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, because there it is the tortfeasor who has
furnished the benefit. Again, note that in such cases the plaintiff
would be entitled to recover the value of future medical and
hospital expenses, since he might prefer private care. In con-
tradistinction to the collateral source rule, we would deny
recovery against a tortfeasor, whether the United States or not,
where the plaintiff has received free care at a Veterans Ad-
ministration Hospital. Such care simply represents a social
welfare benefit extended to veterans who are indigent. In this
connection, the courts should ignore the attempt of the lawyers
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in the Veterans Administration to recover the cost of such care
under the "assignment" method. It is difficult to believe that the
total cost of care for indigent veterans who are accident victims
amounts to such a significant portion of the Veterans Administra-
tion budget that the judicial machinery should be used to
reallocate the loss which has come to rest in an efficient channel
of distribution.
Where the expenses have been met by health insurance or
some similar protective arrangement, the plaintiff should recover
either the amount of the expenses or the total amount of his
premiums or contributions, whichever is smaller. The collateral
source rule would allow recovery of the expenses without regard
to the premiums or contributions. Recovery should also be re-
duced by any amount paid to the plaintiff under a medical
payments provision, whether he is suing the driver of the auto-
mobile in which he was riding or the driver of another vehicle
involved in the accident. Such payments have operated to
reduce his loss, and he has not given value for them. We would
deny recovery for expenses met by Medicare and limit the
beneficiary to what he has actually expended for the deductible
and co-insurance amounts and the payments for supplementary
coverage. Under the collateral source rule, recovery for the
value of the hospital and medical services would be allowed.
Finally, we would allow the plaintiff to recover the value of
nursing services rendered by family members, where such ser-
vices would be compensable if rendered by private nurses,
distinguishing these from services rendered to a disabled ac-
cident victim in the course of the normal family relationship,
which, in effect, are compensated by the award of damages
for pain and suffering. It should be noted that not all courts
allow recovery, even under the collateral source rule, for
"gratuitous" services rendered by family members.
Loss oF EAi-NG OPPoRTuNrry
From the standpoint of out-of-pocket loss, loss of earning
opportunity is the most significant item of damages. As a result
of the injury the plaintiff, if he has been working, will have lost
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time from his work, which obviously represents a compensable
loss.266 Moreover, the injury may have had permanent effects.
Although the plaintiff perhaps will be able to return to work,
his earning capacity might be impaired, and if so, he recovers
damages for what is called impairment of future earning op-
portunity.26 7 This situation will ordinarily not present any
collateral source problems, 26 8 and for purposes of our analysis,
may be disregarded. We are interested in the case where as a
result of the injury, the plaintiff has become "permanently and
totally disabled," which means that he will not be able to work
at all, or at least will be unable to earn anything significant.
Whether the victim is "permanently and totally disabled" will
depend not only on the nature of his injury, but on the nature
of his employment. The longshoreman with a sixth grade educa-
tion who has become a double amputee will, in all likelihood,
be unable to work again. The college professor in the same
situation may well continue his employment without reduction
in earning capacity. The permanently and totally disabled victim
likewise recovers for loss of future earning opportunity, i.e., he
recovers what he would have earned if he had not been
injured 9.26  Recovery for loss of earning opportunity, then, in-
eludes recovery for both "past" and "future" losses due to
accident.
It is important to review the theoretical basis of this recovery.
The plaintiff recovers for the earning opportunity that he has
lost. One way to deal with the societal problem of accidents
might be to provide only minimum protection against the loss
266 If the plaintiff is a housewife, the husband recovers the value of her
services. If a married woman has been working, she recovers for the lost income
in her own right. See W. PRossFa, LAw OF TORTS, 913-14 (3rd ed. 1964).267 This is a compensable interest even in the absence of evidence that the
plaintiff has suffered a diminution in wages following the injury. See Messer v.
Beighley, 409 Pa. 551, 187 A.2d 168 (1963). See also Gooch v. Lake, 327 S.W.2d
132 (Mo. 1959), where the plaintiff, a football player, was unable to play during
his senior year of college. He was permitted to show that the starting salary of
high school football coaches would depend on whether they played during their
senior year and that, as a result of the accident, he would receive a lower starting
salary. Even though the injury did not have a permanent effect, it resulted in an
impairment of future earning opportunity, for which he could recover.
268 However, as a result of the injury, the plaintiff might receive a partial
disability pension. The analysis applicable to the "permanently and totally
disabled plaintiff" would also be applicable to this situation.
269 This is also true in a wronful death action. The beneficiaries' recovery is
based on the loss of future earning opportunity of the decedent. Thus, whenever
we are talking about recovery for loss of future earning opportunity, we include
both a suit for personal injuries and a suit for wrongful death.
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that results, i.e., in addition to medical and hospital expenses,
we would award enough money so that the victim and his family
could enjoy a modest standard of living during the period of
disablement, whether temporary or permanent.270 Suppose that
an executive earning $50,000 per year is killed or permanently
disabled so that he is unable to work again. If he had the
expectancy of twenty more years of gainful employment, he is
entitled to recover the present worth of $1,000,000 with or
without a deduction for taxes. 271 But his family does not need
nearly that much to subsist. Suppose we conclude that a family
of four needs $6000 per year to enjoy a minimum standard of
living. If he dies, leaving a wife and three children, we could
give the family $6000 per year until the children were grown
and then reduce the amount to that which is necessary to take
care of the wife. This is not how our system works. Compensa-
tion is not based on the minimum needs of the victim or his
family, nor even on "reasonable needs." We try to put the
victim or his family in as good a position as he would have
been if the accident had not occurred.272 Supporters of the
present system of vertical rather than horizontal splitting contend
that "deserving" victims should obtain full recovery and "un-
deserving" victims should not recover, rather than permitting
all victims, "deserving" and "undeserving" to obtain some-
thing.2 73 Therefore, when we speak in terms of "adequate
compensation," we are speaking in terms of what the victim or
his family lost by the accident and not in terms of what his
needs will be afterwards.
At the time our rules of damages for personal injuries de-
veloped, loss of work meant loss of pay. Whenever a plaintiff
was unable to work for a period of time due to the injury, he
received no pay, and it was only proper that he recover the
amount of pay lost from the torifeasor. The courts, however,
said that what he was really recovering was the value of his
27o As is provided in Saskatchewan, for example, for all victims of automobile
accidents. SAsx. REv. STAT. ch 409, pt. 1 (1965). Tort recovery is also provided.
271 See Note 32, supra.
272 Thus, the plaintiff recovers damages for loss of earning opportunity based
on his life expectancy as it existed before the accident rather than his life expec-
tancy as it exists following the accident. See Prairie Creek Coal Mining Co. v.
Kittrell, 106 Ark. 138 153 S.W 89 (1912).
273 See Blum and Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem
-Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 641 (1964).
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lost time, and what he was earning was merely some evidence
of what his time was worth.y It is difficult to believe that the
jury considers whether the plaintiff was being over-paid. Where
a salaried or hourly employee has been injured, it is reasonable
to assume that the jury awards him his pay for each day missed
from work. Such damages are often stipulated. The concept
that the plaintiff was recovering for the value of lost time proved
useful where the plaintiff was not receiving a salary or hourly
pay, as for example where he was unemployed at the time of
the injury,275 was self-employed,2 76 was working in a family
business without pay, 77 or suffered permanent disability when
he was just embarking on his career after a period of training.278
The concept also proved useful in those rare cases where the
employer continued to pay the wages as a "gratuity" either
because he was charitably inclined or because he wished to
retain the loyalty of a key employee. The courts that permitted
the plaintiff to recover full damages despite the fact that his
wages were continued stressed that he was recovering for the
value of his lost time rather than for lost wages; this buttressed
the application of the collateral source rule.279 Moreover, certain
kinds of employees continued to receive their salary despite
disablement, such as military personnel280 and policemen.8 1
Here too, the notion that the plaintiff was recovering for the
value of his lost time operated with the collateral source rule so
as to allow recovery.
Today, of course, the concept of "no work, no pay" has
undergone radical change. Unemployment compensation and
other forms of public assistance are available for those who
274 See generally C. McComIcK, DAmAcEs § 87 (1935).
275 See, e.g., Smith v. Triplett, 83 S.W.2d 1104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
276 See, e.g., Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Shanks, 260 Ky. 416, 86 S.W.2d
128 (1935).
277 See, e.g., Nemer v. Anderson, 151 Colo. 411, 378 P.2d 841 (1963).
278 See, e.g., Grayson v. Irvmar Realty Corp., 12 Misc. 2d 38, 173 N.Y.S.2d
71 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
279 See, e.g., Silverman v. Springfield Advertising Co., 120 Conn. 55, 179
A. 98 (1935).
If the plaintiff's employer continues to pay the plaintiff his wages or
salary during his disability, as a gratuity, the plaintiff could hardly be
said to have lost any wages, but this generosity ought not to lessen the
amount which the wrongdoer should pay, and in these cases the courts
have insisted that it is the 'value' of the plaintiff's lost time that is the
measure of his recovery. C. McComvncK, supra note 274, at 310.280 See Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H. 227, 183 A.2d 729 (1962).
281 See Wachtel v. Leonard, 45 Ga. App. 14, 163 S.E. 512 (1937).
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cannot obtain employment. An employee who suffers injury
during the course of his employment is likely to receive workmen's
compensation during the time that he misses work. He may
have an accident insurance policy that provides payment for
each day that he was incapacitated. With respect to time lost
from work, however, the most important change has been the
advent of sick leave. It is now recognized that employees are
entitled to miss a certain number of days of work without loss of
pay. Sick leave can take a variety of forms; the employee may
have so many days per month or per year, and he may be able
to accumulate the leave for a period of time. More significantly,
the sick leave may be the equivalent, expressly or in practice, to
vacation leave, that is, if the employee does not use up the time
for actual illness he may take it, "pretending to be ill," or as
vacation time without the pretense. Whatever the form, it is
clear that sick leave is part of the employee's total compensation
picture. Enterprises calculate the cost of sick leave benefits as
part of total employment cost, and it has "dollar and cents"
value in collective bargaining agreements.
The change in societal attitude is equally applicable where
the employee has become totally and permanently disabled.
At one time the individual who was no longer able to work was
left to provide for himself with primary dependence on savings,
efforts of other family members, and private or public charity.
Now, if he has suffered the injury in the course of his employ-
ment, he will usually receive benefits under a workmen's
compensation plan or similar statutory scheme.282 He may
receive a disability pension from his employer. He may have
income protection insurance, under which he receives a sum of
money each month for a designated period of time or until the
end of life. And he may receive a disability pension under the
Social Security Act,2 3 or similar legislation such as the Railroad
Retirement Act284 or the Federal Civil Service Retirement
Act.2 5
282 It must be remembered, however, that not all employees are covered.
See the discussion in 1 A. LARSON, TnE LAW OF WoRKMN'S COMPENSATION, §
5.30 (1966). Some employees such as railroad workers and seamen have a statutory
cause of action against the employer, which alters common law defenses.
28342 U.S.C. § 423 (1964).
28445 U.S.C. § 228b (1964).
2885 U.S.C. § 8337 (1966).
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It is evident, therefore, that the question of collateral source
benefits as affecting recovery for loss of earning opportunity will
frequently arise. The plaintiff who was unable to work for a
period of time because of the accident may not have lost any
wages.186 The nature of his employment may have been such
that his salary was continued during the period of disability, or
the employer may have decided to continue it anyway. He may
have received workmen's compensation or have used up some
or all of his sick leave time. Even if he did not get paid, he
might have received insurance benefits, and if he was un-
employed, he might have been receiving unemployment com-
pensation or other public assistance during the time in which
he was incapacitated. Where he suffered a permanent disability,
he might be receiving benefits from workmen's compensation,
from a private disability pension, from a disability pension
provided by the government or from income protection
insurance. Our discussion of the problem will be divided into
three parts: (1) loss of time without loss of pay; (2) private
pensions and accident insurance; (3) social insurance. It is the
latter which will require the most extensive discussion.
A. Loss of Time Without Loss of Pay.
Here we will be discussing the situation where the plaintiff
may not have lost any pay, either because he used up sick leave
time, the nature of the employment was such that pay continued
during disability, or the employer simply paid his wages. The
situation where the wages were not continued, but the plaintiff
had accident insurance or received social insurance benefits will
be discussed in the remaining sections. Let us first consider sick
leave. If sick leave can, in effect, be taken like vacation time,
it is clear that the plaintiff has lost something when he was
compelled to use up sick leave time while recovering from the
accident. What he has lost is part of his paid vacation from work.
Suppose that in a given year the plaintiff can accumulate ten
days of sick leave, which, if unused, he can take as vacation
time. If he uses the sick leave to recuperate from the accident
286 It must be remembered that certain classes of plaintiffs may not have
suffered any loss of earning opportunity, e.g., retired persons, children, and house-
wives.
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and takes ten days of vacation without pay, he is out-of-pocket
the wages for those ten days. More likely, he will take ten days
less vacation than he would have if the accident had not oc-
curred, and vacation time will have been spent in convalescence.
It is surely reasonable to measure the economic value of his lost
vacation by his wages for those days just as if he had used
officially designated vacation time to recuperate. 87 By the same
token, where sick leave can be accumulated, particularly over
a long period of time, the plaintiff loses the benefit of the leave
for future use whenever he takes some of it as a result of the
accident. Again, he has given up something of value, which
can be measured in terms of his wages for the time lost.288  The
point is that in some enterprises employees can take sick leave
like vacation time. The prudent employee may accumulate the
sick leave for future use to the extent possible. Others will take
it at the end of each year. In either event, the employee who
has such leave for convalescence is out-of-pocket, and he is
properly compensated by the recovery of his wages for the time
used as sick leave.
In other enterprises sick leave may mean just that. Employees
may have to substantiate their absence by medical certification
or similar evidence. It is also likely that sick leave cannot be ac-
cumulated for too long a period. Sick leave then becomes a con-
tingent benefit, to be used only in the case of actual illness or
disability. Here too, however, he should be able to recover the
value of his lost time notwithstanding that his pay was continued
under the sick leave arrangement. If, at the time of trial, he
still could make use of the sick leave in the future, it cannot be
said that he actually received his wages during the period of
disability. For, if he should subsequently become ill, the sick
leave would not be available, and he would lose the wages at
that time. It is more likely that this will be known at the time of
trial, and the question is whether the fact that he did not lose
287 See Carroll v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 26 App. Div.2d 552, 271, N.Y.S.2d
7 (1966); Rigney v. Cincinnati Steel Ry., 99 Ohio App. 105, 131 N.E.2d 413(1954). See the discussion in James, supra note 259, at 549-50; Note, Unreason
in the Law of Damages: The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 741, 751
(1964).
288 See Thomas v. Paper Haulers, Inc., 165 So.2d 61 (La. App., 1964);
D'Amico v. Resnick, 22 Misc. 2d 545, 197 N.Y.S.2d 826 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See the
discussion in Maxwell, The Collateral Source Rule in the American Law of
Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rnv. 669, 680 (1962).
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wages because he used his sick leave time should affect his re-
covery. The answer to this question will be found in our analysis
of Sergeant Browning's case. Sick leave represents a "fringe bene-
fit," and as we have said, represents a part of the total compen-
sation picture. We cannot measure how much the plaintiff "gave
up" in reduced wages-and will give up in the future-in order
to obtain the sick leave benefit, in the absence of a very special
computer that our system lacks.28 9 We cannot say that the plain-
tiff suffered no wage loss because of the accident since he had
sick leave, because we do not know what the sick leave "cost"
him. We have, therefore, concluded that in all cases where the
wages of the plaintiff were continued because of sick leave pro-
visions, he should recover the value of his lost time from the
defendant.
Where the pay is continued because of the nature of the
employment-this is also Sergeant Browning's case-the same
rationale is applicable. Where pay continues during disability,
and this is known at the outset of the employment relationship, it
is a fringe benefit and a part of the total compensation picture.
The serviceman knows that his pay continues during a tempor-
ary disability, and if he must retire due to a line of duty injury,
he will receive a disability pension. It cannot be doubted that
the security in knowing that "the government will take care of
you" operates as an inducement to enter and remain in military
service despite the relatively low salary. Since we cannot measure
the economic value of what the serviceman gave up to get this
benefit, we must permit him to recover for the value of his lost
time.290 This is also true in the case of a policeman who con-
tinues to receive pay when injured in the line of duty291 or a
college professor whose salary continues during disability.202 In
certain types of employment the security of continuation of
289 See Klein v. United States, 339 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1964), where the plain-
tiff's salary was continued under the employer's sickness and disability plan. The
court allowed recovery, stressing that the benefit "was part of the bargain for
her labor." Id. at 518.29 0 See Bell v. Primeau, 104 N.H. 227, 183 A.2d 729 (1962). The English
courts do not permit the serviceman to recover in such a case. See the discussion
in Browning v. The War Office, [1963] 1 Q.B. 750, 759 (C.A. 1962). The plain-
tiff in Browning did not claim damages for the value of his lost time.
291 See Wachtel v. Leonard, 45 Ga. App. 14, 163 S.E. 512 (1932); DArch-
angelo v. Loyer, 125 Vt. 325, 215 A.2d 520 (1965).292 See Ashley v. American Automobile Ins. Co. 19 Wis.2d 17, 119 N.W.2d
359 (1963).
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salary during disability may be significant, and we now realize
that "pay" represents a combination of factors, of which salary
is only one. The fact that a person's salary is continued during
disability, therefore, does not mean that he has not "lost" some-
thing by undertaking the kind of employment that provides such
security, and that something is probably less salary. Our in-
ability to measure what he has given up in order to obtain the
benefit precludes us from deducting the value of the benefit,
and the ordinary rule allowing recovery for the value of his
lost time must operate.
As we have stated repeatedly, under our system the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover the value of what he has lost because
of the accident. His needs are irrelevant. When a person's pay
is continued during disability for any reason, he does not need
to recover the value of the lost time from the tortfeasor. He and
his family will be able to subsist despite the injury. Our goal,
however, is not that the family be able to subsist, but that he
is to be made whole. It may seem illogical from an economic
standpoint to permit a person to recover wages that he never
lost. But since he "gave up" something in order to get those
wages, we cannot make a deduction without giving him credit
for what he surrendered. Since we cannot measure this, we have
no choice but to give him the wages. This is the closest we can
come to measuring his loss from the accident. So long as we award
compensation to accident victims under our present system, we
must continue to deal with collateral source benefits in terms
of whether there has been a loss rather than in terms of whether
a need has been met.293 Because of the limitations inherent in
measuring loss accurately under our system, and in light of our
theory of compensation, we may have to permit recovery for
lost salary where the salary actually was continued.
No problem of measurement confronts us when we consider
the true gratuity situation, that is, the situation where the em-
ployer continues the wages despite the fact that he is not re-
293 Perhaps the soundest way to deal with the problem of the disabled
wage-earner is to require the employer to continue his wages during the period
of disability, just as he now provides compensation for work-connected injuries.
Or, it may be sounder to permit the employer to recover the costs from the tort-
feasor on the ground that this would materially reduce the cost of sick leave
benefits, leaving more money available for other fringe benefits or higher wages.
But this is not how we approach the problem, and the matter of loss allocation
and reallocation is not the concern of the court hearing the personal injury case.
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quired to do so by the contract or the nature of the employment.
Rather he does so out of charity, or more likely because he thinks
that it is in his interest to do so in order to retain the loyalty
of a key employee.294 If we are to treat the gratuity as a sep-
arate category, we must assume that the plaintiff did not take
less salary or give up something in the past in order to obtain
the gratuity.295 Where the wages have been continued as a
gratuity, for whatever reason, it is clear that the employer has
lost something because of the accident. Either he had to hire a
substitute or operate short-handed, 9 6 and, as we have said, the
accident is likely to have had effects on others than the immedi-
ate victim. The courts have had a difficult time with these cases.
It may be that the employee will continue to perform some
services, though his efficiency has been reduced. Some courts
have tried to distinguish between the situation where it could
be said that the employee actually lost no time from work, so
that he could not recover for this item of damages,297 and
where it could be said that he was really being paid a gratuity,
so that recovery for the value of his lost time was justified under
the collateral source rule.298 Where the employee was definitely
away from work, most courts allow recovery, as we have said,
either on the basis of the collateral source rule299 or on the ground
that he is recovering for the value of his lost time rather than for
lost salary.800 A notable exception is New York, which in the old
case of Drinkwater v. Dinsmore,01 denied recovery, and re-
affirmed its position in Coyne v. Campbell30 2
294 In either event this is only likely to occur where there is an individual
employer-employee relationship. In other cases the enterprise is likely to have
sick leave arrangements.
295 If the employer has taken out insurance against the illness of a key em-
ployee, any payments made to the employee under the insurance do not represent
a gratuity. Such benefits become a part of his total compensation picture.295 This is true even if he has not continued the wages.
297 See Whiddon v. Malone, 220 Ala. 220, 124 So. 516 (1929); Moon v.
St. Louis Transp. Co., 247 Mo. 227, 152 S.W. 303 (1912); Kite v. Jones, 389
Pa. 339, 132 A.2d 683 (1958). These three cases involved high-ranking executives
who were able to perform some of their duties, but clearly at a reduced efficiency.
298 Stevenson v. Pennsylvania Sports Enterprises Inc., 372 Pa. 157, 93 A.2d
236 (1952). Here the plaintiff came into work occasionally to answer phone calls
and went out a few times. See the criticism of the distinction in Maxvell, supra
note 288, at 682.
299 See e.g., Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927).
300 See e.g., Silverman v. Springfield Advertising Co., 120 Conn. 55, 179 A.
98 (1935).
30180 N.Y. 390 (1880).
802 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891 (1962).
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Let us bring this case before our African chief. As he would
see it, the victim and his family were not affected by the ac-
cident, because the employer continued his wages, so there
is no reason for the victim to recover from the tortfeasor. The
effects of the accident were clearly felt by the employer. If he
had hired a substitute, he would be out-of-pocket that amount.
Apart from that, secondary effects might also be visible. The
substitute may have been unable to perform the work as well as
the injured person, consequently the employer would have been
adversely affected in this regard whether or not he continued
the employee's wages. This becomes more pronounced when no
substitute was hired, and the employer had to operate "short-
handed," regardless of whether or not he continued the em-
ployee's wages. Anytime an employee is unable to work, harm
may be suffered by the employer.
Thus, for our chief the question is not whether the employee
should recover the value of lost wages from the tortfeasor, but
whether the employer should be compensated for the distruption
of his enterprise due to the absence of his employee following
an accident for which the defendant was responsible. The chief
would certainly allow the employer to recover the salary he paid
to the employee. That was the tortfeasor's responsibility, and the
employer met it for him.30 3 Where the cost of hiring the substi-
tute exceeded the employee's wages, the chief would also permit
recovery for that amount: this is a clearly ascertainable loss to
the employer, made necessary by the accident. Beyond this, the
chief would be very hesitant to allow recovery, because he would
find it difficult to measure the employer's loss due to the "secon-
dary effects." He would note that he had the same kind of dif-
ficulty whenever self-employed person was injured: how could
he determine what the victim lost due to his absence from the
business, particularly if the business was operated with a sub-
stantial capital investment and a large number of employees.
There, however, he would do the best he could, since all ac-
cident victims are entitled to compensation for their lost time.30 4
303 In the same manner as where the employer pays the injured employee
workmen's compensation. As we will see, in most states the employer can recover
this amount either by subrogation or reimbursement.
304 See e.g., Dempsey v. City of Scranton, 264 Pa. 495, 107 A. 877 (1919).
Cf. Steitz v. Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939).
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Here the employer is not the accident victim, and the chief might
conclude that the employer should not recover in excess of his
out-of-pocket expenditures. Since the loss to the employer from
the secondary effects of the employee's absence could not be
measured to the chiefs satisfaction,30 5 he would say, "I'm sorry,
but you will just have to put up with this kind of loss as a cost of
doing business. This won't happen that often, and there is only
so much that our law can do."
Let us now return to our system and see how we have dealt
with the problem of the disruption of the employer's enterprise.
It is not inaccurate to say that the employer has never been
permitted to recover damages for the disruption of his enter-
prise from the tortfeasor. The gist of the common law action
per quod servitium amisit may have been the loss of services due
to the injury, but recovery was essentially for the ordinary ex-
penses of maintaining the injured servant or child and actual
disbursements such as medical bills.30 Recovery may have in-
cluded the cost of hiring a substitute or extra household help,307
but it may be questioned whether such help would have been
regularly available. If the action survives today, and there have
been few American cases recognizing it,30 8 it may be that the
cost of hiring a substitute can be recovered.0 9 One court has
stated in dicta that the employer could recover what he might
have made above the cost of the employee's services,310 but the
actual holding was that, in the absence of statutory subrogation,
the employer could not recover workmen's compensation from the
tortfeasor. The court flatly stated that the employer could not
recover the wages paid to the injured employee .3 1 As pointed out
305 We would say that "such damages are too speculative, since they cannot
be proved with reasonable certainty." Of course, this represents a value judgment.
Where the interest is sufficiently important to justify compensation, such as pain
and suffering, we permit recovery, although damages are completely speculative.
But where it is not that important, such as loss of enjoyment from being unable
to play a musical instrument, we invoke the "certainty" rule. See Hogan v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 148 Kan. 720, 85 P.2d 28 (1938).306 See Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law,
54 CALiF. L. Bnv. 1478, 1485 (1966).
307 Id. at 1485.
308 Id. at 1490-91.
309 Id. at 1492.
310 Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public Service Elec. Co., 86 N.J.L. 26, 91
A. 1062 (1914).
311 Cf. Mankin v. Scala Theodrome Co., [19471 K.B. 257, where the em-
ployer and the employee made up a joint vaudeville act. The employer was per-
mitted to recover damages based on reduced earnings. Both he and the employeejoined as plaintiffs in the suit against the torifeasor.
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previously, on the whole, our tort law limits recovery to the
immediate victim of the accident and does not allow recovery
to others who may have been affected by it.312 Thus, the em-
ployer does not have a cause of action for the distruption of his
business due to the absence of an employee. Even apart from
questions of "duty," "foreseeability" and the like, this loss simply
cannot be measured, and since it is not likely to occur with great
frequency, 13 the employer will have to bear it. We would then
agree with the African chief on this point.
However, this is a much different question than whether the
employer who has suffered a measureable out-of-pocket loss as a
result of the accident, i.e., the amount of salary paid to the em-
ployee, for which he received nothing in return, should be able
to recover this amount from the torifeasor. Practically all modern
cases in which the employer has tried to recover from the tort-
feasor involve claims for reimbursement of disability payments,
pensions, or the cost of medical treatment for members of the
armed forces, police force or other public servants.314 As we will
see, in most states workmen's compensation payments are re-
coverable by the employer or his insurer, either by way of an
independent action against the responsible tortfeasor, by inter-
vention in the employee's action against the tortfeasor or by a
lien on the employee's judgment. 15 Some civil law jurisdictions
allow recoupment of payments made to the employee from the
torffeasor. 316 Most English and American cases, on the other
hand, hold that the employer cannot recover. 1 7 The result is
justified if, because of the jurisdiction's commitment to the col-
lateral source rule, the employee's recovery is unaffected by the
receipt of benefits from the employer, since otherwise the de-
312 See the discussion, supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
313 Just as it is possible to obtain insurance against the death of a key em-
ployee, it should be possible to obtain insurance against his disablement or tempor-
ary absence from work.
314 See the discussion in Fleming supra note 306, at 1487.
315 See the discussion, infra notes 372-76 and accompanying text
310 See the discussion in Fleming supra note 306, at 1516-20.
317 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947); City of Phila-
relphia v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 337 Pa. 1, 10 A.2d 434 (1940); Receiver
for the Metropolitan Police Dist. v. Croydon Corp., [1957] 2 Q.B. 154 (C.A.
1956). In the latter case the court said that the action per quod servitium amisit
was available only as to "menial servants." Recovery was permitted as to sums
expended for the benefit of the injured employee in Jones v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,
155 F.2d 992 (3rd Cir. 1946), but it is doubtful if the decision (which was
based on Pennsylvania law, and the court apparently was unaware of the City of
Philadelphia case) would be followed today.
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fendant would have to pay twice for the same item of damages.
But if the court holds that the employee cannot recover his salary
which was met by the employer's gratuitous payment, 18 and
does not permit an action by the employer to recover the amount
expended, we have a case of uncompensated loss. The employee
has received his wages, so he has lost nothing due to the acci-
dent. The employer is out-of-pocket the wages he paid his em-
ployee, for which he received nothing in return, even discounting
the disruption of his business. Since the defendant will not have
had to pay anything to the employee for his lost time, there is
no reason why he should not be liable for this out-of-pocket loss
the employer has sustained. And apart from the employer's loss,
he has made good an injury to the accident victim, the respon-
sibility for which the law has assigned to the tortfeasor.
The solution for the African chief was to order the torifeasor
to make the payment to the employer, and as we have pointed
out, this is what happens in the case of workmen's compensa-
tion and in some civil law jurisdictions. This solution has been
advocated for all gratuity cases.3 19 But is this a sound solution in
our legal system? We are not talking about a comprehensive plan
of loss allocation resulting from accidents. The question is whether
in the relatively few cases where the employer has continued to
pay the salary of his injured employee because of charitable in-
clination or the employee's special value to him, the employer
should have a separate cause of action against the tortfeasor to
recover this amount. Our system is not that of the African chief,
and we cannot call the parties under a tree. While we may allow
recoupment in the case of an injured employee who has obtained
workmen's compensation, such cases are significantly more in
number. And such recoupment has been questioned as reallocat-
ing the loss from one efficient channel of distribution to another,
perhaps less efficient,320 as well as presenting practical problems
in apportionment.821
3 18 As the New York courts have held: Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372,
183 N.E.2d 891 (1962); Drinkwater v. Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880). In Eng-
land, the employee may recover the value of his lost time from the tortfeasor in the
gratuity situation. Peacock v. Amusement Equip. Co. [19541 2 Q.B. 347 (C.A.).
319 See West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's
Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 395, 414 (1963).
320 The tortfeasor may be a less efficient loss distributor, particularly where
the employer is insured.32 1 See 2 A. LAnsoN, THE LAw OF WonxmEN's ComPNsAToN § 74.30
(1968).
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There are likely to be similar problems in permitting a sep-
arate action by the employer. 322 Apart from that, the real objec-
tion is to "cranking up the machine again." The employer has,
in fact, suffered a loss due to the accident, since he paid the em-
ployee his salary without receiving anything in return. It seems
more efficient to permit the employee to recover this loss on his
behalf, that is, to recover the value of his lost time without re-
gard to the fact that his salary was continued. We could include
a direction to repay, but this is not really necessary. The em-
ployee and the employer may adjust matters as they wish, and
the defendant is protected, since he will have to meet the loss
only once. An analogy may be drawn to cases where the accident
victim was working but received no salary. By permitting him to
recover the value of his lost time, we are, in effect, compensat-
ing the enterprise for the loss of the employee. A recent case 23
involved a priest who was teaching at a college operated by his
religious order. Following the accident, he missed some time
from work and thereafter taught a reduced load. It was con-
tended that since he had taken vows of poverty and was not
paid wages, he suffered no economic loss in this regard. None-
theless, the court permitted him to recover for the value of his
lost time. No doubt he will turn the proceeds of the award over
to the college, which is thereby compensated for the loss it suf-
fered because of his absence. The same thing will happen when
we allow recovery for the value of lost time to a woman who
performed services as a bookkeeper for a partnership consist-
ing of her husband and son, but recived no salary.324 Interestingly
enough, in that case, damages were computed on the basis of a
monthly salary paid to a replacement. So too, when a partner in
a business has been injured and continues to draw salary during
the period of disablement.32 In all of these cases the enterprise
has suffered a loss when an employee was unable to work due to
the accident. It is more efficient to permit the plaintiff to recover
on behalf of the enterprise, and for want of a better method, we
322 See the criticism of the separate action in Maxwell, supra note 388, at 685.3 2 3 McLaughlin v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. Ry., 31 Wis.2d 378, 143
N.W.2d 32 (1966).
324 Nemer v. Anderson, 151 Colo. 411, 378 P.2d 841 (1963).
325 Lashin v. Corcoran, 146 Conn. 512, 152 A.2d 639 (1959) Canning v.
Hannaford, 373 Mich. 41, 127 N.W.2d 851 (1964). Contra, Pensak v. Peerless
Oil Co., 311 Pa. 207, 166 A. 792 (1933).
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measure the loss to the enterprise in terms of the value of the
employee's time.32
Where the employee who received his salary during the period
of disablement recovers the value of his lost time, funds are
available from which he can reimburse the employer. He and
the employer can adjust the matter as they wish. Therefore, re-
covery for the value of lost time should be unaffected by the fact
that the plaintiff's salary was continued. He is recovering on be-
half of his employer, and under our system-which is necessarily
more complicated than that of the African chief-it is sounder to
go about it in this way rather than to permit a separate action
by the employer against the tortfeasor.
B. Disability Pensions and Accident Insurance.
We have used the example of disability pensions to demon-
strate the methodology of the functional approach. We conclude
that the receipt of a disability pension should not operate to re-
duce recovery because we could not measure what the plaintiff
"lost" in order to receive that benefit. This is not a question of
cumulating benefits, but of measuring the plaintiff's "true loss."
If compensation were determined with reference to the needs of
the victim and his family, the disability pension would be most
relevant, but this is not how we do it. We lack the necessary data
to feed the value of the disability pension into the machine, be-
cause we have no way of measuring the cost of the pension to the
plaintiff. Therefore, the disability pension must be ignored. It is
for this reason that we disagree with the result in Sergeant Brown-
ing's case and agree with the courts that do not allow it to be
considered,27 although we reject the rationale of the collateral
source rule. 8
326 In Canning v. Hannaford, 373 Mich. 41, 127 N.W.2d 851 (1964), the
court noted that the jury could have found that the earnings had decreased as a
result of the plaintiff's absence. Where a self-employed person is injured, and
because of the nature of the enteprise it is not possible to say that a decrease in
profits was due to the employee's absence, he recovers damages based on the value
of his lost time. See Dempsey v. City of Scranton, 264 Pa. 485, 107 A. 877(1919). See also Baltazar v. Neill, 364 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). Fol-
lowing the plaintiff's injury, his wife was required to quit her employment and
take=his place in the store. The court allowed the jury to consider evidence of the
wife's earnings in her former employment as bearing on the value of the plain-
tiffs lost time.32 7 See e.g., Capital Products, Inc. v. Romer, 252 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Hume v. Lacey, 112 Cal. App. 2d 147, 245 P.2d 672 (1952); Husk v. Jef-
(Continued on next page)
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Accident insurance may take a variety of forms, but perhaps
we can concentrate our discussion on three types. The insured
may receive a specified sum of money for each day that he is
disabled, and for the wage-earner this would represent time away
from work. A second kind of protection is against the loss of a
member, and the insured receives a lump sum payment, e.g.,
$10,000 for the loss of a finger, $100,000 for the loss of both legs.
He would also receive a lump sum payment for total and per-
manent disability. A third type may be called income protec-
tion. After the insured has been disabled for a certain period or
has become totally and permanently disabled, he receives monthly
payments, either for a specified time, e.g., two years, or the rest
of his life.
It has long been held that recovery of damages is not affected
by the receipt of accident insurance benefits of whatever varie-
ty. 29 This is in accord with the general rule as to insurance. We
have previously discussed the question in the case of the Insured
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
fries, 110 NJ.L. 307, 164 A. 313 (Err. & App. 1933); Healy v. Rennert, 9 N.Y.2d
202, 173 N.S.2d 777 (1961). See also the criticism of Browning on the ground
that the plaintiff "gave value" for the pension in Jolowicz, Comment on Browning
v. The War Office, 1963 Clm. LJ. 37, 39-40 (1963).
However, the disability benefit may be in lieu of other benefits that the
plaintiff would have received but for the injury. In Healy v. Rennert, the plain-
tiff alleged that if he had not been injured, he could have retired in two years
at half-pay. The evidence of the disability pension was introduced by the de-
fendant to counter the plaintiff's claim of loss. Here the jury found for the de-
fendant, and the court concluded that the introduction of the evidence of the dis-
ability pension was reversible error. See the discussion supra, note 75. None-
theless, sincethedisabilitpensionwas,ineffect, a substitute for the retirement
pension, the plaintiff should not be able to recover the lost retirement pension .n
addition. Perhaps because of the posture of the case, this fact escaped the court'snotice. The samte situation was involved in Cunningham v. Rederiet Vindeggen
A/S, 333 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1964). In a wrongful death action the plaintiff sought
recovery for half the value of pension payments her deceased husband would have
received upon retirement. She had received death benefits, which she would nothave received if he had lived. The court correctly reasoned that she was en-
titled either to the death benefits or the loss of retirement benefits, but not both.
However, it was applying New York law and read Healey to hold that damagesfor the loss of future benefits were recoverable without regard to the benefits re-
ceived. In such a case it seems that the claim for the future benefits necessarily
opens up the question of the present benefits. Unless the plaintiff can show
(and perhaps this could be done at the pre-trial conference) that the loss of
future benefits was greater, in which case he should be limited to the excess, he
should not be permitted to claim those benefits.
38 Note again that it is possible to treat the matter differently under a com-prehensive scheme of loss allocation, but this is not the question with which a
court can be concerned.
329 See e.g., Campbell v. Sutliff, 193 Wis. 370, 214 N.W. 374 (1927); Brad-burn v. Great Western Ry., e1874 v L.d. 10 Ex. 1 (C.A.).
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Accident Victim,3 ' and our solution was that as to loss insurance,
recovery should be reduced by the receipt of the insurance
benefits provided the plaintiff was given credit for the total cost
of the premiums. Under this approach, the plaintiff would either
recover the loss met by insurance or the total cost of the pre-
miums, whichever was smaller. We also pointed out that today
it is possible to take out insurance without regard to economic
loss, so that some insurance is really insurance against the oc-
currence of a contingency. This kind of insurance should not
affect the recovery of damages in personal injury actions, because,
by definition, it is not insurance against loss.
It seems to me that per diem payments and the lump sum
payment for dismemberment or total and permanent disability
are properly classified as insurance against a contingency rather
than loss insurance. The insured may have been thinking in terms
of the insurance as a substitute for lost income, but then again
he may not have been, and more importantly, the insurance is
not marketed as loss insurance. By that I mean that the pay-
ments are not related at all to the insured's income. The insured
can insure for any amount of per diem payment as long as he is
willing to pay the premium. Moreover, it is usually provided that
payment of benefits under the policy is not affected if the in-
sured continues to receive his salary during the period of dis-
ability. Certainly, a lump sum payment for loss of a member
bears no relationship to the insured's earning capacity. For
these reasons, the receipt of benefits under such policies should
not affect the plaintiff's tort recovery. This is truly collateral, and
to the extent that the plaintiff obtains a "windfall," it is because
he purchased insurance for just such a contingency.331 Whether
people should be permitted to "over-insure" in this way is a mat-
ter necessitating a legislative judgment, but so long as they
are, the fact that an accident victim may have purchased such
insurance should not affect his tort recovery.
Income protection insurance, on the other hand, would seem
to be insurance against loss. Benefits are payable only after a
waiting period, and the insured must be disabled. It is the
330 See the discussion supra, notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
331 An analogy may be drawn to the situation where the plaintiff has insured
against an item of loss that is not included in tort recovery. See the discussion
in James, supra note 259, at 550.
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kind of insurance that commends itself to a wage-earner, and it
is marketed on the basis that it is a substitute for lost earnings.
Under the functional approach, as we have discussed it thus
far, it would follow that payments under an income protection
policy should be taken into account in determining the damages
for loss of earning opportunity. In most cases the cost of the
premiums would probably be less than the value of the benefits
payable, particularly if they are payable for the rest of the
plaintiff's life. Consequently this would affect the verdict
significantly.
While this result would follow from the functional approach,
I am reluctant to propose it. The reason stems from the earliest
cases applying the collateral source rule, which involved benefits
under a life insurance policy in a suit for wrongful death, and
from the contrasting approaches to cumulative recovery under
life insurance policies and fire insurance policies. There is no
limit to the number of policies or the amount of life insurance
that a person may carry, and when the insured dies, the bene-
ficiaries are entitled to the face amounts of all the policies.
Whereas in the case of fire insurance, recovery under all the
policies cannot exceed the value of the property, and if the
property has been over-insured, recovery is pro-rated. 3 Perhaps
this restriction is considered necessary to discourage arson or
perhaps we believe that a property owner should not be able
to "gamble" on the destruction of the property by fire. But
there is nothing-other than the economic inability to pay the
premiums-to prevent an individual who is earning $5000 per
year from taking out $500,000 in life insurance policies. Where
an individual is insured in excess of his "economic worth," there
is no doubt that upon his death, his family will be better off
than if he had lived. We often say that "rm worth more dead
than alive." It is not likely that the individual will terminate his
life to provide the benefits, but in case he thinks of doing so,
the policy contains a suicide provision. Nonetheless, we do not
limit in any way the right of a person to take out as much
life insurance as he wishes.
I think that this reflects an important societal value, which is
that no one can carry "too much" life insurance. A person
332 See W. V, cE, I.suRANcE § 154 (3rd ed. 1951).
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cannot estimate the needs of his family after he is dead, as
life insurance salesmen point out when trying to persuade us
to increase the amount of insurance or take out a new policy.
The wife or child may develop a serious illness. The costs of
college may go up tremendously. No one knows what inflation
will do to the value of the dollar, and so on. Thus, when it was
contended that life insurance proceeds should affect recovery
in a wrongful death action, American courts were not at all
troubled by the fact that the beneficiaries would get full wrongful
death recovery and keep the insurance proceeds. 3  Indeed, one
court treated the contrary view as too fallacious to require
comment.334 The English courts, on the other hand, did allow
life insurance benefits to be considered,33 5 but this was soon
changed by statute.3 0
It seems to me that attitudes toward life insurance should be
equally applicable toward income protection insurance. While
the insured may still be alive, he is disabled and unable to
work. The economic problem is even more serious than if he
were dead, since he too must be supported. It is true the
insurance proceeds will meet some or all of the loss that would
otherwise have had to be met by the defendant, and to the
extent that he also recovers from the defendant, there is double
recovery. He can be "made whole" if he recovers the cost of the
premiums. Moreover, it is less complicated to compute the value
of the disability payments than it is the value of life insurance
proceeds. Life insurance would be payable at the time the
insured died, so the fatal accident only means that payment
is accelerated. Recovery would be reduced only by the accele-
rated value of the policy, that is, by the interest the beneficiaries
receive on the proceeds between the time of actual death and the
end of the insured's life expectancy, and by the premiums the
insured would have had to pay during the period of life
33 "... [T~he plaintiff... recovers but once for the wrong done him, and
he receives the insurance money upon a contract to which the defendant is in no
way privy, and in respect to which his own wrongful act can give him no equities."
Perrot v. Shearer, 17 Mich. 48, 56 (1868).334 Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355 (1960). See the discussion in Maxwell,
supra note 287, at 671.
335See the discussion in Ganz, Mitigation of Damages by Benefits Received,
25 Mon. L. REv. 559 (1962).
336 Fatal Accident (Damages) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, ch. 7. For a discussion
of the interesting circumstances leading to the change see Ganz, supra note 335,
at 559-60.
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expectancy 3 7 These problems are not present in the case of
income protection insurance, which would not have been
collected if the accident had not occurred. Our objection to
allowing the deduction, therefore, must take account of the
"double recovery" aspect.
In the next section we will discuss "double recovery" as
applied to social insurance benefits in the context of our system
of awarding damages for loss of future earning opportunity. We
will conclude that social insurance benefits should not affect
recovery of damages for loss of future earning opportunity, and
the rationale may also be applicable to income protection
insurance. However, for the time being, let us assume that the
concept of double recovery is accurate, that we can realistically
say that the plaintiff has been fully compensated for the loss
of earning opportunity for the damages awarded. I still think
there are valid reasons for not considering the insurance benefits
in the personal injury action so that the plaintiff will, in theory,
have double recovery.
In the first place, to allow recovery in the personal injury
action to be reduced by the receipt of insurance benefits could
have some effect on the marketability of income protection
insurance. The potential purchaser is probably thinking as much
about the possibility of disablement due to an accident as due to
sickness, if not more so. The kind of accident uppermost in his
mind is most likely an automobile accident, and when he thinks
of an automobile accident, he thinks about recovery against the
driver of the other automobile, if that is how the accident will
happen (for he assumes that the accident will be the fault of
the other driver). If he is told that he will retain the insurance
proceeds and also have full recovery against the other driver,
this is an additional argument in favor of purchasing income
protection insurance. In any event, the possibility of cumulative
recovery can only be a plus factor in the marketability of accident
insurance, and for the court to hold that insurance proceeds will
operate to reduce recovery works against the accident insurer.
Maybe this should not matter. But it can be said that the question
of whether accident insurance should operate to reduce recovery
337 Apparently the English courts only considered the premium savings. See
Ganz, supra note 335, at 559 n. 1.
1970]
KENTUcKiY LAW JOURNAL
in a tort action involves a conflict between the interests of the
accident insurer and the liability insurer. Perhaps this is the
kind of question that should be determined by the legislature
on the basis of empirical data not available to a court in the
context of a personal injury action. At least it is something to
consider.
More significantly, I think, is our society's attitude toward
insurance. If we say that a person cannot take out too much
life insurance because he cannot estimate the needs of his family
after he is dead, is this not equally true with respect to income
protection? The accident victim has tried to protect his family
from the effects of his disablement. Perhaps he has guessed
correctly, but perhaps he has not. To the extent that we allow
full recovery from the tortfeasor, it is more likely that the family
will be adequately protected. Just as a person cannot have "too
much" life insurance, he cannot have "too much" income pro-
tection when he is disabled. I think that our society would be
opposed to letting the fact that the victim carried income pro-
tection insurance affect his tort recovery. I seriously doubt
that even if they were directed to, the jury would reduce
recovery by benefits payable under such a policy. It is for these
reasons-apart from those to be discussed in connection with
social insurance-that I think income protection insurance should
not affect the recovery of damages for loss of future earning
opportunity.
C. Social Insurance.
We are using the term, social insurance, in a rather broad
sense to include all government-financed and all government-
controlled programs of protection against loss. This is so that
we may distinguish social insurance from private insurance and
other benefits for which the recipient can be said to have
"voluntarily paid." The problem is that in the United States
there is not a comprehensive program of social insurance, and
much of the social insurance that exists is made to resemble
private insurance. We tend to finance these programs under
"special funds" rather than from general revenues, with the
beneficiaries and/or their employers being taxed or otherwise
required to provide the funds of the program. The ethos of social
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insurance in the United States has been discussed previously, and
it may be just as well that we believe it.338 We thus have a patch-
work of programs, which, for purposes of this analysis, I am
calling social insurance. Their common features are: (1) govern-
ment control and/or financing; (2) payment of prescribed bene-
fits to eligible individuals; (3) non-judicial administration of
claims33 These programs represent attempts by government
to provide some protection against the vicissitudes of life, and
may properly be called social insurance. We are not now con-
cerned with medical benefits, which were discussed previously.
Let us first review the kinds of social insurance that we will
discuss in connection with the question of whether receipt of
benefits should affect recovery for loss of earning opportunity.
To deal with the problem of employee "on-the-job" injuries,
all states have enacted workmen's compensation statutes. Com-
pensation is provided without regard to fault, but the sums are
relatively modest. In exchange for such compensation, the
employee loses his tort action against the employer, but as we
will see, not necessarily against third parties. The costs are to
be borne initially by the employer, who may either have taken
out insurance or have been permitted to operate as a self-insurer.
In theory, the cost of the awards or premiums will be reflected
in the price of the employer's product or service and distributed
among consumers and users.3 40 Longshoremen and harbor work-
ers not covered by a state statute are covered by a federal
workmen's compensation law.341
Unemployment compensation is available for employees
"temporarily" out of work. The unemployment compensation
fund will usually be financed by a tax collected either from
employers or from employers and employees. 42 Since these
benefits expire after a period of time, it is likely that they will
be involved in a personal injury action only to the extent that
338 See the discussion supra, notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
330 Note, however, that the opportunity for judicial review of the adminis-
trative determination is generally provided.3 40 See 1 A. LABsoN, Tr LAw OF WoRmmEs COmPENSATION § 2.20 (1961).
34133 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1964). Federal employees are also covered by federal statute. Railroad workers
and seamen are entitled to maintain a statutory action under the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act and the Jones Act.
342 See Note, The Mitigating Effect on Damages of Social Welfare Programs,
63 HAJv. L. REv. 330, 335 (1949).
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the plaintiff, who may have been receiving unemployment
compensation or some other form of public assistance, is seeking
to recover for loss of earning opportunity during the period of
disability.
The Social Security Act, in addition to providing retirement
benefits, provides benefits for persons "permanently and totally
disabled," which continue until the recipient becomes eligible
for retirement benefits. 43 Similar provisions are contained in the
Railroad Retirement Act 44 and the Federal Civil Service Retire-
ment Act.345 Under these statutes the employee "contributes"
to an annuity fund, and the railroad employer and the federal
government also contribute to the respective fund. There is no
doubt that these disability funds represent a substitute for social
security disability, since federal employees and railroad workers
are exempt from the social security tax. Irrespective of the
difference in tax rates and benefits and the terminology of
"contributions" and "annuities," the programs for the railroad
and government employees are social insurance in the same sense
as social security.
Finally, we make provision for war veterans who have become
totally and permanently disabled after they have returned to
civilian life. If this occurs, even though the cause of the disability
is not service-connected, they receive specified disability pen-
sions.3 48 This must be distinguished from the disability pension
paid to a person injured in the line of duty while in active
military service.
It should be quite clear that social insurance in the United
States is a "crazy-quilt" pattern. There is no comprehensive
program of social insurance designed to provide protection
against the loss and dislocation resulting from accidents. The
person injured in the course of his employment may receive
34370 Stat. 815 (1956), as amended 79 Stat. 366 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 423
(Supp. IV, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1964). The term "permanently and
totally disabled" needs some qualification. Prior to 1965 the disability had to be
one "which can be expected to result in death or to be of long-continued and in-
definite duration." 70 Stat. 815 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 423 (c)(2) (1964). The
1965 amendment changes the definition to "or which has lasted or can be ex-
pected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423
(d)(1) (A) (Supp. III, 1967).
34449 Stat. 968 (1935), as amended, 78 Stat. 1094 (1964), 45 U.S.C. §
228b (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 45 U.S.C. 228(b) (1964).
345 5 U.S.C. § 8337 (Supp. IV, 1968).84638 U.S.C. § 521 (Supp. IV, 1968), amending 38 U.S.C. § 521 (1964).
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workmen's compensation while one injured away from work
does not. The unemployed person who has worked previously
may be receiving unemployment compensation during the period
of convalescence, but the person who was about to enter the
job market when the accident occurred will not. Wage-earners
covered by social security and similar programs receive a dis-
ability pension as do veterans, but other accident victims do
not. Moreover, the programs appear to be set up as closely as
possible to correspond with private insurance, so that bene-
ficiaries and their employers are taxed specifically to provide the
funds for particular social insurance programs. All of this makes
it difficult to evaluate the question of social insurance as affecting
tort recovery.
(1) Cumulative recovery and social insurance: the nature
of the problem.
Where social insurance is available to meet part or all of a
loss caused by an accident and the victim retains his common law
action against the tortfeasor, we have another problem of
cumulative recovery. Again, the question is whether the amount
of damages in the personal injury, in this case, the amount the
plaintiff is claiming for loss of earning opportunity, should be
affected by the receipt of the social insurance benefit. Where
two or more remedies are available to deal with an accident loss.
e.g., social insurance and tort recovery, the follOH7i-'g natterns
of solution are possible:
(1) abolish one or more of the remedies;
(2) compel the victim to elect from one of the remedies;
(3) allow the victim to have the cumulative effect of
two or more remedies;
(4) allow the victim to pursue both (or all) remedies,
but limit his recovery to the maximum amount he
could recover from a single source by:
(a) considering one of the sources as primarly
liable so that it bears the full burden, and the
other source will be entitled to indemnity or
subrogation;
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(b) providing that the benefits had under one
scheme diminish the amount to be had under
the other.347
Since we do not have a comprehensive system of social insurance
in the United States, the problem has not been approached from
this perspective. As we will see, each social insurance benefit
has been considered separately, and different results have been
reached. It is well then to consider how a country with a
comprehensive social insurance program has dealt with the
question of social insurance and tort recovery.
We will do this by looking at the British experience. The
British system of social insurance has been described as follows:
The National Insurance Act of 1946 has co-ordinated and ex-
tended the many different branches of social insurance into
one comprehensive system. It covers benefits for sickness,
unemployment, maternity, and widowhood; retirement pen-
sions; guardians' allowances; and death grants. It covers
everybody, employed persons as well as self-employers, house-
wives and other nonemployable persons. It is supplemented
by the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act of 1946,
which replaces the former system of workmen's compensation
by a corresponding system of insurance against industrial
accidents arising in the course of employment, and the
National Health Service Act, 1946, which provides free
medical and dental treatment for everybody. Between them
these acts provide a comprehensive system of minimum grants,
insuring everybody, regardless of personal and financial status,
against the major vicissitudes of modem life, and providing a
bare minimum subsistence, but no more.348
The theory of British social insurance, then, is that of a "bare
minimum subsistence." This is the antithesis of the common law
tort action, which seeks to compensate each successful plaintiff
for the whole of his loss and to put him in as good a position as
he would have been if the tort had not occurred. Obviously the
scale of benefits under social insurance would be far below the
347 This is taken from James, Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Prob-
lem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rtv. 537, 540-41 (1952).348 Friedmann, Social Insurance and The Principles of Tort Liability, 63
HAuv. L. REv. 241, 241-42 (1949).
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amount recoverable in a common law action, not only because
the common law action would allow recovery for pain and
suffering, but also because the maximum compensation for an
employed person under social insurance, while based on wages
earned, would not begin to epproximate the amount recoverable
for a loss of earning opportunity under tort rules of damages.349
Social insurance, it must be remembered, looks to the need of
the victim and his family-and the minimum need at that-while
tort recovery looks to the loss suffered by the particular plaintiff.
It was, therefore, a question of prime importance as to how the
social insurance program would affect tort recovery, and this
was not only considered by the Beveridge Committee,5 ° but a
special departmental committee, the Monckton Committee on
Alternative Remedies, was set up to consider the problem.351
Since benefits under the social insurance program were so
much less than tort recovery, there was no question of abolishing
the common law action.352 Nor was it considered desirable to
require the victim to elect between social insurance and tort
recovery.353 The question, then, was how the receipt of social
insurance benefits would affect tort recovery, which is the
question with which we are concerned. The Beveridge Report
had said that "an injured person should not have the same need
349 Id. at 253-54. At that time an unemployed person with one child would
receive in social insurance benefits less than $1000 for an incapacity lasting one
year, whereas if he were earning around $50 per week, the author estimated
that be would receive around $3400 in damages.
350 Social Insurance and Allied Services, Report by Sir William Beveridge,
Cm. No. 6860 (1946).
351 Id.
352 Friedman, supra note 348, at 253. Not a single witness before the Monck-
ton Committee favored the abolition of the tort remedy. James, supra note 347,
at 542 n. 16.3 53 A cardinal purpose of all forms of social insurance is to provide a
uick and a sure and a well-adapted remedy for the needs it seeks to
alleviate. Among the evils of the older system are delays and many
uncertainties (e.g., as to the fact of recovery, as to amount, as to de-
fendant's financial responsibility). Moreover, successful litigation brings
a lump sum recovery, which often throws the burden of providence and
of wise investment on one ill fitted to meet it (while social insurance
provides periodic payments to meet continuing needs). All these things
ring realhuman hardship and a train of broader social consequences.
Yet the older remedy with all its drawbacks, is potentially much greater.
Thus to tempt the injured man-and to tempt others to tempt him-to
renounce the benefits of social insurance may bring about the very evils
the scheme was adopted to avoid. Benefits under a social insurance
scheme (e.g., workmen's compensation, disability payments) should,
therefore, be payable forthwith, whatever is to happen later in the tort
suit. James, supra note 347, at 543.
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met twice over,"354 and this was the position of the majority of the
members of the Monckton Committee, which recommended that
in assessing tort damages the court355 should reduce recovery by
benefits already paid or by the value of future benefits. 3 6 A
minority of the Committee, representing employee's organizations,
took the position that social insurance was but a more com-
prehensive form of private insurance and since benefits payable
under private insurance policies did not affect tort recovery, 357
neither should benefits paid by social insurance. 35 A proposal
by the Trade Unions Congress that damages exceeding five-
twelfths of the amount of the insurance benefit be retained, as
representing the portion of the insurance met by employee's
contributions, was also rejected.359
When it came Parliament's turn to wrestle with the question,
a different solution emerged. The Law Reform (Personal In-
juries) Act of 1948360 provided that in determining loss of future
earning opportunity, the court should take into account one-half
of all social insurance benefits (industrial injury, industrial dis-
ablement or sickness) payable for a period of five years after the
cause of action accrued. This was treated as a straight political
compromise,361 although it was defended by the Government on
the ground that the employee contributed five-twelfths to the
fund and that the defendant, whether employer or other tort-
feasor, was also a contributor.362 The compromise, then, is be-
tween alternative (3), which would allow the victim to cumulate
remedies, and alternative (4) (b), which would reduce benefits
recoverable under one remedy by the amount recovered under
another. The victim can cumulate, but there is a partial reduction
in recovery because of the receipt of social insurance benefits.
In subsequent years Parliment provided that in a wrongful death
354See Friedman, supra note 348, at 254.3 5 It must be remembered that in England, personal injury actions are tried
before the court rather than a jury.3 56 Friedman, supra note 348, at 255.
357 See, e.g., Bradburn v. The Great Western Ry. Co., [1874] L.R. 10 Ex. 1
(C.A.).
358 Friedman, supra note 348, at 254.
359 Id. at 254-55.
360 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 41.
361 See the discussion in Friedmann supra note 348, at 255-56.
362 Id. at 258. See also the discussion in Ganz, supra note 335, at 566.
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case, social insurance benefits were to be completely disre-
garded.3 3 Here, again, the law eventually adopted was contrary
to the recommendation of the Monckton Committee.364
Another possible solution is alternative (4) (a), under which
the fund could recoup the amount of payments either by reim-
bursement from the beneficiary or by an action against the tort-
feasor. Apparently this is what was done with respect to health
insurance payments in Great Britain prior to 1948.65 Such a
solution was rejected both by the Monckton Committee and by
the Government, on the ground that the victim should never
be deprived of social insurance benefits and that to allow re-
coupment would give the fund an undesirable interest in
litigation.36 On the other hand, this is the solution that is favored
in most other countries such as France, Germany and Soviet
Russia.367 The justification that has been advanced is: (1) for
an accident victim to come out better than he would have been
without the accident is incompatible with the purposes of tort
law and extravagant of the community's resources; and (2) it
is self-evident that the tortfeasor should not take advantage of
collateral benefits.368 This assumes that the problem is one of
overcompensation as against windfall, and it is resolved by
permitting the fund to recover.
The arguments against subrogation made with respect to
insurance,""9 are equally applicable here. Most significantly, such
recoupment shifts the loss from an efficient channel of distribution,
the public treasury, to another channel which may or may not
be as efficient.370 Nonetheless, this represents the solution that
most other countries with comprehensive social insurance systems
have adopted.
363 Fatal Accidents Act, 1959, 788 Eliz. 2, ch. 65.3 64 Ganz, supra note 335, at 566 n. 39.
365 See the discussion id. at 566.
366 Id. See also the discussion in Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and
Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAT . L. Rzv. 1478, 1514-15 (1966).
367 See Fleming, supra note 366, at 1514-26.
368 Id. at 1516.
369 See the discussion supra notes 96, 170-76 and accompanying text.
370 According to Professor Fleming, this kind of argument is rejected on the
continent "[b]ecause 'the principle of the thing' is to the European mind too im-
portant to be cavalierly sacrificed to administrative considerations...." Fleming,
supra note 366, at 1516.
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(2) The present approach in the United States.
Because of the absence of a comprehensive system of social
insurance, little attention has been paid to the basic question of
loss allocation. We have not considered what losses should be
met by society through social insurance, what losses should be
met by the individual through private insurance, and what losses
should be met by the responsible party under a system of tort
recovery.y1. In most cases of social insurance benefits, the
plaintiff is permitted to cumulate both remedies and obtain full
recovery under the application of the collateral source rule. In
some cases the social insurance fund is permitted to recoup either
by reimbursement from the beneficiary or subrogation against
the tortfeasor. In still others recoupment is obtained by reducing,
in accordance with administrative regulations, the benefits pay-
able from the social insurance fund. We will now consider the
approach that has been taken toward cumulative recovery where
the plaintiff has received workmen's compensation, unemploy-
ment compensation or disability pensions.
In exchange for workmen's compensation the employee loses
his common law action against the employer, but in many states
his rights against third parties are not affected. Where the
employee is injured by a third party tortfeasor in the course of
his employment, he receives workmen's compensation payments.
The question is how this affects his recovery from the tortfeasor.
Here the solution in practically all states is to prohibit the injured
employee from retaining both benefits and to reallocate the cost
of the employee's injuries to the torffeasor 3 72 This is accomplished
by -permitting the employer or his insurer either to (1) sue the
tortfeasor directly, (2) intervene in the employee's action, or
(3) obtain a lien against the employee's judgment.373 This has
led to problems in determining what amount of the employee's
recovery is the equivalent of his workmen's compensation pay-
ments 4 While shifting the loss from the employer to the tort-
371 For the view that such consideration is necessary see Fleming, supra note
366, at 1544-49.
872 See the discussion in Fleming, supra note 366, at 1505-8.
373 Id. at 1505-06; see also A. LARsoN, Supra note 340, § 74.
374 A. LARsON, supra note 373. There are also problems as to what defenses
may be asserted where the employer is suing directly or has intervened. Id. § 75.
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feasor may be critized from the standpoint of effective loss al-
location,375 the reason for the rule is understandable when we
consider the circumstances surrounding the establishment of
workmen's compensation, one of the first pieces of social legisla-
tion in the country. The employer was giving up his common law
defenses, which usually enabled him to avoid liability, thus
placing the cost of the human overhead of doing business on the
employee. There were doubts as to the constitutionality of the
legislation.3 76 It seemed logical to the legislative mind of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century that if the injury
was caused by a "wrongdoer"-as a defendant who was found
liable under the law of negligence as it existed at that time
would be-he rather than the employer should bear the loss. To
permit double recovery to the injured employee would also have
been inconceivable. Therefore, most statutes expressly provided
for recovery by the employer.
However, a few did not, and the courts had to resolve the
question in the context of the employee's suit against the tort-
feasor. After some difficulty, the Ohio courts concluded that (1)
the employer would not be permitted to recover the amount of
the payments from the tortfeasor, and (2) the employee's recovery
against the tortfeasor would not be affected by his receipt of
workmen's compensation benefits.37 7 The legislature agreed, and
it is specifically provided by statute that receipt of workmen's
compensation benefits may not be considered by the jury in a
personal injury action. 8 Thus, the employee obtains cumulative
recovery. The same solution has been adopted by other courts
that have passed on the question. Not only is the employee's
recovery not affected, but the introduction of evidence that he
375 Apparently, however, workmen's compensation insurance is operated so
as to take account of subrogation, and subrogation recovery is credited against the
losses of an enterprise or group. See James, supra note 347, at 561-62.
376 See the discussion in A LARsoN, supra note 340, § 5.20. The first New York
statute was held unconstitutional. Ives v. South Buffalo By., 201 N.N. 271,
94 N.E. 431 (1911). A constitutional amendment was then passed, and another
statute enacted. Doubts as to constitutionality under the federal Constitution were
finally laid to rest with the decision in New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S.
188 (1917).377 Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166
N.E. 368 (1929), overruling Ohio Public Service Co. v. Sharkey, 117 Ohio St.
586, 160 N.E. 687 (1928).378 OXo REV. CODE § 4123.93 (Page 1965).
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has received such benefits is reversible error because of the
prejudicial effect it may have on the jury. = The courts have
given varied reasons. One court cited the collateral source rule.380
Another took the position that if the legislature did not permit
the plaintiff from cumulating remedies, it was not for the court
to do so in a personal injury action.' The situation with respect
to workmen's compensation, then, is that in most states the
employer or his insurer is reimbursed for the workmen's com-
pensation payment, but this is not provided for in the statute,
the plaintiff is permitted cumulative recovery. a82
Unemployment compensation may be involved in a personal
injury action in two situations. A person who is disabled for a
period and not covered by workmen's compensation may receive
benefits from the unemployment compensation fund. Or, an
unemployed person may have been injured during the time in
which he was drawing benefits, and they continued after the
injury. As we have said, the question will arise only as to
recovery for loss of earnings during the period of disablement.
Apparently there is no provision for subrogation of the unem-
ployment compensation fund in any of the states, probably
because the number of cases in which the recipient would have
a tort action is small. Where a plaintiff who has been working
before the accident, received unemployment compensation during
the period of disablement, courts have allowed recovery for the
value of the lost time without reference to the unemployment
compensation,383 the same approach that is taken to workmen's
compensation benefits where there is no subrogation. And the
379 Mangan v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 351 F.2d 24 (7th Cir. 1965);
Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1963);
Abbott v. Hayes, 92 N.H. 126, 26 A.2d 842 (1942).380 Ridgeway v. North Star Terminal & Stevedoring Co., 378 P.2d 647 (Alaska
1963). In that case, suit was brought against the employer, and the issue was
whether the plaintiff bad elected to come under workmen's compensation. The
court held that he had not, and presumably he would be required to return the
workmen's compensation payments.
381 Abbott v. Hayes, 92 N.H. 126, 26 A.2d 842 (1942).
3821n North Carolina the employee may bring suit against the tortfeasor, and
it is specifically provided that evidence of workmens compensation benefits is in-
admissable in that action. However, the employee is required to make reimburse-
ment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1965), and Spivey v. Babcock & Wilcox
Co., 264 N.C. 387, 141 S.E. 2d 808 (1965).383 See, e.g., Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. Handelsman, 307 F.2d 525 (9th Cir.
1962); Kurta v. Probelske, 324 Mich. 179 36 N.W.2d 889 (1949); Lobalzo v.
Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (19 62 J. See also Cunuien v. Superior IronWorks, 175 Wis. 172, 184 N.W. 767 (1921), involving benefits under a federal
statute.
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introduction of evidence that the plaintiff received unemploy-
ment compensation benefits has been held to constitute reversible
error.38 4 In California, it appears that the recipient of unemploy-
ment compensation must return the benefits if he receives com-
pensation from another source for the period in which he was
receiving unemployment compensation benefits, so in such a
case the fund is reimbursed. 85
The plaintiff who is unemployed at the time of the accident
is entitled to recover the value of his lost time, and here the
notion that he is recovering for the lost time rather than the
lost wages is useful.38 It is not fair to deny him recovery where
he was unable to look for work because of the injury, and in such
a case the jury does the best it can. Evidence that the plaintiff
was receiving public assistance benefits during the period of dis-
ability has been held inadmissible, although in the particular case,
it appeared that the plaintiff would have received the benefits
even if she had been worldng. 7 In another case where the
plaintiff had been unemployed and obtained employment with
the defendant, in which he was injured, it was held that the fact
that unemployment compensation benefits were resumed during
the period of disability would not affect recovery.3 8  We may
assume that under the present approach, the receipt of unem-
ployment compensation benefits will not affect recovery, since
they are from a collateral source. In the absence of reimburse-
ment, the effect is to enable the plaintiff to have cumulative
recovery.
Where a person covered under Social Security or Railroad
Retirement8 becomes totally and permanently disabled, he
receives a disability pension until he reaches age sixty-five, at
which time he reverts to the retirement pension. Apparently no
effort is made by the fund to recoup payments when the bene-
ficiary recovers personal injury damages,9 0 although benefits are
to be reduced when the beneficiary has recovered workmen's
384 See particularly Lobalzo v. Varoli, 409 Pa. 15, 185 A.2d 557 (1962).38 5 See the discussion in Coyne v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 204 F. Supp.
403 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
388 the discussion, supra note 275 and accompanying text.387 Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256 (1950).
388 Labick v. Vicker, 200 Pa. Super. 111, 186 A.2d 874 (1962).389 Benefits under the Federal Civil Service Retirement Act will be discussed
in connection with suits against the United States.
39g See the discussion of this point in Fleming, supra note 366, at 1515-16.
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compensation benefitsY91 Recovery of personal injury damages
may affect the disability pension paid by the Veterans Admini-
stration to veterans for a non-service-connected disability. The
Administrator is given the discretion to deny or discontinue a
pension when "the corpus of the veteran's estate is such that it
is reasonable that some part of the corpus be consumed for the
veteran's maintenance."9 2 There is no such discretion with
respect to social security disability pensions, which may be
reduced only because of workmen's compensation payments.
In suits against ordinary tortfeasors, the courts have uniformly
excluded evidence of the receipt of social security disability
pensions 393 and veterans' disability pensions.3 94 We will sub-
sequently discuss the problem of disability pensions in a suit
against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Evidence of benefits received under the Railroad Retirement Act
has been excluded. 95 That problem will ordinarily arise in a suit
against the railroad employer under FELA. Because of the
"contribution" aspect, the danger exists that the court would
treat this like private insurance. This has not been the case.
The courts have recognized that the Railroad Retirement Act
represents a social security program for railroad workers, and
the fund is supported by tax collections from employers and
employees who are, therefore, not subject to the social security
tax.396
The pattern of loss allocation with respect to social insurance,
then, has been as follows. Where the employee who received
workmen's compensation is entitled to recovery against a third
party torifeasor, in most states it is specifically provided by
statute that the employer or his insurer is reimbursed for the
workmen's compensation payments. The loss is thus allocated to
391 70 Stat. 406 (1965), 42 U.S.C. § 424a (Supp. I, 1964).
39238 U.S.C. § 522 (1964).
893 See, e.g., A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Ligon, 285 F.2d 936 (5th Cir.
1960); McMinn v. Thompson, 61 N.M. 387, 301 P.2d 326 (1956); Stone v. City
of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 166, 391 P.2d 179 (1964). In all of these cases the de-
fendant claimed that the evidence was relevant for a subsidiary purpose, e.g.,
to show a reason for the plaintiff to take the benefit rather than to wor.
394 See, e.g., A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Ligon, 285 F.2d 936 (5th Cir.
1960); Kainer v. Walker, 377 S.W.2d 613 (Tex. 1964); Stone v. City of Seattle,
64 Wash.2d 166, 391 P.2d 179 (1964).
395 See, Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253 (1963); New York,
N.H. & H. Ry. Co. v. Leary, 204 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1963).
396 See the discussion, Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 254
(1963).
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the third party tortfeasor. Where the statute is silent, the
employee has been able to obtain cumulative recovery. Tort
recovery is not affected by the receipt of unemployment compen-
sation, and the recipient is able to cumulate unless the fund is
entitled to reimbursement from him. The recipient of social
security or railroad retirement benefits obtains cumulative
recovery. In the case of veteran's benefits, the recipient obtains
full compensation against the tortfeasor, but the tort recovery may
cause the pension to be terminated or reduced.
Thus, it appears that most European countries with compre-
hensive systems of social insurance reallocate the loss to the
tortfeasor, while permitting the social insurance fund to recoup.
England permits the accident victim to obtain cumulative
recovery in part, and reduces the liability of the tortfeasor by
the remainder; there is no recoupment for the social insurance
fund. In the United States, due to the fact that we do not have
a comprehensive system of social welfare, and perhaps because
the question must be answered by state courts, there is no
consistent approach.
(3) The functional approach.
It must be remembered that we are approaching the problem
in the context of our system of awarding compensation for
personal injuries, where the amount of recovery is determined in
adversary proceedings before a jury of laymen. Since we have
not abolished the remedy of tort recovery where the accident
victim has received social insurance benefits, 397 the question is
how the tort recovery is to be affected by the receipt of such
benefits. Any attempt at loss reallocation must be made within
this framework.
In attempting to find a solution under the functional approach,
I find it sounder to distinguish between recovery of lost earnings
during a temporary disability resulting from the accident, and
recovery for loss of future earning opportunity where the victim
is disabled. It seems more realistic to look at the problem from
this perspective rather than with reference to the nature of the
social insurance benefit.
397 Except in the case of the employee who was injured by his employer or
who cannot maintain an action against a third party tortfeasor.
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When a person misses work because of an accident, we permit
him to recover the value of his lost time, and the measure of
recovery depends on what his time was worth. As we say, the
goal of tort law is to put him in as good a position as he would
have been if the accident had not occurred. Social insurance
benefits are designed to provide minimum subsistance during a
period of disability, and the goal is to enable the victim and his
family to meet the crisis caused by the accident. The goals of
tort recovery and social insurance are not inconsistent. Suppose
a person who was earning $30 per day misses 30 days of work
He receives workmen's compensation payments on the basis of
two-thirds of lost wages, and the $20 per day may be said to
represent the minimum subsistence that he needs. While it is
difficult to justify a definition of minimum subsistence that
is based on the individual's wages, nonetheless, this is how it is
done. In any event, because the victim received social insurance,
his actual loss is less than it would have been if he had not
received the benefit. Ten dollars per day is all the plaintiff needs
to make him whole, that is, to put him in as good a position as
he would have been if the accident had not occurred. Our
system is fully capable of absorbing the "data" of the social
insurance benefit. There is no dispute as to the economic loss
he suffered during the period of disability, and as pointed out,
frequently lost wages are stipulated. If the jury does not
"compromise" the verdict, it will award him the full amount
of his loss, which will be $10 or $30 as the judge directs. It may
be pointed out that the award will not compensate him for his
true loss, because he will not get to keep the full sum: his
lawyer must receive a fee from the recovery. But this is true of
the sum awarded for medical expenses or any other item of
damage. Perhaps the contingent fee system needs to be re-
formed."' This factor is irrelevant when his compensation is
purportedly based on the economic loss he demonstrates, and,
398 "For example, the public turned on the time-honored practice under
which a physician, for the successful cure of a patient was entited to one-half
of the patient's earnings for life. The public a not mollified when the Imperial
Medical Association pointed out that tIs practice was justified because, after all,
the physician took the risk that this treatment might not be successful and that the
patient might die, in which case he would receive no fee at all, and that, further-
more, if the patient had not been cured he would have had no further earnings."
Krause, A Restoration of the Institute-A Re-Tort to Dean Prosser, 19 J. LEGAL ED.
321, 323 (1967).
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in fact, he received $10 per day less than he otherwise would have
because of the accident, not $30 per day less. The matter of
adequate compensation for the plaintiff and his attorney is
not realistically met by pretending that the plaintiff suffered
economic loss which he did not suffer.
Our plaintiff, therefore, has lost only $10 per day, and under
a compensatory theory of damages, this is all he is entitled to
recover from the tortfeasor. Whether the remaining $20 loss
should be met by the tortfeasor or the social insurance fund is
an entirely different question, the answer to which requires the
kind of empirical data more likely possessed by legislatures than
courts. It may be asked how much the workmen's compensation
fund would save if subrogation were allowed and whether it
would be enough to appreciably affect the employer's insurance
premiums or cost of doing business, if he is a self-insurer. We
might ask today whether workmen's compensation insurance
rates are less because of the subrogation against the tortfeasor.
I would guess that it probably is not economically feasible to
shift the loss from the employer or his insurer to the torifeasor
or his insurer. Nonetheless, the legislatures of most states have
made the decision that the loss is to be reallocated to the tort-
feasor. This being so, the employee may obtain full recovery
against the tortfeasor and then make reimbursement to the
employer, or the employer may subrogate in the action directly.
In either case there is no problem as to tort recovery. In other
states, either the legislature has specifically provided that the
employee may have cumulative recovery-as it may do-or, where
the statute is silent, the courts are probably right in concluding
that legislative silence demonstrates its intention that the plaintiff
should have cumulative recovery. Perhaps someday we will
rethink the matter of loss allocation for on-the-job injuries
suffered by employees. But for the time being, it can be said
that the legislature has spoken, and the court in the personal
injury case need not concern itself with the problem.
In other situations, however, legislative intent will not be
of much assistance. The legislature has ordinarily provided other
social insurance benefits, such as unemployment compensation
to one temporarily unable to work, without regard to ultimate
loss allocation. In these cases, the receipt of social insurance
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benefits should be deducted from tort recovery. If his normal
wages were $30 per day and he received $20 per day in social
insurance benefits for the period of disablement, he has only
lost $10 per day as a result of the accident, and this is all he
needs to recover. The minimum subsistence, as represented by
the social insurance benefit, has operated to meet some of the
loss caused by the torifeasor. Therefore, the plaintiff's loss is
less, and the fact that the defendant's victim-whom he takes as
he finds-was entitled to social insurance, has worked to the
defendant's benefit. A question may be raised, however, because
of the method by which we measure compensation for loss, namely
what will happen when the jury is given the data of the social
insurance benefit. In a doubtful case, as we have seen,"9 it may
find against the plaintiff, because it concludes that he has
received sufficient compensation by the social insurance benefit.
The fact that this could happen ff the jury were aware of the
social insurance benefit does not trouble me very much. Much
of our negligence law is "never-never land" anyway. The jury
assumes that the defendant is insured or otherwise financially
responsible, which may cause it to tip the scales against him in
a close case. If a balance is achieved by knowledge of the
plaintiff's receipt of social insurance benefits, it is not all that
bad. But, more importantly, the problem need not arise. Damages
for lost wages usually can be stipulated, and all that is necessary
is that the amount received from social insurance benefits be
deducted from the total. It may then be announced to the jury
that the plaintiff's lost wages are a specified amount. In the
rare cases where the parties do not stipulate, the evidence of
social insurance should be allowed, and the judge can follow
it with a cautionary instruction. In his discretion he could refuse
to allow the introduction of the evidence and make some ad-
justment in the judgment.
A similar question is involved where the plaintiff who was
unemployed at the time of the injury was receiving unemploy-
ment compensation benefits. I would allow the jury to consider
the fact that he had received such benefits in determining the
value of his lost time. The question is whether he suffered any
399 See the discussion, supra, notes 52-76 and accompanying text.
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loss at all, and the jury is merely guessing. It may conclude that
the unemployment compensation was as much as he would have
earned if he could have obtained a job. The fact remains that
he did not lose the "full value" of his time, and I think the jury
should have this information. Since he received the social
insurance benefit, we may assume that his subsistence needs
were met, and if he is limited to that amount, there is no danger
that he will become a "public charge" as a result of the jury's
reduced award of damages for lost time.
Thus far, we have advocated solution 4(b): recovery in the
tort action is diminished by the amounts received from social
insurance. The question is not what the defendant should pay,
but what the plaintiff has lost as a result of the accident. So
long as we can accurately measure this loss, there is no reason
to permit the plaintiff to recover more. Note that this means
that part of the loss is borne by the social insurance fund and
part is borne by the tortfeasor, but the tortfeasor's liability is
reduced at the expense of the social insurance fund. As we said
before, perhaps a different allocation is possible, but this is
the kind of solution that must come from the legislature. In the
absence of legislative action, the only course for the court in
the personal injury action is to reduce the plaintiffs recovery
by the value of the social insurance benefits.
We may now consider the effect of the receipt of social
insurance benefits, namely disability pensions,400 on recovery of
damages for loss of future earning opportunity. It becomes clear
that in most cases we are talking about substantial sums of
money, both as regards loss of future earnings and the amount of
the disability pension. Realistically, the jury awards damages
for loss of earning opportunity until the plaintiff would reach
the age sixty-five unless it concludes that he had a lower life
expectancy. At that age it assumes that he would retire. The
disability pension will continue until he reaches age sixty-five,
at which time he receives a retirement pension, which is irrele-
vant. Thus, if the plaintiff lost $100,000 in earnings until age
sixty-five (assume that this is the present worth figure) and
would have received pensions totalling $50,000 (also the present
4o0 This would include pensions paid to the survivors upon the death of the
wage-earner.
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worth figure), it would make quite a difference whether the
value of the pension was deducted.
From what we have said so far, it would seem that it should
be deducted. The plaintiff is not entitled to recover for loss of
future opportunity twice over. If he has lost $100,000 in earnings
that he otherwise would have had, and $50,000 of this is met by
a disability pension, it follows that all he needs to make him
whole is $50,000, and this is what he should recover from the
defendant. The problem, however, is that with respect to future
earning opportunity, we do not really "know" what he has lost.
When the jury says that he has lost $100,000, this represents a
relatively uneducated guess. It is at this point that we must
again take a realistic look at our system of awarding damages
for personal injuries. We feed a certain amount and a certain
kind of data into the machine, always concerned with how much
and what kind of data the machine can absorb. We introduce
evidence of the plaintiff's life expectancy, but he may live that
long or he may not, he may retire at sixty-five or he may retire
earlier or later. We introduce evidence of what the plaintiff
was making at the time of the injury and evidence calculated to
show what he might make in the future. We consider his
education, experience and so on. We also guess as to what the
dollar will be worth some years hence. When our lay jury
somehow arrives at this figure, it must reduce it to present
worth, with or without the aid of annuity or combined tables.
The process is as unscientific as it can be. The matter is further
compounded by the fact that the jury returns a general verdict,
which may or may not have been influenced by a number of
factors.40' Even if a special verdict were required as to each item
of damages as well as liability, the amount awarded for loss of
future earning opportunity would still represent a guess. From
a scientific standpoint, it cannot be said whether a verdict "over-
compensates" or "undercompensates." We cannot say that we
know whether we have adequately compensated the plaintiff for
what he has lost, because we have no way of scientifically
measuring his loss, or at least the method we employ is not that
of scientific measurement.
In view of this, the question becomes whether we should feed
401 See the discussion, supra, notes 19-22 and accompanying text,
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the additional data into the machine. There is no doubt that data
concerning the receipt of disability pensions is relevant to de-
termine the plaintiffs actual loss, but the fact that the data is rele-
vant does not mean that the machine can absorb it. The inability
of the machine to absorb data has been given as a justification
for refusing to permit the jury to consider the tax aspects of per-
sonal injury damages.402 It is one thing to award the plaintiff a
monthly sum, adjustable for a number of factors, and set the
monthly disability pension off against that sum. It is another to
award the plaintiff a lump sum representing, as best as we can
measure, the total loss of future earning opportunity, reduced
to present worth, and to set off against that sum the estimated
value of the disability pension. At this point the fact that the de-
fendant is legally responsible for the loss may become relevant.
If we purport to compensate the plaintiff for his actual loss, and
the process, because of its unscientific nature, necessarily creates
both a risk of overcompensation and undercompensation, it is
proper to take the risk of overcompensation so as to protect the
innocent plaintiff against the defendant who must bear respon-
sibility for the accident.
However, I would prefer to approach the question from a
different perspective, namely to consider the consequences of
running the risk of overcompensation as opposed to the conse-
quences of running the risk of undercompensation. To the extent
that the data concerning the receipt of the disability pensions
is fed into the machine, the risk of overcompensation is reduced.
If the receipt of such benefits may be considered, we may as-
sume that in the great run of cases, the amount of recovery will
be less. 403 Conversely, if the data may not be considered, the total
of all judgments in personal injury cases will be higher. The
consequences of higher personal injury judgments that will be
felt by defendants as a class can be distributed by insurance, or
in the case of the uninsured enterprise, by the cost of the enter-
prise's products or services. To the extent that recoveries are
greater, because not reduced by the receipt of social insurance
benefits, the cost of the insurance premiums or the cost of the
402 See note 32, supra.
403 While the jury may take a gestalt approach, it will still be influenced by
the data it receives. To the extent that it sees some of the loss as having been
met, it will see the total loss as less.
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enterprise's product will increase.40 4 Perhaps empirical data might
indicate that the savings would be so significant that it is in the
best interests of society to reduce recovery by the amount of
social insurance benefits. No such data has been produced, and
I would doubt that the savings among defendants as a class or
among a group of insureds or producers would be appreciable.
Today, when the loss is initially shifted to defendants as a class,
it will usually be distributed, and the impact on the particular
defendant ordinarily is insignificant. 5 In terms, then, of the con-
sequences that overcompensation will have upon defendants, the
risk of overcompensation is not of much concern.
On the other hand, plaintiffs in personal injury actions are not
loss distributors °.4 0 Where the plaintiff is undercompensated, he
must bear the full extent of such undercompensation, and the loss
to him is significant. Undercompensation does not have such an
effect on the defendant. For this reason, from the perspective of
consequences, the risk of overcompensation is to be preferred to
the risk of undercompensation. More importantly, when we are
dealing with social insurance benefits, undercompensation could
have undesirable social effects. The relationship between social
insurance benefits and tort recovery is more marked in the case
of lower income people, people whose income more closely ap-
proaches the subsistence level. The social insurance benefits are
more important for the individual earning $5,000 per year than
the one earning $20,000 per year, since the difference between
the social insurance benefits paid the former, even if they are to
some extent based on prior income, will not be a multiple of
four.4°7 As to the low income person, the proportion of the loss
met by social insurance will be much higher in proportion to the
total loss of future earning opportunity. If the jury miscalculates
his loss of future earning opportunity and makes the deduction
for the value of the social insurance benefit, there is the real risk
that he and his family will have barely enough money to meet
404 At some point, depending on the amount of the increase in costs, it may
be more economical for the enterprise to insure.4 0 5 See generally, F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, 2 THE LAW OF TORTS, § 13.4
(1956).
406 An individual plaintiff may have taken out first person insurance against
loss. But plaintiffs as a class cannot be considered as loss distributors.
407 Social security benefits, for example are adjusted in favor of low income
groups. See the discussion in ten Broek and Matson, The Disabled and the Law
of Welfare, 54 CAxaF. L. REv. 809, 819-20 (1966).
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their minimal needs. Not only will the plaintiff not have been in
as good a position as he would have been if the accident had not
occurred, but insufficient recovery may change the very nature of
his life and that of his family. Social insurance benefits, it must
be remembered, are designed to enable the plaintiff and his
family to exist at the subsistence level. Tort recovery is designed
to enable the plaintiff and his family to maintain the standard
of living they would have had if the accident had not occurred.
There is always the danger that the jury will miscalculate, and
if it does so, the plaintiff and his family will not enjoy that
standard. In the case of the low-income plaintiff, the result of the
miscalculation may mean that he and his family will have little
above the social insurance benefits, since they represent a sub-
stantial proportion of his total loss.
The risk of undercompensation, which will bear heavily on
the individual plaintiff, can not be justified in the absence of
evidence that to reduce the liability of defendants as a class by
allowing the jury to consider the receipt of social insurance will
have positive societal benefit. It is for this reason that I would
exclude such evidence from the jury's consideration. The process
of determining damages for loss of future earning opportunity
involves too much guesswork. To inject a new variable, designed
to reduce recovery, offers little promise of societal benefit and
greatly increases the risk of undercompensation, particularly
among those plaintiffs in the lower-income bracket, where sub-
sistence approaches earnings. It is sounder, therefore, to permit
cumulative recovery, thereby increasing the risk of overcompen-
sation. The consequences of overcompensation to defendants as
a class seems slight, particularly when it is considered that they
are not required to pay more than they would have had to pay
in the absence of social insurance benefits. The danger to plain-
tiffs as a class, and most importantly the individual plaintiff, by
the injection of social insurance into an already uncertain process
could be great. Therefore, it is more in the interest of society-
who, in the final analysis, may actually have to support the under-
compensated plaintiff and his family-if the jury has guessed
incorrectly-to increase the risk of overcompensation rather than
the risk of undercompensation. In the absence of a more scientific
method of compensation, the courts should not increase the risk
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of undercompensation, with its attendant consequences, by al-
lowing the jury to consider the receipt of social insurance benefits.
The question of loss allocation between the social insurance fund
and the tortfeasor is an entirely different question, the resolution
of which can only follow a change in our present method of
compensating accident victims.4 08 This is not the concern of the
court awarding damages in a personal injury case, and upon a
consideration of the consequences and risks, we have concluded
that it is better to permit cumulative recovery to the accident
victim.
(4) Social insurance and suits against the Government.
Finally, we may consider the effect of social insurance where
the defendant is the United States in a suit under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, and the social insurance has also been provided
by the United States.419 Since the United States is both the tort-
feasor and the source of the social insurance fund, the discussion
may help to focus on loss allocation. But again, this is loss alloca-
tion within the context of our present system of awarding com-
pensation for personal injuries. Also, the relationship between the
victim and the government will vary. In some cases the victim
will be a serviceman or federal employee, in others he will be a
veteran, while in some, he will simply be the recipient of a social
insurance benefit such as a social security disability pension.
Let us first consider the cases in which the question has arisen.
It is now well-settled that in a suit against the government by a
serviceman or a veteran injured while a patient at a govern-
ment hospital, payments under a serviceman's disability pen-
sion410 or a veteran's disability pension, whether for a service-
connected 41 1 or non-service-connected 412 disability, are to be de-
ducted from tort recovery for loss of future earning opportunity.
However, it has also been held that in a suit by an injured fed-
408 As we have pointed out, we are not at all optimistic about the likelihood
of such a change.
409 The question could also arise in a suit against a state that had abolished
sovereign immunity, where the state had provided social insurance benefits to
the plaintiff.
410 See United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949).
411 See Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965);
Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964).412 See United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952).
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eral employee, disability benefits under the Federal Civil Service
Retirement Act4 13 would not be considered.4 14 Likewise, in a
wrongful death action, benefits received by a widow as "mother's
insurance" under the Social Security Act415 did not affect re-
covery.4
16
Although the tort recovery and the social insurance come from
a single source, tort recovery is predicated on the negligence of
the government as any other tortfeasor while social insurance in-
volves the government in a different capacity. Moreover, the ethos
of social insurance in this country, as discussed previously,417
may make the court reluctant to treat the government as the sole
"source" of the benefit. This may explain the different treatment
of the serviceman and federal employee. In the case of the
servicemen, one of whom was killed and the other injured when
they were struck by a government vehicle while off duty,418 the
government as employer paid disability and death benefits.
Although the employee, as we have said, has "given up" some-
thing to get these benefits, 419 he did not make "contributions"
into a fund,420 as does the federal employee into the Federal Civil
Service Retirement Fund. In the case of the serviceman, the court
saw the government as employer meeting some of the loss caused
by the tort, and applied the principle of mitigation permitting
a deduction for the value of the benefits given to the victim by
the tortfeasor. Whereas, in the case of the federal employee, the
court concluded that the benefits under the Civil Service Retire-
ment Act were benefits from a collateral source. 421 It stressed the
participation of the employee in the fund and pointed out that
payments were based primarily upon salary and duration of
service. It saw the fund as analogous to a pension fund maintained
413 80 Stat. 572, 5 U.S.C. § 2257 (1966).
414 United States v. Price, 288 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1961).
41549 Stat. 623 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1964).
416 United States v. Harue Hayashi, 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960).
417 See the discussion, supra, notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
418 United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949).419 See the discussion of Sergeant Browning's case, supra, notes 136-148 and
accompanying text.
420 Note that recovery against the United States is not affected by the receipt
of National Service Life Insurance benefits, since such insurance is purchased by
the serviceman. United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1949).421 The court stated that it was applying Virginia law. As we have pointed
out, this is questionable where federal social insurance benefits are involved. See
the discussion, supra note 226.
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by a private employee with his and the employee's contribu-
tions.422 But, as we have pointed out, the employee's "contribu-
tions" to the fund are a substitute for social security taxes, which
the federal employee does not pay. And the serviceman's dis-
ability pension represents something for which he has "paid" by
taking less salary, even though he does not thereby "contribute"
to a special fund. In both cases the tortfeasor has met a part of
the loss by a disability pension. The serviceman "contributed" by
taking less salary; the contributions by the federal employee were
in lieu of social security taxes that other wage-earners had to pay.
Any "benefit" the government received, therefore, was offset by
the loss of tax revenue. It is difficult to justify the different
treatment in these cases.
Now let us consider the cases of the plaintiff injured while a
patient at a Veterans Administration Hospital. In one, the plaintiff
was receiving a disability pension not connected with the prior
service.423 In another, plaintiff had been receiving a pension for
tuberculosis, which had cleared up, and following the injury in the
hospital, he was given another disability pension.424 In the third,
he had been receiving a pension for a service-connected disabil-
ity, which was increased following his injury at the hospital.425
In all cases the value of the pension was deducted. It should be
noted that there is no jury in suits under the Federal Tort Claims
Act,426 so the difficulty of computation may be lessened. In any
event, Congress has decided to deal with this problem by legis-
lation. It is provided that where a veteran receives injuries at
a Veterans Administration Hospital, this is to be considered as a
service-connected disability with a correspondingly higher pen-
sion. It is further provided that if the veteran recovers against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, no benefits
are to be paid until the aggregate amount of benefits that would
have been paid equals the total amount of recovery in the tort
action.427 Presumably this means the amount of the judgment-
422 If this were so, then under traditional doctrine, the employer (here the
United States) should be credited with the percentage of the benefits represented
by his contributors. He has paid for that benefit, and his liability should be
reduced thereby.423 United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1952).
424 Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965).425 Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
426 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964).
42728 U.S.C. § 351 (1964).
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which would include damages for future medical expenses428
and pain and suffering. If the court, in addition, were to deduct
the value of the disability pension from the tort judgment, the
plaintiff would truly receive less compensation than that to which
he is entitled. When faced with the statute, a court concluded that
the statute merely authorized the Veterans Administration to
withhold benefits that were included in the tort recovery. 29 Under
this approach, if the court takes the pension into account in
determining tort recovery, the veteran would continue to re-
ceive it.
The statute does not cover the pension for a non-service
connected disability, but where the veteran has been receiving
such a pension, the administration may consider the tort recovery
in deciding whether to continue or grant the pension.410 It is clear
that Congress and the courts are unwilling to permit what they
consider to be double recovery against the United States in this
situation. This is certainly a proper result. The victim will be
compensated as fully as our system is capable of doing. He will
either receive compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act
with credit for the Veterans Administration disability pension
he receives, or payment will be withheld until the portion of
the judgment representing loss of future earning opportunity
equals the amount of the unpaid pensions 3' At that point the
pension payments will be resumed. In effect, the payment of the
pension continues, but the United States will not have to pay
the portion of the judgment met by such payments. As the sub-
sequent discussion will indicate, we believe it is sounder for the
adjustment to be made by the Veterans Administration rather
than the court, but in this area at least, the present practice
prevents double recovery against the United States for a single
loss.
In United States v. Harue Hayashi,432 when faced with the
question of "mother's insurance benefits," the court took a dif-
ferent approach. Suit was brought under the Federal Tort Claims
428 Which, as we have said, are recoverable against the United States. See
the discussion, supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.4 2 9 Christopher v. United States, 237 F.Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
430 Ashley v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis.2d 17, 119 N.W.d 359 (1963).
431 The court will specify the amount representing compensation for loss of
future earning opportit.
432 282 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1960).
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Act to recover for the wrongful death of the plaintif's husband.
Upon his death she received these benefits as provided in the
Social Security Act,433 which would continue until she reached
age sixty-two. It is not unsound to consider these benefits as a
substitute for the disability pension the husband would have re-
ceived if he had lived. The court held that the value of the
benefits would not be deducted, likening them to insurance bene-
fits paid from a special fund, observing that the fund was fed
by contributions from the decedent and his employer. Recovery
under the Federal Tort Claims Act would be from general rev-
enues. Since the funds were different, the court reasoned that the
"mother's insurance" benefits were payable from a collateral
source and would not affect the liability of the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Thus, the holdings of the different Courts of Appeals-no case
has been decided by the Supreme Court-as supplemented by
Congressional legislation, have produced the following results.
Benefits are deducted in the case of the serviceman and the recip-
ients of veterans' disability pensions. They are not deducted in
the case of federal employees covered by the Civil Service Re-
tirement Act and recipients of disability pensions under the
Social Security Act.
But it is clear that all cases involve the same basic ques-
tion, whether the liability of the United States as tortfeasor is
affected by the receipt of social insurance provided by the United
States. The benefits payable to injured servicemen and the depen-
dents of deceased servicemen are related to social security bene-
fits, and it is not possible to cumulate benefits under servicemen's
legislation and under the Social Security Act.434 While federal
employees "contribute" to the Civil Service Retirement Act, this
is in lieu of social security taxes. So, whether the plaintiff in the
tort action is a federal employee or not, the United States is
involved principally as social insurer. The benefits payable to
servicemen and federal employees serve the same function as
social insurance benefits payable to others. In all the cases, it is
sound to think of the United States in the role as tortfeasor and
social insurer.
433 49 Stat. 623 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1964).
434 See 64 Stat 512 (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 417 (1964).
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Disregarding the concept of collateral source or separate funds,
which would be irrelevant under the functional approach, the
question is what should be done when the tortfeasor has provided
social insurance benefits for the victim. This social insurance con-
forms to the ethos we have discussed, so the benefits bear some
relationship to the amount of taxes paid in, and in the case of
federal employees, we call the payments "contributions" and the
benefits "annuities." But this is all social insurance, and in theory
social insurance benefits are designed to provide minimum sub-
sistence. The government, as tortfeasor, on the other hand, is
required to make good the losses suffered by the victim in the
same manner as a private tortfeasor. Since the victim is to be
compensated for what he lost and only for that loss, it follows
ideally that any social insurance benefits which have met some
of the loss (notwithstanding that their purpose may have been
to provide subsistence, unrelated to the question of tort liability),
must be deducted from tort recovery.
We recognized the theoretical justification for such a rule
when discussing the effect of social insurance upon tort recovery
in the action against the private tortfeasor. We concluded, how-
ever, that under our system of awarding damages for personal
injuries, too great a risk is involved in allowing the jury to
consider the receipt of social insurance benefits as affecting
recovery for loss of future earning opportunity. To allow the jury
to consider the social insurance benefits increases the risk of
undercompensation, and the consequences of undercompensation
are more serious than those of overcompensation. It is better,
we say, to take the chance of overcompensation, which affects
defendants as a class, since this class can efficiently distribute the
loss. Our conscience is not troubled, because the defendant is
only required to pay what he would have had to pay in the
absence of the social insurance benefit and does not have to
"pay twice" for the same loss.
When the government is the tortfeasor, the public treasury
is required to bear the same loss twice, because the government
is at the same time the social insurer (note that we treat the
payment of benefits to servicemen and government employees as
the equivalent of social insurance). Social insurance benefits and
tort recovery came from the same source, the public treasury,
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and whether a particular fund has been set aside to meet certain
losses is irrelevant. Disregarding how or from whom the par-
ticular taxes may have been collected, the public is compensating
the victim for his loss. The unwillingness to subject the public
treasury to double payment is clearly reflected in the decisions
requiring a deduction of servicemen's and veteran's benefits and
in the congressional legislation dealing with tort recovery by per-
sons injured in a government hospital. In the cases involving
social security benefits and Civil Service Retirement benefits,
however, the court did not seem at all concerned by the effect
on the public treasury. Perhaps they were mesmerized by the
analogy to insurance or private pension plans. Or, they may have
been concerned about their ability to adjust the social insurance
benefits to the tort recovery in the context of a personal injury
action, notwithstanding the absence of a jury. Although the
court can "absorb" the data more readily than the jury, it is still
guessing when it is trying to measure loss of future earning op-
portunity. More significantly, it must make a series of predictions
when awardg damaiges in a lump sum, and these predictions
may turn out to be i ipcburate. Our system of awarding damages,
particularly as regards loss of future earning opportunity, is
simply not very efficient, and to consider the receipt of social
insurance benefits, operates to increase the risk of undercompen-
sation, with its possible disastrous consequences for the individual
plaintiff.
Therefore, although I agree that the public treasury should not
have to bear the same loss twice, I question the soundness of
making the allocation between tort recovery and social insurance
in the context of personal injury litigation. We have discussed
the effort of Congress to prevent double recovery by victims of
accidents in Veterans Administration hospitals. When faced with
this statute, the court interpreted it as a direction to the social
insurance fund to withhold the benefits only if their value was not
deducted in the tort action. The court claimed that it still had the
responsibility to determine what was "just compensation" and
proceeded to deduct the value of the benefits.43 5 This procedure
is very questionable, and I doubt if this is what Congress intended.
It seems more likely that Congress wanted the court to award
435 Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
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damages without consideration of the disability pension, in ac-
cordance with the traditional rules of damages, and then wanted
the Veterans Administration to see to it that the United States
was not to be subject to double recovery.
Certainly, such an approach is more realistic. Our method of
awarding compensation in personal injury action does not lend
itself to measuring efficiently the receipt of social insurance
benefits against tort recovery, and this is only slightly less so when
the court is making the necessary guesses. To reduce tort re-
covery by the receipt of such benefits is to increase the risk of
undercompensation. Where the tortfeasor is the government, it
makes no difference to the public treasury whether the adjust-
ments necessary to prevent double recovery are made by the
social insurance fund or by the courts. And it makes more sense
to have the social insurance administrator do so than the judge.
I think this is what Congress intended when it tried to prevent
double recovery by a plaintiff injured in a Veteran's Administra-
tion hospital. This can also be done in the case of a veteran
who was receiving a pension for a non-service-connected dis-
ability at the time he was injured by the government, since the
administrator can take the tort recovery into account in deter-
mining whether the veteran needs the pension.8 6 It is interesting
to note that while a social security disability pension is reduced
by any amounts received from workmen's compensation, 4 7 and a
pension under the Federal Civil Service Retirement Act is re-
duced by amounts paid under the Federal Employees Compen-
sation Act,438 no provision is made for a reduction because of
recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Perhaps this will
also be done, and Congress could at that time make a decision
whether benefits should be affected because of recovery from
third party tortfeasors.
It is, therefore, our conclusion that in a suit against the United
States under the Federal Tort Claims Act the court should not
deduct the value of social insurance benefits from the amount
of tort recovery. In the case of the private torifeasor we justified
the solution on the grounds that (1) to do so increases the risk
of undercompensation, whereas the risk of overcompensation is
430 Ashley v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis.2d 17, 119 N.W.2d 359 (1963).
43742 U.S.C. § 424a (Supp. I, 1964).
4385 U.S.C. § 8337 (f)(g) (1966).
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to be preferred to that of undercompensation, and (2) in any
event, the tortfeasor is not required to meet the same loss twice.
In the case of a suit against the United States we justify the solu-
tion on the ground that the social insurance fund can make the
necessary adjustments to prevent double recovery more efficiently
than the courts. Apart from the difficulty of accurately measuring
loss of future earning opportunity in the context of adversary
proceedings, the social insurance administrator has the benefit
of hindsight, which the court does not. If this method is followed,
both the objectives of tort recovery and social insurance will be
satisfied. Tort recovery is designed to compensate the victim
for his loss as best as it can be measured under our system.
Social insurance is designed to provide minimum subsistence for
victims of misfortune. So long as tort recovery is accomplishing
its purpose, it swallows up the necessity for social insurance.
Once the victim is awarded tort recovery, social insurance bene-
fits can be discontinued, so they should be ignored by the court
in ascertaining loss. If, because of the difficulties inherent in the
system, tort recovery has failed, social insurance can step in and
fill the void with subsistence payments.
The same principle is applicable in the case of the private
tortfeasor. As we have said, the question is not whether the loss
or a portion of it should be met by social insurance or tort liability.
Rather it is what should be done in the context of our present
system of dealing with accident victims. Our society recognized
both social insurance and tort liability as methods of dealing
with the harm caused by accidents. In the light of the way our
system of tort recovery operates, it is more efficient to discount
social insurance benefits in the tort action. If the victim is not
to have his loss met twice over, pragmatic considerations dictate
that, perhaps by default, the savings go to the social insurance
fund rather than to the government. And where the victim clearly
should not have his loss met twice over, as where the United
States is the tortfeasor, the same pragmatic considerations dictate
that the necessary adjustment be made by the social insurance
fund rather than by the court in the tort action. We, therefore,
conclude that in all cases the receipt of social insurance benefits
should not be considered in determining loss of future earning
opportunity.
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D. A Comparison.
It will be seen that the functional approach will produce
relatively little change in the matter of damages for loss of earn-
ing opportunity. Where the plaintiff has received his salary during
the period of disability either because of sick leave benefits or
because of the nature of his employment or as a true gratuity, we
would allow him to recover the value of his lost time from the
defendant without any consideration of this fact. He has either
"paid" for this benefit, the amount of which we cannot measure,
and therefore, cannot estimate its value to him, or he recovers the
value of the gratuity on behalf of his employer, and they are
left to adjust matters. His recovery also would not be affected
by the receipt of disability pensions from his employer or by
accident insurance. Again he has "paid" for the disability pension,
which forms part of his total compensation picture. Since this
amount cannot be measured, the true value of the pension is not
known, and it cannot be deducted. As to the insurance, here we
would not limit recovery to the cost of the premiums because of
society's attitude toward such insurance, i.e., that a person cannot
have too much protection against loss of income. We would permit
recovery for lost earnings during the period of disability to be
affected by the receipt of unemployment compensation or some
other form of public assistance. Likewise, we would allow the
jury to consider the receipt of unemployment compensation to
determine the value of the lost time of an unemployed person.
In these two situations, therefore, we would reach a different
result than that required by the collateral source rule. In most
states the employer who has paid workmen's compensation or
his insurer, subrogates to the claim of the employee against the
third party tortfeasor or is entitled to reimbursement from the
employee. In the states where this is not so, a legislative intention
to permit the employee to have cumulative recovery may be
inferred, if not expressly provided.
With respect to recovery of damages for loss of future earning
opportunity, we would exclude evidence of the receipt of social
insurance benefits. This is not because such evidence is not
relevant to measure actual loss. It is because our system of award-
ing damages for personal injuries, as presently constituted, cannot
absorb this data. To permit its consideration would markedly
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increase the risk of undercompensation, and in light of the re-
sultant consequences, we conclude that the risk of overcompen-
sation is to be preferred to the risk of undercompensation. This
factor would be excluded from the personal injury award, and
any adjustment should be made by the social insurance fund.
This is in accord with the result reached under the collateral
source rule, although the reasoning is quite different. We would
go further than is required under the collateral source rule and
take the same approach to all social insurance benefits where the
United States is a defendant under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
We would exclude the social insurance benefits from the personal
injury action, and allow the adjustment necessary to prevent
double recovery from the same source to be made by the social
insurance fund. Our reason is that the social insurance fund is
better equipped to make the judgment, with the benefit of hind-
sight, than the court which must make it in the context of esti-
mating damages for prospective loss.
CONCLUSION
We have traveled far afield in our attempt to come up with a
solution to the problem of collateral source benefits. Our law of
personal injury damages grew up at a time when tort recovery
was the only method of obtaining compensation for an accident
and the law reflected the values of the time. When societal values
changed and benefits from other sources became available to the
accident victim, the court dealt with the problem in terms of an
all-embracing rule, reflecting the attitudes of a time when such
benefits were considered "charity" and the defendant in a tort
action was considered a "wrongdoer." The rationale of the
rule does not accord with our present day attitudes toward com-
pensation and allocation of losses, and its application adds an
air of unreality to the already unscientific process of tort recovery.
It is for this reason that we must analyze the matter of col-
lateral source benefits carefully and consider the relationship that
the receipt of such benefits should bear to tort recovery. We must
do so, however, in the context of our present system of awarding
compensation. We still look toward tort recovery as the primary
method of compensating the accident victim for the loss he suf-
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fered, and we measure the loss by rather unscientific means.
This being so, there are necessarily limitations on how we can
allocate loss between tort recovery and collateral sources. Within
the framework of this system, then, we have tried to propose a
solution. Under this solution, the receipt of collateral source bene-
fits frequently will not reduce recovery. But this is justified not
in terms of a rule, but by considerations of practicality and eco-
nomic and social policy. I call this solution the functional ap-
proach. If courts will come to deal with the problem of collateral
source benefits and tort recovery in this way, the collateral source
rule will be rendered irrelevant as a product of a by-gone era.
